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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the political reformation of “faction” in the political 
thought of Montesquieu, David Hume, and Edmund Burke, three thinkers whose 
works span what Pierre Manent calls “an exquisite moment of liberalism.”  It 
examines the transformation of faction from one based largely on class to one based 
largely on political function and argues that as the political emphasis of “party” 
overtook that of class, a disconnect in constitutional theory appeared between the 
principles formerly associated with class, such as honor, and the principles now 
associated with parties.  This disconnect is examined by focusing on the interrelated 
concepts of political principle, or that which motivates and regulates men, and faction, 
itself divided into two types, principled and singular.   
This thesis further considers the role of political principle to faction in each 
thinker’s thought in order to demonstrate how limited domestic political conflict 
could sustain itself via a party system.  Each thinker recognized that limited political 
conflict did not weaken the state but rather strengthened it, if engendered by 
“principled faction” cognizant of a nominal sovereign.  Accordingly, it is argued that 
a similar understanding of “principled faction,” though focused largely on aristocratic 
ideas of prejudice, self-interest, and inequality, better promoted political liberty within 
the state and contributed to a greater acceptance of party in political thought.    
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1  §  Getting the Party Started 
 
 
 
 
Party is an imperfect expedient, accepted only because superior to 
arrangements which are even less perfect.1 
 
 
 
The eighteenth century was rather schizophrenic about party.  When liberty 
seemed secured by its continued presence, a presence owing more to circumstance 
than organized intention, government learned to tolerate it.  This was something 
unique; for though party had always existed in practice, it had not always been 
tolerated.  Yet, toleration was not a full-blown promotion of party, nor really an 
acceptance of it.  Party continued to lack a theoretical foundation upon which its 
continued presence could be justified.  As it was tolerated, however, eighteenth-
century thinkers would come to formulate ways in which it could be made 
respectable, and respectable is at least one step above tolerated.    
The fact that parties are respected to some extent today is truly a remarkable 
thing.  Put into its proper perspective, as Harvey Mansfield remarks in Statesmanship 
and Party Government, it is the respectability, not the existence, of party government 
that is surprising today.2  The idea of party is not a complicated philosophical one; 
this is perhaps one reason why it does not have an intellectual tradition like other 
concepts such as liberty or justice, or even more politically specific concepts such as 
                                                
1 J.A.W. Gunn, Factions No More: Attitudes to Party Government and Opposition in Eighteenth 
Century England (London: Frank Cass, 1971), 30. 
2 Harvey Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1965), 2.  Hereafter cited as Statesmanship. 
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representation or the separation of powers.  Due to the simple fact that party derives 
from political experience, practice has always preceded the philosophy of it.  Party 
does not need philosophical justification for it to exist – indeed, the absence of party 
can only exist theoretically – in order to make party respectable, however, its does.     
Parties were not generally accepted on their own terms in early eighteenth-
century English politics.  They had to assert that their presence was necessary in order 
to maintain the constitution.  Nancy Rosenblum states in her most recent work, On the 
Side of the Angels, that,  “before parties were accepted, only the claim to be a great 
party – a party of high principle or constitutional necessity – could justify 
divisiveness, and then only as a prelude to putting an end to partisanship.”3  Such 
constitutional necessities paved the way for the development of party.  B.W. Hill has 
noted: 
Few politicians in 1689 could have anticipated that their actions would 
result eventually in the domination of Parliament by the party system; 
yet already in their time the burning questions which centered upon 
religion, the succession to the throne, and the position in society of an 
increasingly important monied community, all made for a cleavage as 
wide as any known the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.4 
 
Parties would come to be accepted on their own terms by the end of the eighteenth 
century, and while it is tempting to ask how this came to be there is, unfortunately, no 
simple answer.  J.A.W. Gunn’s seminal work, Factions No More goes a long way 
towards answering this question, but even that study remains focused on, and thus 
limited to, the journal and pamphlet wars of the day.  B.W. Hill’s two-part study on 
parliamentary parties from 1689 to 1832 is perhaps the most complete study on party, 
though it cannot tell the reader much in the way of the political thought that arose 
from the experience of party.  Both remain aspects of a more complete answer.   
                                                
3 Nancy L. Rosenblum, On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 135. 
4 B.W. Hill, The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742 (Archon Books, Hamden, CT: 1976), 25. 
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A shift in political thinking upon party, however, cannot be denied.  Though 
the process by which it came about can be debated, the end result is clear: party, and 
hence party politics, became an accepted, and in many ways respectable, attribute of 
representative government.  The problem remains that party and principle have not 
been thoroughly examined together as an alternative to the acceptance of party.  
Examining party alone without the fundamental and binding force that keeps party 
together and within political bounds is only offering part of a solution.  Taking this as 
a given, and recognizing it can only attempt to be one aspect of a larger answer, this 
thesis will seek to answer the question: how did Montesquieu, David Hume, and 
Edmund Burke contribute to the acceptance of party in political thought?   
Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke all had unique solutions to slow the inevitable 
political decline of a state that one finds prevalent in classical political thought.5  
What makes them compatible for this thesis are the similar solutions they presented 
that involved a shared understanding of political principle and faction, inclusive of 
self-interest.  In looking at the development of the idea of self-interest as it relates to 
party and party members, encompassing both motivation and regulation, this thesis 
will show that a new understanding of self-interest, previously politically allied with 
that of class, emerged among political parties.  
Despite the fact that none of the three thinkers were English, they were all 
greatly influenced by the development of eighteenth-century English politics, 
especially that of party.  Each thinker would come to interpret this development in 
their own way, in the process flagging larger issues that make their thought much 
more diverse than one can find, for instance, in the pamphlet wars of the day.  All 
                                                
5 Cf. Plato, Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14.609a, 364.; 
Aristotle, The Politics, Book V; Polybius 6.10.3-4; Cicero, On the Commonwealth I, lxiv.  
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told, their thought would help support the events of eighteenth-century English, 
American, and French politics that have informed our modern understanding of party.   
Though each helped make party respectable, the point should not be oversold.  
They could not have fully pronounced a “dialectic of party conflict as progressive” as 
it is understood today, though this thesis will argue that they contributed to it.6  That 
parties check and moderate one another for the public benefit is roughly the extent to 
which their thought can be stretched.  Though their thought anticipates parties that 
complement and correct one another, it falls short of a coherent political theory 
detailing how they would do so.  Caroline Robbins goes so far as to claim that, “the 
simplest division might be between those in and those out of office, though no one 
discussed the virtue or the reverse of a two-party system.  There were many more than 
two and they were not systematic.”7  This does not mean, however, that their thought 
is not relevant to us today, as Robbins seems to imply, but quite the opposite.  “The 
early [post-Revolution] party alignment differed from the twentieth century party 
system in many ways,” B.W. Hill writes, “yet to deny that there was any kind of 
system at all, on the grounds that later developments were not present, would be no 
more useful than to deny that cricket matches were played in the early eighteenth 
century because the bats looked like clubs and defended wickets consisting of only 
two stumps.”8  If eighteenth-century party, “tended to lack an identifiable leadership 
and a recognised corpus of policy and principle around which to cohere,” it was still 
not too different from modern party, Jeremy Black remarks, which though different in 
size and scope, is neither monolithic in organization nor in policy.9  Despite vast 
                                                
6 Cf. Rosenblum, 139. 
7 Caroline Robbins, “‘Discordant Parties’: A Study of the Acceptance of Party by Englishmen,” 
Political Science Quarterly 73, no. 4 (Dec., 1958), 520-21. 
8 Hill, The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742, 23. 
9 Jeremy Black, The Politics of Britain, 1688-1800 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 
92. 
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differences between their time and ours, Gunn notes, “an enquiry into eighteenth-
century attitudes towards parties can still cast light on the difficult business of 
sustaining limited social conflict.”10  A part of the “how so?” to this claim – the 
“virtue” of the party system that Robbins claims was missing – can be found in the 
political thought of Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke.   
Today, such an endeavor speaks to statesmen and citizens alike for, unlike 
three centuries earlier, party (though not to say party politics) would not exist today 
without the citizen.  Reexamining eighteenth-century political thought on party and 
principle speaks to larger issues raised by scholars of political thought, such as 
antipartyism, representative democracy, sovereignty, traditions of political principle, 
and constitutionalism.11  These issues continue to speak to us today in a time when 
parties are still not completely respected, or respectable.  It is indeed ironic that party 
government is pervasive, yet party continues to have a bad name in the twenty-first 
century, just as it did three hundred years ago.  Certainly, to be cynical about party 
was, and remains, easier than being constructive of it.  “Lamenting the defects of 
party, emphasizing their inevitability, and cautioning that their activities must be 
rendered as moderate as possible,” Gunn writes, “need not involve anything more 
than a cynicism about politicians and parties which is probably as characteristic of our 
own day as it was of the eighteenth century.”12  Terms such as “partisan,” “party 
man,” “political,” or “politician” still carry with them connotations that are typically 
demeaning.  Party “principle” is castigated as nothing more than party discipline, not 
                                                
10 Gunn, xi. 
11 See for example Mansfield, Gunn, and Rosenblum cited above; Bernard Manin, The principles of 
representative government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Sharon Krause, 
Liberalism With Honor, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); J.G.A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient 
and Modern (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1975); Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984); David Runciman, Political Hypocrisy: the mask of power from Hobbes to 
Orwell and beyond (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
12 Gunn, 27. 
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a set of intrinsic values shared by party members.  So, why are parties so disliked?  
Simply put, parties are divisive.  Parties are accused of breaking apart the “whole” of 
the body politic that would exist were it not for their presence.  Their divisiveness is, 
so the argument goes, fatal to the state.  But is it as simple as this? 
By highlighting a duality that existed in political thought upon faction, 
“principled” and “singular,” this thesis demonstrates that all three thinkers maintained 
a dual understanding of faction, at times praiseworthy and at times highly critical.  As 
they did so, the question must be asked, what (for them) differentiated the two?  By 
concentrating on political principle as a fundamental aspect of party, rather than on 
party alone, each thinker, this thesis argues, helped to fend off anti-party sentiment in 
the eighteenth century and make party more respectable, elevating the debate and 
making it more significant to constitutional government.  As the former loses steam to 
anti-party arguments as well as antipathy towards party today, the importance of party 
to constitutional government is increasingly forgotten.13  A brief look back might help 
remind us of the danger of forgetting.   
From here the introduction proceeds in four parts.  First, the method used in 
this thesis to examine the thought of each thinker concerning party and principle will 
be laid out.  Following that, the terms that ground this thesis, principle and faction, 
will be examined.  It will then expose the relationship that both have with the 
constitution in more theoretical terms before reviewing how both were understood in 
the context of eighteenth-century politics, including the debates on corruption and 
luxury.  The third part will put the thinkers back in the context of the debates on 
faction and principle that brought them together, both in theory and in practice.  The 
former (party in theory) will take a brief look at the history of mixed regime and 
                                                
13 On the state of contemporary political theory and the idea of party see Rosenblum, chs. 4 and 6. 
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separation of power theories while the latter (party in practice) will look at the 
historical acceptance of party in English politics.  The final part will take a look at 
two particular influences upon the debates concerning faction and principle, namely 
Bolingbroke and Mandeville, in order to better situate the thinkers of this thesis and 
highlight a concept that will be examined in greater detail in the conclusion.   
 
Method 
According to Quentin Skinner the, “only history to be written is thus a history 
of the various statements made with the given expression.”14  To understand each 
expression one must interpret and separate each context.  On this Leo Strauss writes, 
“an adequate interpretation is such an interpretation as understands the thought of a 
philosopher exactly as he understood it himself.”15  R.G. Collingwood, however, is 
perhaps the most straightforward on this topic.  He writes, “to know someone else’s 
activity of thinking is possible only on the assumption that this same activity can be 
re-enacted in one’s own mind.  In that sense, to know ‘what someone was thinking’ 
(or, ‘has thought’) involves thinking it for oneself.”16  An impossible task, but a noble 
endeavor, this thesis attempts that last step: a myriad of thought processes from each 
thinker, attempting to know “what someone was thinking.”   
Historical thought, according to Collingwood, “‘is a river into which none can 
step twice’; historians, even in their own lifetime, find the questions keep changing 
and so, therefore, do the answers they give.”17  He insisted that this relativism was not 
skeptical, however, it merely added another branch of history to the typology: namely 
                                                
14 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory, Vol. 8, 
No. 1 (1969), 39. 
15 Strauss, “Political Philosophy and History,” Journal of the History of Ideas 10 (Jan. 1949), 39. 
16 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, ed. J. van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 288. 
17 Christopher Parker, The English Idea of History from Coleridge to Collingwood (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2000), 204. 
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the history of history itself.  All the same, the historian’s conception of history had to 
have historical truth, not just aesthetic appeal.  Historical interpretation had to be 
localized in space and time and consistent with history in general, not just with itself.  
In effect, the historian’s interpretation of history has to be true to all the evidence 
available at the time.  Such an interpretation this thesis aims to be.   
Strauss maintained that we are today the heirs of a tradition which has 
transformed elementary ideas, ideas which were nothing more than pure primary 
impressions, into “mere implications and tacit presuppositions” from what they once 
were.18  From Strauss’s perspective political philosophy, “does not exist anymore, 
except as a matter for burial, i.e., for historical research, or else as a theme of weak 
and unconvincing protestations.”19  In effect, Strauss seeks to resurrect what has been 
buried.  And, in order to do this, philosophy needs history.  Hence, the purpose of the 
history of political ideas for Strauss is to reclaim the prominence of political ideas and 
to actualize their implications.20   
Similar to Collingwood’s “scissor-and-paste” historian, the historicists that 
were Strauss’s target limit their interpretation of political history to historical 
responses or reactions of the “first-level,” by limiting their object of analysis to 
evident historical situations and not accepting a dynamic character who is, or could 
be, responding to a number of different events or situations, or even adapting prior 
thought to present conditions.  For example, Strauss points out that past thinkers 
thought in terms of universal ideas, but that in application they could have been aware 
of the dynamic shift necessary for “universal” ideas to be applied to their current time.  
Historicism does not allow for this and misinterprets political thinkers: “by proving 
                                                
18 Strauss, “Political Philosophy and History,” 47. 
19 Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?,” The Journal of Politics (Vol. 19, Aug. 1957), 346. 
20 “This means that the clarification of our political ideas insensibly changes into and becomes 
indistinguishable from the history of political ideas.”  Strauss, “Political Philosophy and History,” 47. 
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that their political teaching as a whole is ‘historically conditioned,’ we do not at all 
prove that their political philosophy proper is ‘historically conditioned.’”21  The 
relativism inherent in the “history of history” was meaningless since it denied the 
existence of a tradition of political thought.  This is where historicism defeated 
philosophy, Strauss claims.  He distinguishes between philosophic thought, which is 
universal, and historical thought, which is individual.  The two ask fundamentally 
different questions.22  
Strauss wanted to learn from the thinkers of the past, however, and not strictly 
about them, as historicism seeks to do.23   This thesis will likewise seek to learn from 
the thinkers of the past, and not simply about them, in order to better understand the 
ideas of principle and faction as we have inherited them today.  Strauss believed that 
the plethora of possible interpretations in “understanding the thinker of the past 
exactly as he understood himself” leaves the historicist method to fall flat on its face: 
one cannot understand the author better than he understood himself, a caution which 
this thesis takes seriously.  Interestingly however, Strauss does not suggest how to 
remedy this.  He vaguely suggests that, “there is only one way of understanding [the 
author] as he understood himself.”24  Yet, Strauss, retaining the mystery of his 
method, does not elaborate as to what this one way of understanding the author might 
                                                
21 Ibid., 37. 
22 Ibid., 30. 
23 Ibid., 42. 
24 Ibid., 41.  “Strauss contended that all great philosophers have dispensed both ‘esoteric’ (secret) and 
‘exoteric’ (ostensible) doctrines, communicating the ‘truth’ to the wise few ‘between the lines’ of their 
books, and teaching ‘noble lies’ to the many through their actually printed words.”  The authors, of 
course, did this in order to save themselves from persecution.  This makes Strauss himself extremely 
hard to interpret since one remains perplexed as to his actual intention.  On Strauss see, James M. 
Rhodes, “Philosophy, Revelation, and Political Theory: Leo Strauss and Eric Vogelin,” The Journal of 
Politics 49 (Nov. 1987): 1037; and, for a more cogent account see John G. Gunnell, “The Myth of the 
Tradition,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), 122-134. 
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be.  As a result, Strauss can only take one so far, unless one were to buy into his 
system of thought entirely.25  
This thesis does not seek to resurrect universal ideals, as Strauss would have 
us do, but comes closer to Collingwood’s understanding of the purpose of historical 
study, a less intentional endeavor for Collingwood than for Strauss.  Collingwood 
believed that the historian has a purpose in studying history, though its purpose is 
nothing like the resurrection of classical political philosophy.  Rather, Collingwood 
sought to establish a philosophy for the discipline of history that borrows from the 
principles of scientific method but that is nonetheless distinct from it.  He focused 
within the discipline of philosophy, attempting to demonstrate that, “traditional 
philosophies [can] carry with them the implication that historical knowledge is 
possible,” and that, “whereas the right way of investigating nature is by methods 
called scientific, the right way of investigating mind is by methods of history.”26   
Collingwood’s method of historical study is a reaction to what he calls 
“scissors-and paste-history,” a “pasting together of passages from ‘authorities’ as 
opposed to the proper critical and creative use of sources.”27  This is the type of 
history that claims history as a body of connected and coherent facts, not a jumble of 
incoherent problems, which, in truth, history is.  Collingwood sought to understand 
the thought contained in historical action, which he interpreted as the unity of the 
inside (thought) and the outside (actions) of an event.28  The historian is investigating 
the historical action, and is therefore concerned with both the inside and the outside 
event, however the object to be discovered in history, according to Collingwood, “is 
                                                
25 On this see Anne Norton, Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004). 
26 Collingwood, 209. 
27 Parker, 204. 
28 Ibid., 213. 
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not the mere event, but the thought expressed in it.”29  Hence, the historian is only 
concerned with the events that are outward expressions of thought, and only so much 
as these are expressions of thoughts.30 
Collingwood acknowledged that there is an absurdity in the historian 
completely understanding the context of an historical thinker’s thought.  Though 
Collingwood believed that the historian should employ similar contexts to extrapolate 
what he can from historical thought, unlike Strauss he did not believe that there 
existed a universality or tradition in the history of thought.31  He observed, 
nonetheless, that thought can sustain its identity.32  Historical knowledge can only 
spring from that which can be experienced, or that which can be re-enacted in the 
historian’s mind.  Therefore, an historical act must be contained in a similar context, 
similar enough to promote historical understanding to what a historian has already 
experienced.  In a similar vein, Strauss believed that elements of every political 
situation will relate to other political situations, for, “how else,” he asks, “could one 
intelligibly call all these different political situations ‘political situations’”?33   
Collingwood believed in the value of the classics’ thought, but was well aware 
of their limits, which stands in contrast to Strauss who contended that pre-historical 
thinkers were aware of the “essence of political things,” i.e., of universal ideas such as 
the best political order.  They were also aware of the practicality of application of 
such universal ideas to their present times and conditions.  As stated above, modern 
contextual history does not allow for this since it frames the thinker’s thought into 
delimited realms of possible thinking, making universal ideas no longer valid, “in 
                                                
29 Ibid., 214. 
30 Ibid., 217. 
31 “The Republic of Plato is an account, not of the unchanging ideal of political life, but of the Greek 
ideal as Plato received it and re-interpreted it.  The Ethics of Aristotle describes not an eternal morality 
but the morality of the Greek gentleman.” Collingwood, 229. 
32 Collingwood, 300. 
33 Strauss, “Political Philosophy and History,” 38. 
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short, the truism that all political action is concerned with, and therefore presupposes 
appropriate knowledge of, individual situations, and so on, is wholly irrelevant to the 
question raised by historicism,” Strauss writes.34  Political philosophy, once 
concerned with universal ideas, now has a derivative character of what were once 
simple and primary issues.  By contextualizing all historical thought, modern political 
philosophy has removed itself from the original phenomena of political things. 
This thesis attempts to balance the above positions and seeks to appropriately 
identify context without allowing the focus on that context to override the common 
ground that can be found among different historical situations.  It attempts to be as 
objective as possible in placing the authors in their appropriate contexts, as well as in 
extracting from those contexts the appropriate actions and intentions.  By considering 
each thinker in his context, the ideas are not put above the authors themselves.  It also 
maintains that there is no history of an idea absent of those who thought upon it.  In 
other words, the ideas of principle and faction are not “universal”; they cannot exist 
independently of a thinker, as an idea floating in the ether.  Rather, history should be 
focused on the various agents who used the idea, and on the varying situations and 
intentions in which it is used. 
The thesis does not attempt to credit writers for anticipating thought, and 
where it is claimed an author is “trying” to articulate an idea, it is usually in reference 
to an intention known from another source.  Likewise, a theorist’s intention cannot be 
discounted in order to maintain coherence, as sometimes a contradiction actually is a 
contradiction.  Nonetheless, one cannot assume that contradictions are deliberate (i.e., 
writing in code) and so this thesis does not attempt to read “between the lines.”35  
Like Skinner, this thesis maintains that it is not necessary to decode texts if something 
                                                
34 Ibid., 35. 
35 Cf. Strauss, Art and the Persecution of Writing (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952); Skinner, 21-22. 
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is oblique.  Rather, the voluntary strategies adopted by the authors to convey their 
meaning with deliberate obliqueness needs to be understood.  In this way it seeks to 
demonstrate that history has a natural ambiguity.36   
Reflecting on Strauss’s point above, it can be assumed that political 
philosophers of different times and places will consider the same political ideas, such 
as citizenship, even though the end political ideals, such as the state or the polis, may 
take different forms due to contextual limitations.  Hence, one could deduce that 
political thinkers compose their political ideas with similar ideals, ideals which are 
similar enough to be understood in historical reflection.  The end ideas may be 
sufficiently different as not to be “universal” as such, but the constituent parts that 
compose such lofty (in that they seek to be universal) ideas, such as civilization, 
freedom, liberty, sovereignty, duty, honor, etc., can be understood by one historical 
thinker to the next, regardless of context.  It is this limited understanding of shared 
ideas, limited by contextual differences but shared in the similarity of their 
abstraction, that maintains the continuity from one thinker to the next in this thesis. 
There are many issues which simply did not pertain to the authors considered 
in this thesis that are relevant to us today, and so no thinker will be criticized for not 
considering an issue that did not pertain to him, such as race or gender equality.  
Though there is merit in better understanding the ideas of principle and faction as they 
are understood today, this thesis is principally concerned with understanding the 
meaning of the terms as understood by each thinker.  Indeed, this is Skinner’s 
“mythology of prolepsis” which occurs when the historian is more interested in the 
retrospective significance of a given historical work or action than in its meaning for 
the agent himself.  Neither Montesquieu, Hume, nor Burke could have anticipated the 
                                                
36 Skinner, 36. 
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party system that exists today, and it would be preposterous to assume otherwise.  
This thesis cannot, however, adopt all that Skinner has to offer in terms of 
methodological criticism.  To do so would not only be impossible and somewhat 
redundant, but boring.  Or, as Joseph Femia puts it, it, “would reduce the history of 
thought to little more than a sterile celebration of intellectual pedigree.”37   
The methodology of this thesis does not assume that it can know the past 
completely, or know the past completely as it understood itself.  If this were to be 
done, the object (the past) would be incorporated into the subject (the present) 
meaning that we only need to understand the present in order to understand the past.  
It will not assume that the present is superior to the past, a fault which limits the 
historian from understanding the past in itself. 
The concepts of principle and faction themselves are hollow, unless 
understood as part of a much larger network of each thinker’s political thought, 
though it is not intended to be a commentary on their collected works, or even a 
commentary on a single work of each thinker as a whole.  This thesis will be a partial 
account of each thinker’s thought upon the constitutional ideas of principle and 
faction.  Having said that, this thesis cannot be an intellectual history of the ideas 
themselves, but will seek to examine the intersections of thought that can be found 
upon such ideas.  One advantage of treating the ideas of principle and faction in such 
narrow terms, especially with thinkers whose philosophy spans such large areas of 
thought, is the depth of understanding that can come from examining concepts as part 
of a system, rather than examining a system consisting of concepts.  In highlighting 
individual ideas more clarity will be given to the ideas themselves, if not to the 
                                                
37 Joseph V. Femia, “An historicist critique of ‘revisionist’ methods for studying the history of ideas,” 
in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 158. 
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system overall.  This comes, of course, at the risk of giving too much importance to 
insignificant details. 
Understanding each idea in the full context of each thinker’s writings is a 
limited endeavor and comes complete with its own drawbacks, the most obvious 
being the irrelevance of making a minute point upon a few ideas and abstracting them 
from an overall system of thought.   That said, it will attempt to avoid what Strauss 
calls, “scientific concern with political facts,” which requires isolation that could to 
lead to misleading or irrelevant results.  It will attempt to, “see the phenomena in 
question within the whole to which they belong.”38  To further avoid this, if indeed it 
is possible to do so when examining overlapping concepts among thinkers, each 
chapter has its own approach.  Rather than structuring each chapter by identical 
formats, the differing ideas of each thinker have been allowed to compose the 
narrative of the respective chapters.  Accordingly, the direction of each chapter is 
slightly different from the others.  The Montesquieu chapter, for instance, focuses 
more upon institutional factions that stem from mixed regime or separation of power 
theories, whereas both the Hume and Burke chapters focus more upon parties whose 
differences are represented in the legislative branch.  The latter two chapters also 
conclude upon a similar topic, legitimate resistance.  They all nonetheless overlap in 
their treatment of the ideas of principle and faction. 
 
Principle and Faction 
Lord Bolingbroke gave perhaps the most precise definition one can give for 
such a vague and elusive thing as a “constitution.”  It is, he wrote, “that assemblage of 
laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, 
                                                
38 Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?,” 353. 
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directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that compose the general system, 
according to which the community hath agreed to be governed.”39  So notably against 
party, Bolingbroke is not surprisingly silent on the topic of faction and the political 
principles that might motivate them, yet his definition remains full of assumptions 
upon them.  For instance, how do the “institutions” interact?  Are they complementary 
or designed to check one another?  Are they composed of men from similar classes 
with similar political principles?  And, to what ends are customs and principles 
maintained?  If they are mentioned in a definition of a constitution, can one assume 
they are maintained for political ends?  If so, what effect do customs and principles 
have in shaping men? 
Principle, or that which motivates men to act politically, and faction, the 
political separation of men, though not tangible parts of a constitution, are 
characteristics that are unavoidably derived from it.  Therefore, it must be asked, what 
part do principle and faction play in constitutions?  What, for instance, is faction in 
relation to the constitution?  Is it an ingredient to it, a property of it, or is faction 
instead a method of forming a government, like a cooking procedure?  That is, if men 
are ingredients in government and one is baking a constitutional cake, is it necessary 
for one to consistently follow established procedures, procedures which are dictated 
according to the properties of the ingredients, such as mixing the dry and wet 
ingredients separately?  
As in baking, the properties of the ingredients with which one is working 
limits the way in which the cake is made.  An egg is an egg is an egg, and men in 
political society are the same.  They are ingredients to the end product which one can 
only hope to understand and manage.  This is not to discount potential; an egg white, 
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after all, if whisked long enough, will become meringue.  Men, likewise, can be 
manipulated, but in order to be manipulated their properties need to be understood.  
And faction, this thesis will argue, is a natural tendency, a property if you will, of man 
that cannot be overlooked.  It is an inevitability of human nature that must be 
prepared for when organizing political society.   
The end product in baking is determined by the way in which the ingredients 
are handled, as well as the way in which the properties of the ingredients are 
manipulated.  When making custard one does not put boiling milk into the eggs, they 
must be tempered slowly so that they do not curdle.  The fact that an egg will curdle, 
however, does not stop a chef from learning how to manipulate its properties, and the 
fact that men are factious by their nature did not encourage Montesquieu, Hume, or 
Burke to seek to change that nature.  Instead, they sought to make the best 
constitutional cake with the ingredients they were given.  Men are not bad eggs; 
indeed, if handled correctly properties that appear only to limit them, such as their 
factious nature, can be used for greater purposes.     
In extending this vignette, let us look at principle.  If faction is a property of 
men, something that must be understood like the viscosity of eggs, principle is an 
extra ingredient that can help to realize its potential.  It is, if you will, the cream of 
tartar to the meringue; it can help to turn the gelatinous egg into something light and 
fluffy.40  It both instructs and restrains men in political function and is a necessary 
though often overlooked aspect of a constitution’s success.  Principle is an extra 
ingredient used to manipulate a larger more prominent ingredient, in this case, men.  
All three thinkers realized that the addition of principle could manipulate a tendency 
of all men, that is their factious nature, into something better: party.   
                                                
40 This analogy of men as eggs has its limits.  It was Robespierre, after all, who chillingly noted that 
one needed to break a few eggs in order to make an omelet. 
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The way in which principle is used to form men is seldom agreed upon.  Since 
it is used to manipulate their properties, it determines the end product and the end 
product is always to someone’s interest over that of another’s.  For this reason, 
principle plays a major role in this thesis because the way in which men act and for 
whom or what purpose they are acting determines the role of faction in the state, and 
the role of faction, it will be shown, determines the balance of the constitution. 
 
Though the terms faction, opposition, and party, were all closely related in 
eighteenth-century politics, often overlapping, there became an acknowledged 
difference between the terms “opposition” and “faction” during the first half of the 
eighteenth century.  This in turn led to an increased difference between “party” and 
“faction.”  Faction, Gunn explains, “was associated with a single-minded pursuit of 
office and was also applicable to men already in office, depending on their behaviour.  
‘Party’ more frequently carried the connotation of a union based on principle, 
although it was not yet widely appreciated that these principles might dictate striving 
for office.”  Nevertheless, these two terms “remained subject to confusion.”41  Part of 
this confusion stems from the fact, Jeremy Black notes, “that it is inappropriate to 
offer an analysis that is equally pertinent throughout the century [since] parties played 
very different roles, firstly in the formation of ministries, secondly in the maintenance 
or weakening of parliamentary majorities, and thirdly in elections and in the country 
at large.”42  It is not an easy undertaking, one commentator admits, “to disentangle 
distinctions between party, faction and opposition in the pamphlets of this period.”43   
                                                
41 Gunn, 25.  Throughout the thesis, when two quotes that follow each other are from the same source 
and same page, they will be referenced on the second, or final, quote, as above.  Additionally, all 
emphasis in quotes are the author’s unless otherwise noted. 
42 Black, 92-93. 
43 Robbins, 528. 
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The term “party” will be used in many ways throughout this thesis in the same 
way as faction, in both a positive and a negative manner.  Though it contributes to 
making the overall concept more vague, the use of the two terms is unavoidable as 
each of the thinkers employed them according to their own contexts which, as noted 
above, were constantly changing.  Though both implied a division within the state, 
faction could be more easily applied to the different types of divisions: constitutional 
or functional (what we now call branches), class, or party, the latter of which came 
later but could be called faction based on principle.  Thus, in the majority of instances 
where the terms party and faction overlap in this thesis, they are meant to be 
interchangeable.  The use of the term “party,” though certainly prevalent by the time 
each thinker was writing, had varying connotations similar to the division of faction 
that will be used in this thesis (explained below) from the pejorative, found in 
Bolingbroke, to the rather encouraging, but limited, use of the term as found in Burke.  
It is the latter’s use of the term “party” that will be found most often in the thesis 
where it is used according to context. 
Party will be largely understood as it was in the formation of eighteenth-
century English politics, though this is certainly not the only context with which party 
will be discussed.  Though quite a lot of the contemporary discussion on political 
parties centers on electoral politics, this thesis centers on parties, or factions, of 
statesmen, politicians, or representatives in government, not outside of it.  It centers 
on those who directly influence the political decisions of the day by their actions 
(often votes).  The party that will be described is not separated by another layer of 
political decision-making.  It is not concerned with voters, or those who elect those 
who are to compose the law.  Party is here direct and immediate.  A large part of it 
does not vote and recede, only to emerge much later, as members of modern parties 
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do.  The whole of it is present.  It cannot absent itself because the understanding of 
the men who composed party or faction, as will be explained below, was a more static 
one than that of today.  Party, and an earlier understanding of political class, existed 
in something more permanent, from Montesquieu’s president à mortier to Burke’s 
“natural nobility,” both theories wrapped up in aristocratic overtones and inclusive of 
political principle.  Before taking a look at how “principle” and “faction” will be 
understood in this thesis, the relationship between the two will be briefly laid out. 
Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke were not alone in recognizing the 
convergence of principle and party in the eighteenth century.  J.A.W. Gunn notes that 
there was, “a certain parallel between the development of the respectability of 
individual self-interest and the eventual acceptance of party, although it is more a 
matter of a similar sequence of positions than of identical subject matter.”44  Indeed, 
the gradual acceptance of parties was a matter of seeing the virtue in party politics, 
self-interest included, rather than the vices inherent in it.  By coupling the debate on 
principle with that of party in political thought, a new understanding of party emerged 
which helped to turn “faction” into “party.”  In this way, new understandings of self-
interest, of which Mandeville was the greatest proponent, had a profound effect upon 
the development of political principle and its effect upon party.  Burke would call this 
“a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national 
interest.”45  Montesquieu, and especially Hume, recognized the motivation that self-
interest gave to parties which, if constitutionally regulated, could secure the national 
interest. 
The idea of “self-interest” in politics, as it was beginning to be understood, 
stemmed from the debate on luxury.  Though the focus of the thesis is not to 
                                                
44 Gunn, 10. 
45 Edmund Burke, “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents,” Select Works of Edmund 
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demonstrate where each thinker entered into this debate and how (indeed, both Hume 
and Montesquieu wrote at length on the topic), the fact that they could not avoid it is 
of much relevance, since it was part and parcel to many of the arguments made for 
and against faction and party in eighteenth-century politics, most notably that of 
political “corruption.”  Since the Crown could not fund all that was necessary for its 
“needs,” it relied on the monied (finance) sector for investments who most often 
provided the funding for the burgeoning of British trade and thus Empire.  In turn, the 
Crown looked after the monopolies and privileges of those who invested.  This was a 
corrupt practice, according to some, though others considered it necessary, even 
among the landed class.46  Support for the practice manifested itself in Parliament in 
the form of political patronage, often as seats in Parliament or public office.  
Opposition to it provided a sort of raison d’être for those who were set against the 
practice, most notably Burke and the Rockingham Whigs. 
Whereas corruption was at the state level, the debate surrounding luxury also 
concerned state commerce.  As Istvan Hont points out, Hume’s essays “Of the 
Balance of Power” and “Of the Jealousy of Trade” were modeled after Hobbes’ 
assertion that even when sovereigns are not in a state of war, they are still in a 
posture, informed by their mutual jealousy, of war.47  That Hobbes’ analysis was 
devoid of any meaningful economic theory did not stop Hume from incorporating 
ideas of jealous nations into theories of political economics.  In The Spirit of the 
Laws, Montesquieu explained his belief that, “the natural effect of commerce is to 
lead to peace,” since, “two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally 
dependent.”48  He also recognized how fragile it was.  Commerce, he wrote, destroyed 
                                                
46 Black, 22. 
47 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 21. 
48 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & 
Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), XX.2, 338.  Hereafter cited as 
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by conquerors and hampered by monarchs, “wanders across the earth, flees from 
where it is oppressed, and remains where it is left to breathe: it reigns today where 
one used to see only deserted places, seas, and rocks; there where it used to reign are 
now only deserted places.”49  Both Hume and Montesquieu maintained that 
commerce was a cause as well as a consequence of liberty since trade could only 
flourish where certain freedoms existed.   
This was a debate between ancients and moderns, the virtuous and the selfish.  
It would, in time, transform our understanding of relations between states as well as 
the individual and his or her relationship to the state.  Self-interest and its influence in 
politics arose from this new type of political economy.  It would alter civic virtue, as 
it was up to that point conceived, because it necessitated, “a foundation less spiritual 
and more social and even material.”50  There were two sides to this debate: those who 
believed that luxury contributed to such things as inequality, depopulation, loss of 
morals, courage, or patriotism, and those who believed that luxury helped increase 
living standards, overall wealth, “the rise of the Arts and Sciences” (as Hume would 
put it), the power of nations and general happiness.51  Montesquieu, Hume and Burke 
all fit into the latter category, though the latter category itself split into different 
camps according to how, and for what purpose, such ends could be achieved.  
Montesquieu, for instance, recognized that the debate on luxury could become quite 
arbitrary when considering different states.52  That they were in the latter camp, 
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however, meant their understanding of political principle and faction could not be 
separated from self-interest.  The value that self-interest has had for economic theory 
is evident, particularly in historical terms, though this focus is largely upon self-
interest at the state level, as in “reason of state.”  Though at times the two overlap 
(what we today call political economy), this thesis will look at the development of 
self-interest (often vice) and the decrease of selfless virtue as it relates to party and 
party members in constitutional thought.   
Gunn calls eighteenth-century party a matter of “sentiment and influence” that 
relied heavily upon alliances between prominent men.53  Because parties were known 
to exist through “connexions,” they were seen as “interests” in the full sense of the 
word.54  Because of this, they were seen as not only partisan but irrationally self-
interested.  Burke would maintain this same argument and pursue it.  Unapologetic in 
his defense of connexions and prejudices, his conclusion was novel and set against 
other commentators who believed that men gave up, “their reason and consciences to 
party managers, staking their personal comfort in an unrestrained effort to satisfy 
ambitions not properly their own.”55  The thinkers of this thesis would understand this 
argument very well, but in the end they would come to interpret it differently, largely 
because of the role they afforded political principle in the formation of party. 
 
Though the concepts differ slightly according to how each thinker understood 
them, principle and faction are consistently employed in the same terms, by which is 
meant shared analyses of similar forms of government: Greek, Roman, Venetian, 
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French, and most notably English.56  This thesis attempts to likewise understand these 
concepts via the same terms, but a more specific explanation of how they will be used 
is appropriate. 
“Principle” is the quality of character that motivates those who have a hand in 
government.  The use of the word “principle” in this thesis will refer to political 
principle, or that which motivates as well as regulates men when acting in political 
function.  It is at the same time a quality of character that establishes rules for men in 
government and, “the human passions that set [government] in motion,” as 
Montesquieu put it.57  Principle is often a reflection of the constitutional form, though 
one does not require the other.  As a political principle, such a quality of character 
need not be moral.  Indeed, this thesis will argue, the most effective principles are, in 
the end, not based upon ethical or moral considerations but rather upon considerations 
of self-interest. 
Though principle is commonly understood as that which motivates men to act 
in government, it is often categorized according to more familiar political terms, 
illustrative of the way in which each thinker understood principle.  Of the three, 
Montesquieu is the most straightforward.  He lists three principles, virtue, honor, and 
fear, which correspond to three government forms, democracies (including republics), 
monarchies, and despotisms.  Unlike Montesquieu, who attaches principle to 
government form, Hume and Burke first identify principle with party.  Like 
Montesquieu, however, they understand principle to be that which motivates and 
regulates men in political function.  There exist many exceptions to this basic 
understanding, however, and none can fit easily into a conceptual box.  Burke, for 
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instance, identifies a single principle with the Jacobin form of government while 
Montesquieu admits to there being several principles that motivate the different 
factions of England’s mixed monarchy – but for now, let us rest content with 
associating two actions to the idea of principle that are shared among all three 
thinkers: motivation and regulation. 
The use of the term faction is a bit more nuanced.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, and in order to identify and make use of the concept of faction more clearly, it 
is defined in two ways, following the various uses of the concept employed by 
Montesquieu, the first thinker to be examined in this thesis, throughout The Spirit of 
the Laws.  I have retained the word “faction” for both concepts, rather than give two 
separate terms denoting similar concepts.  The concepts are, in fact, interrelated and 
complementary.  So, like Montesquieu and his understanding of virtue, I have 
preferred to fix the signification of the concept by that which follows or that which 
precedes the word.  Thus, I attach to the concept of faction two words which give it 
separate significations, but related and complementary meanings.   
The first concept, “singular” faction, remains closest to a colloquial definition 
of faction in a pejorative sense.  That is, it is faction which seeks no other interests 
than it’s own, even at the risk of ruining the constitution within which it operates and 
achieves political power.  It is faction that ends in what Montesquieu called the 
“despotism of one alone.”  Indeed, the word “singular” is used in the same manner as 
Montesquieu when he applies the term to the “singular” institutions of ancient Greece, 
which were used to form and promote a single outlook for the republic (IV.6-7).58  
Since their natural setting was, “in a small state, where one can educate the general 
populace and raise a whole people like a family,” the singular institutions operated 
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best when no opposition existed within the state.59  Such a decided lack of opposition 
in the state gave these singular institutions in Greece a potency that is unrivaled in 
history (IV.4).  Yet, their weakness lay in their inability to adapt to the natural 
passions of man, passions which were antagonistic to the virtues instilled by the 
singular institutions and which historically prevailed over their constitutions.  This 
antagonism resulted from man’s desire to be different.  Where diversity existed or 
was produced in ancient Greece, man’s natural passions caused singular institutions to 
become singular factions, which in turn provoked other singular factions to arise, 
threatening the stability of the constitution. 
The second term for faction that will be used in this thesis is “principled” 
faction, or faction as positive competition within the state.  Principled faction may 
remain individually motivated up until the point at which that singular motivation 
threatens the balance of the constitution.  In this way, it “stretches” the constitution, as 
Montesquieu put it, in a beneficial and reinforcing manner but does not aim towards 
despotism or tyranny (XI.13).  It is virtuous in the way in which it benefits the whole 
of the state, but honorable as it is really virtue as self-interest.  Whereas singular 
faction seeks to destroy the constitution unless it controls the power of the state, 
principled faction seeks to strengthen the state by reinforcing its previously 
established constitutional bodies and their respective shares of power.   
A key difference between singular and principled faction is an inherent 
rejection of difference in the former and a specific necessity for it to exist in the latter.  
A further difference between the two types of faction is the tolerance of political 
hypocrisy and the understanding of its use in political society.  Singular faction rejects 
it outright, or professes to.  Principled faction, on the other hand, tolerates hypocrisy 
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to an extent.  It recognizes that it is necessary and can be useful, but it also recognizes 
how singular faction can abuse it.  The extent to which principled faction should 
tolerate political hypocrisy, as advocated by the thinkers of this thesis, continues to 
speak to us today and will be taken up at greater length in the conclusion. 
 
The English Connection 
Many similarities are shared among all three thinkers in this thesis.  
Interestingly, all three had a period of “wilderness” years.  Montesquieu was in Paris 
from 1709 to 1713 as a young advocate, during a period of which little is known.  
Indeed, not a single letter sent or received by him survives.60  Hume spent three 
extremely productive yet reclusive years in France after a brief earlier period spent 
pursuing a career in shipping in Bristol.  And, Burke’s “missing years” in his early 
twenties in England were a time of which little is known, though much is theorized.   
All three thinkers were intimate with one another’s works, save for 
Montesquieu being aware of Burke (Montesquieu died in 1755, a year before Burke’s 
first major publication was released).  The relationship between Burke and Hume was 
a cordial one, and could be described as close.  Burke was well aware of Hume’s 
work, as well as the work of other Scottish thinkers of the time, for whom he had 
much respect.  It was from Hume that Burke received the first-hand accounts of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau employed in “A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly.” 
Montesquieu and Hume were familiar with one another and wrote to each 
other occasionally upon the receipt of one another’s works through mutual friends.  In 
writing to Montesquieu, Hume praised the Frenchman as, “the author of a work that is 
held in the highest esteem by all nations and that will be admired through the 
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centuries.”61  Montesquieu wrote to Hume, noting that he and their mutual 
acquaintance, John Stewart, had read an essay where Hume, “mistreated slightly the 
ecclesiastical order.”  “We could not have entirely approved,” he continues, “though 
we are content with admiring you.  We did not find reason to believe that these men 
were such as you say, but we found your reasoning sound to say as much.”62 
The two, Montesquieu and Hume, respected each other intellectually and their 
correspondence demonstrates not only cordiality, but also clarification and, at times, 
criticism.  Hume, for instance, corrected Montesquieu on a point made in XI.3 in The 
Spirit of the Laws that English juries do not determine if something is “proven” or 
“not proven” but whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.  There is a subtle 
difference between the two, a difference which Hume highlights by citing a case of 
persecuted Presbyterians in Scotland where the law only necessitates proof; they were 
“proven” to have met and so the punishment followed.  Hume leaves open the 
question of guilt, but the point is implicit.  That something is proven does not 
necessitate guilt.  Montesquieu took this to heart and incorporated Hume’s point by 
changing the wording in the next edition.63 
Though Burke and Montesquieu were not acquainted personally, the former 
was well aware of the latter’s work.  It is thought that Burke did not read Montesquieu 
until sometime after 1750, but thereafter, as C.P. Courtney writes, “his admiration for 
Montesquieu is constant.”64  Burke read Montesquieu in his own way and 
appropriated him for his own cause.  That Montesquieu was used by the Jacobins for 
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their cause, Burke found highly ironic.  In a letter written shortly before the 
Reflections Burke writes of Montesquieu:  
You say, my dear sir, that they read Montesquieu – I believe not.  If 
they do, they do not understand him.  He is often obscure; sometimes 
misled by system; but, on the whole, a learned, and ingenious writer, 
and sometimes a most profound thinker.  Sure it is, that they have not 
followed him in any one thing they have done.65 
 
Burke admired Montesquieu until the end of his life and warmly received Charles-
Louis de Secondat, Montesquieu’s grandson, at Gregories in 1796. 
All three men were outsiders, in one way to another, to a place that equally 
attracted them: England.  They were all, in fact, outsiders in their own lands.  
Montesquieu’s Gascon accent, a result of being raised by the local miller for the first 
three years of his life, would cause him to stand out in polite Parisian company.  
Hume’s steadfast refusal to conform to any religion meant he would be denied twice 
for academic chairs in his native Scotland, chairs which he most certainly deserved.  
Burke was a product of Catholic parents, one recently conformed, in officially 
Protestant Ireland, and his Nagle connections, which meant his Catholic connections, 
were an unpleasant reminder for him in his public life, even while still in Dublin.  
That said, as outsiders, they shared an appreciation for the history and the exercise of 
the English constitution, to which their thought on party is heavily indebted.  To 
better establish a background for their thought, it deserves a brief discussion. 
  
The English constitution had been, by the second half of the eighteenth 
century, held up by so many to be the model upon which modern liberty could rest 
that its legend began to take on a shape of its own.  In celebrations of the English 
constitution, the Glorious Revolution was typically signaled as a milestone in the 
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development of English “liberty.”  For others, however, it signaled merely a shift in 
power from king, to king-in-parliament.  What is undeniable, however, is that the 
prevailing theory of sovereignty had been reformed.  Theories of Bodin, Filmer and 
Hobbes no longer resonated with the occasion and as a result, political theory was 
forced to change with the new circumstances.  Sovereignty had been reformed, but 
whether or not power had been moderated was yet to be seen.  Had parliament 
assumed the hubris of power that once resided in kings, for instance?  Or, had 
despotism merely been substituted with corruption and patronage?   
With parliament’s ascendancy following the Revolution, the fear of a king 
ruling without parliament began to subside.  In its stead arose a new, subtler fear, “of 
covert tyranny by an oligarchy which controlled parliament.”66  There existed a 
discussion among men of the Country stripe that, “revolved around several ubiquitous 
dichotomies, virtue against corruption, public good against private advantage, 
transparency of counsel against the secret cabals of juntos and cabinets.”67  Such 
dichotomies are the material for the political thought of our thinkers, though they did 
not resolve them according to moral dictates, as much as they sought to understand 
the causal tendencies of each dichotomy.  Bolingbroke did the most to stoke the fear 
of such division, as will be discussed below, and his thought on the matter provides a 
starting point for this thesis.  By controlling the distribution of offices the executive 
could control Parliament, corrupting its members and generally influencing all 
legislative decisions for his will, so the argument went.  This was the “Country” view 
of things, and was broadly seen as “Whig” doctrine, though its mantle was just as 
                                                
66 Mark Goldie, “The English system of liberty,” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century 
Political Thought, 64.   
67 Ibid., 68. 
34 
 
easily adopted by Tories when out of power.68  Alternatively, “Court Whigs” were 
accused of having betrayed the “principles” of the Revolution, the “principles” being 
a resistance to the corruption of power.   
No matter who adopted what principles, the fact remains that parties would 
come to be based around “principles” that most often described one’s relationship 
towards “constitutional policies” and not daily policy.69  Following the Revolutionary 
settlement, which had resolved the “great issues” of constitutional opinion when both 
Whig and Tory parties united in opposition to James II, Whig and Tory parties went 
from being “great” to “small” parties.70  For though the large issues of constitutional 
import were decided upon, the issues themselves remained and continued to divide 
men according to their opinion on them.71  That parties were divided upon 
constitutional opinion, yet remained conciliatory, had far reaching implications for 
constitutional theory.72  Not only were parties beginning to form recognizable party 
traits but they were doing so in the context of a constitution that could accommodate 
their presence.      
As Jeremy Black notes, “the crucial division between Tories and opposition 
Whigs and the role of issues, on which there were recognizable party positions, in the 
politics of the first half of the century suggests…that it is appropriate to adopt a party 
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approach to the politics of the period.”73  Just as divisions were being made in 
practice over constitutional principles, a parallel change was taking place in political 
thought that took a more functional approach to party.  This change was neither 
immediate nor complete.  Anti-party sentiment ran deep, well after the settlement was 
complete.  It had not been too long since party strife had led men to take up arms 
against one another.  Nonetheless, it was a change whose most telling effect was a 
reappraisal of the “mixed constitution” theory, and the revival of what was now being 
called, upon the assertion of the Common’s increasing power, the balance, or 
separation, of powers.   
The question, “what replaced the mixed constitution?” is a larger question and 
one that precedes the one this thesis is seeking to answer – “how did Montesquieu, 
Hume, and Burke contribute to the acceptance of party in political thought?”.  
Nonetheless, the latter is derivative of the former and so the former must be touched 
upon to answer the latter.  The answer that will be given in the conclusion to the 
question “what replaced the mixed constitution?” is straightforward: party politics.  
The extent to which Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke contributed to a theory of party 
politics is what this thesis will attempt to answer by looking at the ideas of both 
principle and faction.  
The argument that the constitution of England was a product of mixed 
institutions, a mixed form of government, was most ardently and desperately put forth 
in Charles I’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of 1642.74  The mixed regime was 
argued to be the institutional expression of tolerance, of the acceptance that different 
understandings of justice can exist within one political society.  In a mixed 
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constitution, social divisions are given the political space to represent themselves, but 
they are not parties in the contemporary sense.  Proponents of mixed regimes argued 
that “a well-ordered constitution has parts without parties.”75   That is, social divisions 
were tolerated and permitted in a share of the constitution, but parties were castigated 
as exploiters of these natural divisions.   
The difference between theories of mixed regimes and theories of a balance of 
power – and the shift in emphasis from one to the other – can be seen as the 
difference between a country’s public and private constitutions.  The former, that 
which appears to the public as the ostensible form of rule, tends to denigrate, if not 
completely neglect party, while the latter, the way in which the regime is actually run, 
has always been the natural harbor for party.  Bolingbroke, discussed below, would 
label the two public and private, or the “government” and the “constitution,” 
respectively.  The public constitution of seventeenth-century English politics was 
continually in crisis.  Once it could no longer live up to its professed principles, 
recourse was slowly made to the private constitution.  In doing so, the interaction of 
the government itself – the men who decide political affairs – would be examined.  
There was a grey line that marked the extent to which institutional interaction in the 
mixed regime was antagonistic, or partisan, and therefore acted as a balance.  That 
grey line, nebulous as it was, was reformed after the Restoration, continually revised 
until the Revolution and then resituated once the Revolutionary principles had been 
established in practice.  This move – which was nothing more than an acceptance of 
opposition – served to highlight the theoretical transition that was taking place from 
the mixed regime to one of a balance, or separation, of powers. 
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Two recent definitions of these constitutional terms will help to clarify this 
point.  Robert Shackleton maintains that the difference between the mixed regime and 
the separation of powers is a question of sovereignty.  In the former, the legislative 
power is sovereign and assigned jointly to king, nobles, and people in parliament.  In 
the latter, political authority is divided (and therefore not sovereign) into three 
constituent functions that operate separately and without collusion.76  Rosenblum 
notes that a balance of power “assumes antagonistic interests” and does not require 
fixed social orders or cooperation, while a mixed constitution, “does incorporate 
permanent, designated groups or social orders, not shifting interest groups, and aims 
at cooperation.”77  Rosenblum and Shackleton’s definitions are great starting points, 
though they only take one so far.  They do not explain how the mixed constitution, 
which aimed at cooperation, became one that incorporated antagonistic interests, or at 
least became one that tolerated antagonistic interests such as an opposition.  Likewise, 
how is one to understand how the division of the legislative power according to social 
classes morphed into the division of government by functions (if not in practice, then 
at least in theory)? 
It was a theoretical leap from a theory of mixed regimes to one of a separation 
of powers, but one that all three thinkers in this thesis were required to take.  That 
they did so, however, does not mean that one theory was swapped for another.  Often 
theories of mixed regimes were blended with theories promoting a separation of 
powers and vice versa.  Theories of mixed regimes carry with them an implicit 
assumption that power will be separated at some level, while there remains in theories 
that expound a separation of powers the understanding that the constituted powers 
will continue, out of necessity, to collaborate.  The two were always more separate in 
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theory than they were in practice, though initially after the Revolution, Whig and 
Tory parties clung to differing theories.  Tories believed in a divine-right monarchy 
while Whigs continued to believe that England had an ancient mixed constitution.  
What emerged from both theories was manifested in Parliament as foundations for 
each party – the “constitutional necessities” promoted by each party. 
While one focused on asserting the rights of the monarch, the other asserted 
the rights of Parliament (as well as guarding against the encroachment of those rights 
by the monarch), a struggle that served to highlight the balance of the powers in the 
state.  The historical move from a belief in mixed government to a balance of powers, 
originated principally as party formed largely to express “opposition” (though party 
could also be an expedient way of consolidating a ministry).  In The History of 
England, Hume explains how the party system arose out of the jealousies attending 
the mixed constitution.  Though all parties sought to preserve the constitution, and 
were thus parts of the whole, they varied in their “prejudices, interests, and 
dispositions.”  Some inclined “with more passion” to the regal, others to the more 
popular part of government.78   
Along with this change in emphasis from a mixed constitution to a balance of 
powers, there was an increasing tendency to associate constitutional powers with 
political functions over that of social classes.  (Today, for instance, in nearly all 
constitutions, governments are composed of different political functions, not social 
classes.)  The diversification, more so than the extension, of suffrage was a key reason 
for this.  Competition for election was not a traditional element of the House of 
Commons, but it began to take hold in the eighteenth century when it evolved among 
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the gentry, largely for ideological reasons, social distinction, patronage, and influence 
at court.79   
Two things occurred during this change in emphasis, as mixed constitutions 
became increasingly separated by the division of functions and less so by the division 
of classes, that this thesis will seek to examine.  First, a fear of singular faction that 
sought control of the various functions was regenerated, though this time the fear was 
that of a party, and not of a social class.  Second, there became a gap in the 
maintenance of principle associated with each division of government and the 
principle in practice, especially in the House of Commons.  In the mixed regime, 
social classes, particularly the aristocratic governing class, were regulated by 
longstanding and firmly entrenched principle.  As the emphasis came to be placed 
increasingly upon party, however, over that of class (the former replacing the latter in 
government function), a disconnect in constitutional theory appeared between 
political principle and the political bodies that now carried out government functions, 
party.  It is this disconnect that all three thinkers recognized was an increasing 
problem in constitutional thought.  Principled faction helped to reconnect the function 
of government with political principle.  
 
There are two ways to describe eighteenth-century party, especially in a two-
party state: a minority and a majority, or a government and an opposition.  The latter 
is the most useful for this thesis because it flags the constitutional development, 
highly influential upon all three thinkers of this thesis, that transformed parties from 
parts against the whole to parts of the whole.  As noted above, while social divisions 
were accepted in the mixed regime, division by party was seen as illegitimate.  After 
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the Revolution, however, the idea that parties prevented a necessary degree of 
national unity was questioned.  “Even some strongly anti-party writings thus admitted 
that their effect could not be as virulent as commonly supposed,” Gunn writes, “or the 
nation would long ago have disappeared.”80  Certainly the understanding and gradual 
acceptance of a legitimate opposition, which developed slowly but naturally from the 
events following the Glorious Revolution, contributed in large part to considering 
parties parts of the whole and not parts against.81  Though there are notable 
exceptions to this focus on English constitutional history, even among the thinkers of 
this thesis, one finds that the idea of a legitimate opposition was vital to the 
development of a constitutional balance of power enforced by party.82 
Party became a justifiable source of opposition, just as opposition came to be 
seen as a necessary way of maintaining integrity in the government, though the state 
of “party” in practical affairs remained an unstable phenomenon that lacked a precise 
definition.83  Knud Haakonssen describes it as a “shifting constellation of interests, 
policies and principles represented by changing alliances of individuals and groups, 
often connected by family ties.”84  Though a party’s content changed as each gained 
or lost power, they remained a fact of English political life.  Gradually the idea of 
conflict as a necessary political tool in shaping effective policies came to be accepted 
so that party came to be seen as something unavoidable in any free government.  Most 
importantly, instead of placing value upon particular parties, the nature of party 
interaction was increasingly appreciated.   
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Once the formality of opposition was entrenched it became much easier to 
attack the party in opposition rather than “opposition” in general.  By the early half of 
the eighteenth century, Gunn notes, “the diversity of interests and parties was usually 
seen as a consequence, not the cause, of that general freedom which Englishmen 
enjoyed.”85  If party was the cause of English liberty, for better or worse, the effects it 
had in moderating power gained appreciation, though party itself was not, for the 
most part, overtly praised.  The fact that power was now balanced within parliament 
via a ministry and an opposition, loosely taking on the form of antagonistic parties, 
was enough to elicit praise.86   
The useful balance opposition provided to the monarch was already in 
existence by the early half of the eighteenth century.  When the Tories were not in 
power, their “place in Parliament was owed not only to their widespread support 
among the electorate but also to the fact that their existence as a potential alternative 
administration gave monarchs a useful check upon Whig pretensions.”87  This was 
true, in turn, of the parties in their relation to the crown, which could in theory still 
appoint or dismiss ministers at will.  The crown did so, however, “at the risk of losing 
control of Parliament through the activities of one or other of the parties.”88  
Monarchical influence in parliament and opposition to this influence slowly became 
positions, “which fell within the tolerable limits of conduct, however much it might 
be condemned as a factious doctrine.”89  Practice, in this case, came before theory.  
The residue of constitutional practice colored all celebrations of the English 
constitution to the extent that the organizing principle, “was the commonplace idea 
that structures of government could preserve political freedom only where they 
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frustrated the abuse of political power.”90  Groups were therefore tolerated – the 
Tories after the Revolution – without being excluded, because they contributed to a 
controlled constitutional antagonism, and not cooperation, that was seen as necessary 
to secure the ends of the constitution.   
This tenuous and at times delicate constitutional relationship provided the 
material for our thinkers, though a detailed theory was far from being formed.  As 
Robbins rightly notes, “The ways in which on the one hand evil effects in the 
constitution could be controlled, and on the other the connection of party and public 
opinion could be adjusted to the implementation of policy by Parliament, were not as 
yet clearly laid out.”91  The changes in constitutional practice left plenty of room for 
theory to offer solutions.  Montesquieu and Hume were merely observers of English 
politics whereas Burke would directly enter the debate, yet all three were inspired by 
the constitutional debates over ministry, opposition, and party.  The result can be 
found in their contribution to constitutional thought which continues to inform our 
understanding of party today. 
 
Bolingbroke & Mandeville 
The starting point for this thesis comes after certain assumptions are already 
made, as described above, concerning changing economic conditions and 
corresponding theories of civic virtue, which were, according to the thinkers of this 
thesis, outdated.  “Corruption,” had already set in, and the political order known to 
Harrington or hoped for by Sydney, for instance, had radically changed by 
Bolingbroke and Mandeville.  Government had grown, standing armies were accepted 
and “the substitution of private dependencies for public authority” had eroded and 
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altered forms of property that had previously maintained independent forms of 
power.92  As J.G.A. Pocock notes, “once land and commerce were placed in historical 
sequence, civic man found himself existing in a historical contradiction.”93  What 
unites the thinkers of this thesis is the way in which they reacted to this contradiction 
by tolerating certain forms of hypocrisy and inequality; it is also what separates some 
other contemporary thinkers from it.  So before taking a look at Bolingbroke and 
Mandeville, two major influences upon all three thinkers, a word or two should be 
mentioned on why two of the most important constitutional theorists on party, Adam 
Ferguson and Publius, were not included in this thesis. 
Of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers whose ideas pertain to this thesis, 
Hume offers more on party and principle than any other, though Adam Ferguson 
certainly contributed greatly to the topic.  Ferguson’s focus on civic virtue veers too 
far away from the typology of political principle that one finds in Mandeville or 
Montesquieu, especially in the latter’s understanding of false honor.94  Ferguson 
differed over the roles of citizenship and wealth with Hume, as well.  Rather than 
adjusting civic values to the new economic reality, which would permit certain forms 
of political hypocrisy, Ferguson believed that those civic values were antecedent to 
attaining wealth.  Ferguson saw the draw of wealth and noted its tendency to pull men 
out of politics; reclaiming the civic creed, therefore, was Ferguson’s main task.95  
Rather than reclaim an outdated civic creed, all three thinkers reformulated 
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understandings of civic virtue, if not abandoning it altogether as Montesquieu did, in 
the face of a newly emerging commercial state.   
Many arguments could be made for including the Federalist Papers in a 
discussion on party and principle in the eighteenth century.  The constitutional end 
sought by Publius was much the same sought by all three thinkers, security (#3).96  
Indeed, Publius appeals directly to many of the same British examples where security 
was found in a greater union of differences (#5).  The understanding of representative 
democracy was nearly the same (#14), as was their discussion of principle in 
representatives (#10, 36, 49, 51, 58, 76).  Nevertheless, the nature of the debate was 
fundamentally different.  Such an argument has more to do with federalism, 
anticipated expansion and conflict, than it does national parties (#5-9, 13, 18).  
Whereas Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke had to compromise between constitutional 
theories of class structure and political function, Publius could reject the former 
outright (#35; though this did not stop him from examining the nature of class 
relations).  Due in large part to the newness of their situation, they could apply 
directly to a much more rigorous theory of the separation of powers, even more 
rigorous than that proposed by Montesquieu.   
 
Though Bolingbroke was silent on the topic of party in his definition of a 
constitution, his understanding of it corresponded to his unique distinction between 
the “government” and the “constitution.”  By “constitution” Bolingbroke meant the 
institutions and traditions composing the governing process.  It is how the government 
should operate in the abstract.  “Government” is, “that particular tenor of conduct 
which a chief magistrate, and inferior magistrates under his direction and influence, 
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hold in the administration of public affairs.”97  It is good government in as much as it 
is in conformity with “the principles and objects of the constitution.”98  The 
constitution is how the country should be governed whereas the government is how 
the country is actually governed at any particular time.  Bolingbroke’s understanding 
of “party” corresponds to this political understanding of government.  In the first 
category (the constitution, or how things should operate) Bolingbroke most often used 
the term “estates” to denote the powers that compose the constitution, largely absent 
of any grouping by party.  It is in the second category, the actual operation of 
government, that Bolingbroke more often used the term “party.”   
Bolingbroke believed that party inherently held harmful tendencies and was 
thus pessimistic about the potential benefit its continued presence could have in 
constitutional government.  He nevertheless promoted the idea of a “national party” 
which coalites in order to suppress a third type of party, faction, or those who seek to 
corrupt the constitution by taking charge of the government and acting 
unconstitutionally (a term coined by Bolingbroke).  Faction is in this way opposite to 
the constitution.  Before his idea of faction can be fully understood, however, it is 
necessary to understand how Bolingbroke conceived of party and party politics. 
In the first Letter of A Dissertation Upon Parties, Bolingbroke maintains two 
points that underpin his argument throughout the work.  First, the party system, if not 
based on, is at least maintained by corruption.99  And second, in order to check that 
corruption, “good men…should join their efforts to heal our national divisions, and to 
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change the narrow spirit of party into a diffusive spirit of public benevolence.”100  
Here Bolingbroke first pronounces the difference between his general understanding 
of party, his understanding of “national party,” and a coalition that sought the national 
interest.  To begin, however, let us start with party.  
Believing it had a tendency to degenerate into faction, Bolingbroke uses the 
term “party” almost always in the negative sense.  Divisions were most often false 
ones, directed by those with sinister interests towards those who would become, “the 
instruments and the victims of private ambition.”101  In describing “party justice” 
Bolingbroke explained how the actions of party are motivated by men’s passions and 
not their reason.  What’s more, party employs the full extent of its power for 
vengeance, as opposed to reparation, and knows no other way of dealing with the 
perpetual problems of party.102  This skeptical understanding of party came from 
Bolingbroke’s view of recent English history, shared in many ways by the thinkers of 
this thesis.  The similarities help to illustrate why, even when he was so pessimistic 
about party politics, he still believed that parties could come to the rescue of the 
constitution.   
In the first Letter of the Dissertation, quoted above, Bolingbroke pronounced 
the difference between parties and a coalition of parties that sought the national 
interest.  The “good men” must act in coalition to stem corruption, but who are the 
good men?  To answer this, one must look at how Bolingbroke understood the role of 
party in fomenting the Glorious Revolution.  At the end of Charles II’s reign there 
were factions of the court who were set against the Parliament, and factions in 
Parliament who were set against the King.  Both were obstinate, but when James II 
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assumed the throne, this common danger united them.103  Parties could either improve 
and act as  “national parties” who were willing to put the national interest above their 
own, or degenerate into faction.  Jacobins, those who supported James II, did the 
latter and became a stronger and more dangerous faction while the parties of Whig 
and Tory were becoming less so to one another.  The Jacobins were, at this time, the 
only truly dangerous faction because their difference centered on an unconstitutional 
belief in the crown’s prerogative.  The mutual fear of this faction incited “good men” 
to act against their party prejudices which had previously driven them apart.  
Consequently, both Whigs and Tories acted in the national interest over their own 
unique interests.  
The events surrounding the Revolution had a mitigating effect upon the 
parties, and when the situation called for it, they entered into a coalition that dissolved 
the differences of party.  Both parties “saw their errors,” Bolingbroke writes.  “Both 
had sacrificed their country to their party.  Both sacrificed, on this occasion, their 
party to their country.”104  Thus, when acting in coalition the parties ceased to be 
Whigs or Tories, though the coalition was not a party itself.105  Bolingbroke’s 
“national party” is therefore a party that will join a coalition in order to suppress 
faction.   
After the Revolution, the new constitution was built on national interest over 
that of party.  “Instead of erecting the new government on the narrow foundations of 
party systems, the foundations of it were laid as wide, and made as comprehensible as 
they could be.”106  This established the national interest over that of party interest and 
made party, in theory, less necessary.  Party would change after the Revolution, 
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however, as both Whigs and Tories dropped their “real essences,” even though they 
maintained their “nominal” ones, the latter causing as much damage after the 
Revolution as had been done by the former before the Revolution.107  Party before the 
Revolution, therefore, was founded upon real differences, especially ones concerning 
the foundation of government.108  After the Settlement, the differences became merely 
nominal.  Subsequently, party strife was only for the sake of party strife, even though 
that party strife was slowly corrupting the national parties.109   
Each party championed positions that they strongly opposed before the 
Revolution.  They forgot their true principles, and the struggle became one for power, 
not principle.110  Such a return to party was not as dangerous as it previously was, 
however, because the Revolution had settled all of the estates, especially the Houses 
of Parliament, upon a national interest: “the three estates have not only one common 
interest, which they always had; but they have, considered as estates, no separate, 
contradictory interest.”111  As long as the spirit and principles of the constitution are 
“agreeable to nature and the true ends of government,” which Bolingbroke believed 
the new constitution to be, truth and reason would prevail over any prejudices that 
sought to abuse or corrupt the government.112   
Regarding the Revolution, Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke would come to 
much the same conclusion as Bolingbroke.  All were in agreement that “party” had 
become less harmful, though “faction,” in the pejorative, had not.  A key difference 
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that all recognized between party and faction was the belief the former had in the 
constitution, and the contempt the latter held for it.  It was a difference recognized by 
Bolingbroke – that between principled and singular faction – though the thinkers of 
this thesis would come to different conclusions.  They would promote party to make it 
a stable part of constitutional government. 
In the ninth Letter of the Dissertation, Bolingbroke breaks down faction into 
three types.  First, there are men who are, “angry with the government, and yet 
resolved to maintain the constitution.”  Second, are men who are “averse to the 
government, because they are so to the constitution,” or, “averse to the constitution, 
because they are so to the government.”  Though the second is more likely to bring 
about slavery than to promote liberty, Bolingbroke does not see much danger in either 
of the first two types of faction against which “liberty” cannot prevail.  Men may 
want better ministers, kings even, but, according to Bolingbroke, they will never find 
a better constitution.  As a result, he puts his faith in the constitution to prevent 
against these two types of faction.  The third type of faction presents the greatest 
danger.  This, to Bolingbroke, is what is called in this thesis “singular faction.”  It is 
composed of men who are “attached to the government; or…to the persons of those 
who govern; or…to the power, profit, or protection they acquire by the favour of 
these persons, but enemies to the constitution.”113  Since the third type of faction does 
not conform to the principles of the constitution, but only to power and profit, they are 
only attached to themselves, or to those who protect them.  A prince who seeks to 
subvert the constitution by gaining more power usually puts this type of faction into 
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power, as their allegiance is to him and not the constitution.  Thus, faction disrupts the 
constitution for its own ends.114   
After identifying the type of faction the Dissertation is set against, 
Bolingbroke goes on to explain how that faction seeks to corrupt the constitution, and 
how such corruption can be prevented.  He employs the proverb, “the corruptions of 
the best things are the worst,” (repeated later by Hume) to illustrate how such a free 
constitution, indeed the best possible, is at the same time prone to corruption and 
when corrupted, to tyranny.115  As factions are no longer able to draw armies into the 
field, as they once were, they have come to rely on cunning and corruption.  Here 
Bolingbroke makes his strongest warning in the Dissertation: the corruption from and 
influence of the Crown that stems from the increase in the civil list will pervert the 
constitution.  Those of the Court party argue for an increased civil list so that they 
might corrupt the Houses of Parliament.116  This newfound influence, which is a 
corruption of the true powers of the constitution, replaced the corrupt arguments in 
support of the prerogative of the crown, as argued formerly by the Jacobins.  This is a 
new faction, Bolingbroke warns, and it must be opposed. 
As a free government is more prone to the schemes of those who seek to 
corrupt it, representatives must maintain their integrity.117  It is not the frequency of 
parliament that secures the liberty of the state, as much as it is the frequency of new 
parliaments.  Frequent parliaments allow the people to redress their grievances, but 
new parliaments allow the people to call their representatives to account for their 
actions, and in this way prevent factions from forming.118  After all, Parliament is the 
“true guardian” of liberty.  Though it was created as a bulwark against tyrannical 
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power, a corrupt parliament is worse than no parliament at all, as the latter only 
increases the power of the king.  Besides, Bolingbroke notes, it is easier for a king to 
corrupt parliament than it is for him to get rid of it.   
In addition to frequent new parliaments, which treated the effect of the 
corruption and not the cause, there was another solution that defended against the 
faction that sought to corrupt Parliament (and therefore the constitution).  Since this 
faction was intimately associated with a constituted power in the state (the Crown), 
Bolingbroke believed the solution could be found in the strengthening of a second 
constituted power, the Lords, who constitute a “middle order.”119  The duty of the 
Lords to be a “middle order” was in danger of being subverted by ministers of the 
Crown.120  It was in the Lords’ own interest to defend the Commons against the 
Crown, as opposed to the Crown against the Commons, because any loss of power in 
the Commons reverts to the Crown and bypasses the Lords altogether, putting them in 
a weaker position.121  He called upon the “good men” of national parties, the Whigs, 
Tories, and Dissenters, to join together so that this corruption might be opposed, and 
the constitutional powers rightfully restored.122  Bolingbroke argued for party to come 
to the rescue of party, to “lay aside their groundless distinctions,” and in coalition 
destroy those factions that are against the constitution.  
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By exposing the methods of corruption engaged in by faction (the Court 
party), he hoped to reform the vices that existed in government.  Thus, it is not only a 
Dissertation for the national parties, but for factions as well.  Men are liable to 
corruption, especially when led by faction.  Like the minister in the story with which 
he concludes the Dissertation, Bolingbroke wants only to point out this fact so that 
men can be diligent.  It is not necessarily a call-to-arms, but more an edifying tool by 
way of warning.  As sin without repentance brings damnation, so too does unchecked 
corruption bring the destruction of the constitution.  In order to save the soul of the 
constitution, Bolingbroke lobbied the good men of the national parties to proselytize 
the principles of the Country party who “must be authorized by the voice of the 
country [and] formed on principles of common interest.”123 
Bolingbroke was an important influence upon each thinker in this thesis, yet 
there remain many differences that set them uniquely apart from his belief in the 
purpose of party.  Indeed, an understanding of this difference is critical to interpreting 
the change in political thought that occurred on party and principle in the writings of 
Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke.  Whereas Bolingbroke saw continual corruption of 
party and the subsequent harm done to the national interest when party was set against 
party, whereas he saw its potential to become singular faction, the thinkers of this 
thesis saw something different.  Because their thought was inclusive of a more robust 
political principle, they understood that party politics had the potential to maintain 
political liberty.  Bolingbroke sought to recreate a coalition of national parties in order 
to uproot corruption and ultimately do away with party.  Alternatively, the thinkers of 
this thesis promoted party in order to make them more permanent. 
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Montesquieu was the first to alter this understanding.  After observing 
Parliament for nearly two years, he described the party rivalry as one where, “the 
hatred between the two parties would endure because it would always be 
powerless…As these parties are made up of free men, if one party gained too much, 
the effect of liberty would be to lower it while the citizens would come and raise the 
other party like hands rescuing the body.”124  Implicit in Montesquieu’s observation 
of Parliament was an understanding that political principle and self-interest were not 
mutually exclusive.  Likewise, Hume would later respond to Bolingbroke in “Of the 
Independency of Parliament” by explaining that corruption and bribery in all its forms 
is not contrary to the purpose of Parliament.125  As Hume believed that the crown was 
substantially weaker than the Commons he believed, unlike Bolingbroke, that bribery 
was a necessary method of balancing the two powers.  He did not see this as a 
slippery slope, as Bolingbroke did, because, like Montesquieu, Hume believed that an 
extra check upon corruption, political principle promoted by party, could regulate the 
self-interested nature of man. 
Bolingbroke’s faith was in the constituted powers of the state, not party.  Party 
was only a means to an end.   In contrast, Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke believed 
that party was useful, especially when it came to regulating the self-interested nature 
of men.  Though the coalition of Whigs and Tories resulted from the common self-
interest of “good men,” Bolingbroke saw little point in maintaining party after the 
Revolution because all of the great divisions had been settled.  Conversely, one 
conclusion of this thesis will assert that each thinker considered party a necessary part 
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of preventing further great divisions, even though it encouraged smaller ones.  Party 
for these men was not just a means, as it was for Bolingbroke, but an end. 
 
Bolingbroke wanted men involved in politics to be honest and sober, but he 
did not elaborate upon how they were to be so.  To the contrary, the thinkers of this 
thesis promulgated systems whereby men were inclined to be honest and sober 
statesmen by appealing to their self-interest, and even on occasion to passions that 
could be described as base.  To keep such passions and interests within bounds, their 
political principle also included schemes of inequality, education, and ultimately 
responsibility.  A Dutchman turned Englishman, Bernard Mandeville best promoted 
these ideas. 
Mandeville was perhaps the most influential writer on the understanding of 
political principle in the eighteenth century.  It was Mandeville who, in The Fable of 
the Bees, made the most cogent argument for the use of man’s private vices for public 
benefit.  Vice is in this way conceived as an homage paid to virtue; it is hypocritical, 
but effective nonetheless.  As the combination of party and principle is often 
neglected when looking at party, so too is the idea of hypocrisy overlooked when 
asking why it is that self-interested parties and politicians continue to operate within 
the bounds of politics.  This will be taken up in greater detail in the conclusion, but 
must be prefaced by taking a brief look at Mandeville’s thought on the topic. 
As will be argued in the thesis, the permission and employment of man’s self-
interest was a critical component to the understanding of governing principle for all 
three thinkers; much of their thought owes its origin to Mandeville.  Three aspects of 
Mandeville’s thought, highlighted below, are important influences upon each thinker 
and thus supply constant themes throughout this thesis regarding the relationship 
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between principle and constitutional government.  First, an appeal to vanity was 
necessary to encourage virtue.  Second, a balance of virtue and vice was of more 
benefit to the public than virtue alone.  Finally, a reinterpretation of honor that 
employed vice and self-interest could be employed in order to keep men ever mindful 
of their political duties. 
Men were not altogether virtuous, especially when left to their own devices, 
Mandeville argued.  An attempt to make a better or more virtuous person by pointing 
out his or her weaknesses, was as futile as trying to make someone taller by pointing 
out their height.  Human nature was in this way fixed.  Instead, if in order to 
encourage virtue one appealed to a weak person’s vanity, the proper motivation could 
be found for virtuous actions.  According to Mandeville, it was politicians who first 
discovered this.   
The “imaginary Notions that Men may be Virtuous without Self-denial are a 
vast inlet to Hypocrisy,” Mandeville wrote.126  Flatly recognizing the falsity with 
which he believed virtues and morality to have been created, Mandeville recognized 
that politicians were forced to coax men into believing that virtue, which was 
predicated on self-denial, was an ultimate goal for which they would be rewarded.  
Lawgivers have always tried to make their subjects believe the public interest should 
be placed ahead of their own personal interest, but as this is an almost impossible 
task, skillful politicians turned to morality, “to render Men useful to each other as 
well as tractable.”127  Morality thus became a codified version of proper action which 
men followed for the rewards society bestowed upon moral persons.  Mandeville 
sums up: “the Moral Virtues are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon 
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Pride.”128  Men act morally because they seek the rewards of being seen as moral; 
such actions are hypocritical but as they are motivated by vanity they are politically 
effective. 
Accused by many of his contemporaries of encouraging vice, Mandeville 
insisted instead that a balance of the two could achieve public benefit. 
I am far from encouraging Vice, and think it would be an unspeakable 
Felicity to a State, if the Sin of Uncleanness could be utterly Banish’d 
from it; but I am afraid it is impossible: the Passions of some People 
are too violent to be curb’d by an Law or Precept; and it is Wisdom in 
all Governments to bear with less Inconveniencies to prevent 
greater.129 
 
As vice was a part of human nature, there was no need to directly encourage it.  Thus, 
the action of the politician is one of laissez-faire.  Inaction ensures that the 
appropriate vices will be there to aid virtue for, “the best of virtues want the 
assistance of the worst of Vices.”130   
 Honor, which is, “nothing else but the good opinion of others,” filled this 
balance.131  Though it was a “chimera without Truth or Being, an invention of 
Moralists and Politicians,” honor employed the passions that Mandeville did not 
believe could be eliminated: vanity, jealousy, envy, all of which kept men “close to 
their Duty and Engagements.”132  The honorable man is obliged to be, “faithful to his 
Trust, to prefer the publick interest to his own, not to tell lies, nor defraud or wrong 
any Body, and from others to suffer no Affront, which is a Term of Art for every 
Action designedly done to undervalue him.”133  Though the principle of honor curbs 
self-interest, it does not do away with it.  By being so principled, men think more of 
themselves, not less. 
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 Mandeville was an important influence upon a theme that will run throughout 
this thesis: honor appropriately harnesses men’s motivation and employs it in political 
function for ends that benefit the state.  Among other ways that are examined in this 
thesis, the practice of venality demonstrates the way men’s vanity can be checked by 
their own self-interest; in this case, the desire for institutional honor: “When a 
Gentleman is made a Baron or an Earl, it is a Great Check upon him in many 
Respects, as a Gown and Cassock are to a young Student that has been newly taken 
into Orders.”134  No other virtue, Mandeville argued, has been as useful to the 
civilizing of mankind as honor.  Without the use of honor in political society men, 
“would soon degenerate into cruel Villains and treacherous Slaves.”135   
 
Plan 
The second chapter, “Honor is a Virtue: the benefits of prejudice,” will 
examine Montesquieu’s thought on the principles of honor and virtue and their 
political relationship with faction in the state, found principally in The Spirit of the 
Laws.  Without extinguishing either, Montesquieu sought to discover which principle 
could best contribute to the proper balance between liberty and equality, that would 
allow for independence but not license, and that would encourage ambition and 
reward talent but limit the usurpation of power.  It was honor, Montesquieu 
concluded, that could best secure such aims.   
The third chapter, “The Practical Side of Party Politics,” will examine David 
Hume’s understanding of principle and party politics, and is drawn mainly from the 
Essays Moral, Political, and Literary.  By tracing his concept of “justice” and looking 
at his thoughts on the origin of government, the chapter demonstrates that Hume 
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recognized the utility and the necessity of both principle and party, even though he 
denied the authority of their existence outside of their utility.  Influenced heavily by 
his observations of English politics, Hume’s understanding of faction reflected the 
reality of human nature as he saw it.  Instead of changing human nature, he sought to 
incorporate into his “ideal commonwealth” all the passions that could be used for 
political purposes, including the natural passions of jealousy, spite, or intrigue.  In this 
way, faction was regulated even though self-interest was permitted as a political 
motivation.   
The fourth chapter, “A Prudent Party for Remarkable Men,” will examine how 
the ideas of principle and party informed Burke’s understanding of legitimate 
resistance to the sovereign authority.  Of the three, Burke’s thought on party and 
principle remains the most recognizable today.  Imbedded in party politics himself, he 
became a champion for its continued presence in constitutional government.  The 
fourth chapter argues that the reason for this is not as evident as first appears, but it 
has everything to do with the maintenance of political principle and, as a result, 
political liberty.  Burke found a better, more proficient vehicle than man to embody 
principle in government.  
 
It is an inherent irony of politics that extraordinary political moments receive 
much more time and attention than do the ordinary ones.  The outbreak of war, the 
welcome peace: if an issue’s importance is measured by studies dedicated to it, then 
neither are lacking in importance.  But, what about limited political strife within the 
bounds of a single political body?  Indeed, this is the only situation where a party 
system can arise and be tolerated, but it remains an uncomfortable concept for us to 
accept.  Not only are we, in accepting the existence of party strife, admitting that 
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political truths will not be agreed upon, we are admitting that the body politic can 
never be made whole.  It is the equivalent of being politically agnostic, or at worst, 
atheistic.  Though party as singular faction is almost always involved in extraordinary 
political change, principled faction, or party, operates in the realm of, and maintains, 
the ordinary.  That being said, this thesis will attempt to find the extraordinary in the 
ordinary, as Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke all did.   
This thesis has all the beginnings of a great joke.  It should be funny: a 
Frenchman, a Scot, and an Irishman: if only they had walked into a bar together!  
What follows is the punch line, unfortunately.  At the least, I hope it entertains and 
manages, every now and then, to provoke a novel thought.   
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2  §  Honor is a Virtue: the benefits of prejudice 
 
 
 
 
You could say that it is like the system of the universe, where there is a 
force constantly repelling all bodies from the center and a force of 
gravitation attracting them to it.  Honor makes all the parts of the 
body politic move; its very action binds them, and each person works 
for the common good, believing he works for his individual 
interests.136 
 
 
 
The Spirit of the Laws was written to be an enduring treatise.  It was, 
Montesquieu believed, a survey without precedent concerning the historical relation 
of the law among and between different peoples.  Yet, he was not so foolish as to 
believe the work to be ultimate and definitive.  As stated in the conclusion of his 
eleventh book of The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu’s purpose in writing the work 
was to make men think and to do so in new ways.  In the preface to the last edition of 
The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu included the phrase from Ovid, “an offspring 
without a mother.”  He did not consider his ideas entirely new, though he did consider 
its composition to be original.  His successors would agree.  As Pierre Manent points 
out, if political philosophy starts from the viewpoint of the actor and sociology starts 
from the viewpoint of the spectator, then Montesquieu could be said to have been the 
first sociologist.137  Likewise, Emile Durkheim would claim that The Spirit of the 
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Laws laid down the principles of sociology.138  All told, the work took twenty years to 
complete and resulted in what a renowned twentieth-century thinker would term a 
“distinctive political theory that was unlike any of its predecessors.”139   
As Melvin Richter notes, Montesquieu sought to explain how the causes of 
legal, political and social phenomena could be explained while retaining a rational 
basis for condemning certain government forms or government practices as well as 
certain social and religious practices.140  The perspectives and explanations he 
generated, though overlapping and sometimes contradictory, allowed him to take 
social and political approaches toward men and groups that were otherwise 
antagonistic.  The novelty of this task is perhaps why Montesquieu is better 
remembered for whom he influenced than by whom he was influenced.   
He was, overall, a man apart: an aristocrat, an historian, a wine merchant, a 
well-seasoned traveler.  He was learned though not connected with any university, 
extensively traveled with the wealth and connections that his position afforded him, 
and a practiced magistrate who knew full well the laws and their effects upon men.141  
All the same, he was an observer and not a man of action.  It is interesting to note that 
Montesquieu effectively resigned from public life at the age of thirty-six; he would 
not publish The Spirit of the Laws until he was fifty-seven.  As Albert Sorel points 
out, there have been few thinkers who have had such an impact on their century as 
Montesquieu did, without having been directly involved in the affairs that defined 
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it.142  Within half a century after his death in 1755, Montesquieu’s thought helped to 
shape two very different revolutions.  In 1787 and 1789, he was more than an 
inspiration to the “founding fathers” of the United States and the Revolutionary 
citoyens of France – he was the cited authority.  As the world changed and 
government was redefined, it was Montesquieu who, first and foremost, “served as a 
bridge between a traditional and a modern idea of constitutional government.”143   
 
The literature dealing with Montesquieu’s principles of government is 
abundant, in particular concerning honor and virtue (while leaving aside his third 
principle, fear), though it remains surprisingly analogous in form and, more 
importantly, conclusion.  The vast majority concludes with Montesquieu’s preference 
for honor, and there are a few who conclude otherwise.  While this could be seen as a 
gap in the literature, and is indeed tempting to see it as such, it is also testament to the 
strength of the argument which runs vaguely along similar lines.  That is, 
Montesquieu had an early preference for classical virtue but he had concluded that the 
age of virtuous republics was over, and his voyages in Europe, prior to and influential 
upon The Spirit of the Laws, proved as much.  The system of honor was the only 
abstract principle (for certainly there were other motivating principles as 
demonstrated by his examination of English qualities of character) that could preserve 
political liberty in the contemporary world. 
Most commentators stipulate that true virtue was harder to establish in its most 
effective form (VIII.3), and too often gave rise to extreme forms of virtue that 
inevitably led to the despotism of one alone.  Conversely, however, Nannerl Keohane 
interprets Montesquieu as adapting a secular version of Christian charity, and from 
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there goes on to state Montesquieu’s preference for the classics and classical virtue.  
Concerning the principle of monarchies, Keohane describes honor as amour-propre 
turned into a virtue via an all-encompassing education of the subjects of modern 
monarchy.144  She rightly describes honor as self-seeking, yet neglects Montesquieu’s 
bi-fold classification of honor into true and false honor.  In particular, Keohane 
neglects Montesquieu’s description of true honor, or honor that is self-confident but 
not self-righteous.  Indeed, Keohane sees Montesquieu as backward looking and as a 
result mistakenly glosses over his conviction of legislative and constitutional 
progress, and the role that honor was to play in that progress. 
Like Keohane, Robert Shackleton highlights Montesquieu’s early preference 
for the notion of republican virtue which he took from his readings of the ancient 
world.  Shackleton, however, traces Montesquieu’s thought on virtue and honor from 
the Persian Letters to The Spirit of the Laws, noting in particular his disillusionment 
with republican virtue as a result of his travels in the republics of eighteenth-century 
Italy and Holland.  Unlike Keohane, Shackleton rightly concludes that Montesquieu 
considered virtuous republics a thing of the past.145 
More emphatically, Pierre Manent calls Montesquieu’s idea of virtue “a 
fiction” and does not take him at his word that in speaking of virtue he means 
“political virtue.”  Instead, Montesquieu’s virtue, “draws its force and its meaning 
from the spent force of two traditions, ancient and Christian.”146  The common 
denominator for these two types of virtue was “obedience to a rule that mortifies the 
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passions.”147  After arguing that Montesquieu was the first modern thinker, Manent 
argues that honor could not have been the principle that Montesquieu admired – like 
virtue, it too was outdated.  The modern principle that he desired for modern regimes 
was a mix of honor and commercial self-interest.  Though Montesquieu may have 
appreciated the principles behind the English constitution, Manent neglects two 
aspects of this appreciation.  First, honor as a principle has more to do with 
institutional resistance within a constitution than do the mixed principles of England.  
Honor is, and has been, constitutionally established.  It suggests permanence and 
reinforces law.  Even though the English principles maintain an undeniable influence 
within the constitution, they were by and large untested.  Second, when Manent 
claims that Montesquieu is being intentionally redundant with “good man” and “good 
citizen,” he too neglects the intention of a political actor and the ends achieved, or the 
difference between true and false honor that Montesquieu recognized was an 
important aspect to understanding modern men.148 
Harvey Mansfield supposes that Montesquieu’s concept of virtue was 
intentionally utopian while his description of the principle of honor is genuine and 
suitable to contemporary Europe.  Montesquieu’s philosophy is, “embodied in an 
interpretation of institutions and laws found in actual regimes, not philosophical 
utopias.”149  Mansfield interprets Montesquieu as believing that passions and fears are 
more fundamental to human action than reason and gratitude.  Contrary to Hobbes 
and Locke, according to Mansfield, Montesquieu focuses on the opinions about our 
fears concerning security.  Montesquieu’s starting point is thus rooted in human 
nature, and he constructs his theory of government from what that human nature can 
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tell us.  Continually disparaging of Montesquieu’s concept of virtue, Mansfield 
concludes that classical virtue cannot establish a ground in reason, whereas modern 
freedom cannot find a ground in nature.150  Mansfield highlights book XI, chapter 6 of 
The Spirit of the Laws, where Montesquieu ascribes to the House of Lords the ability 
to defend the judicial power, and rightly notes that the judiciary should have a 
“faculty of preventing” rather than a “faculty of enacting.”151  For Mansfield, 
Montesquieu’s aristocratic honor finds a distinct role in government through the 
power of judging where honor operates as a defensive political mechanism in a mixed 
form of government (England); this is essentially a precursor to Federalist #47, and is 
later picked up by other commentators such as Michael Mosher, Sharon Krause, and 
most notably Paul Carrese.  
Sharon Krause, borrowing strongly from Mansfield, in particular concerning a 
negative interpretation of virtue, begins her analysis of Montesquieu’s principles with 
a fundamental assumption that restlessness and internal division mark all free 
governments.152  When joined with the Montesquieuan belief that all men will try to 
increase their own power, Krause seeks to explain why Montesquieu would promote 
his version of a free government (where faction is allowed) when internal division and 
faction inevitably lead to the usurpation of power.  These two assumptions appear to 
contradict one another: if faction leads to the usurpation of power, how can the 
government be free?  The answer lies in the principle of monarchical government, 
honor, and Krause rightly takes Montesquieu to his logical conclusion that honor, 
“can animate actions that self-interest, at least conventionally conceived, never would 
allow, including actions that put one’s life in jeopardy in the name of principled 
                                                
150 Ibid., 222. 
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ends.”153  Unlike Keohane, Krause argues that honor, as Montesquieu described it, 
was false because, philosophically speaking, it does not suppose perfect virtue or seek 
to directly benefit the community.  Regardless, Krause is right to point out that false 
honor is not corrupt honor.154  
Thomas Pangle (like Krause and Mansfield, a Straussian) in his book 
Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism, notes that Montesquieu’s notion of virtue is 
subordinated to freedom because virtue can be misled by passion.155  For Pangle, 
Montesquieuan virtue is a means to the end of liberty as self-rule.  Though in stating 
this Pangle neglects the inherent danger of subordinating the self to the general 
welfare of the community, a topic which will be examined in greater detail later in the 
chapter.  Like Mansfield and Krause, Pangle also finds Montesquieu’s classical virtue 
outdated, and argues that virtue has a powerful tendency to fill the void left by its 
outdated nature with acts of aggression, which in turn can change a democratic people 
into a despotic empire.156 
Without first forming a preference for honor or virtue and displaying its utility 
or uselessness, as the above have done, commentators such as David Carrithers, Mark 
Hulliung and Michael Mosher, focus on aspects that are commonly neglected in the 
literature on Montesquieu’s understanding of honor and virtue.  In the end, however, 
all three demonstrate Montesquieu’s preference for honor.  For instance, Mark 
Hulliung takes a more historically minded approach by placing Montesquieu within 
an historical framework and interpreting his thought as a result of, even a reaction 
against, contemporary French politics whereupon honor was paramount to all political 
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action and inaction within the state.  Hulliung goes so far as to point out the different 
effects that honor can have on various social classes, and concludes that its effect is 
one that reinforces the liberty provided by the code of honor.157   
David Carrithers analyzes virtue and honor via the principles that animate 
aristocratic republics, a point of view that has been largely ignored.  Carrithers points 
out that Montesquieu did, in fact, hold a higher opinion of monarchical government 
than of republics, particularly adapted to modern conditions, though in the end 
Carrithers offers a view that is quite conciliatory of the two principles, virtue and 
honor.  Analyzing aristocratic republics, Carrithers demonstrates that Montesquieu’s 
conception of virtue is in fact still pragmatic (indeed, Montesquieu calls it 
moderation), though it serves largely to maintain a regime from within.  Nonetheless, 
Carrithers emphasizes Montesquieu’s subtle preference for honor.  Carrithers suggests 
that by appearing to be more virtuous without being less honorable, the aristocracy 
can better maintain the stability of their rule.158   
Like Hulliung, Michael Mosher also traces the lineage of Montesquieu’s 
conception of honor, though his level of analysis runs much deeper into French and 
Franco-Roman history than just the contemporary politics of Montesquieu’s day.159  
In doing so Mosher highlights the more distant historical conventions from which 
Montesquieu borrowed in order to explicate the development and function of honor in 
his philosophy.  In particular, Mosher emphasizes the singular nature of 
Montesquieu’s code of honor, originating initially at the level of the individual group 
but later developing for the individual actor as well.  Such a singular perspective, or 
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custom of independence, allowed for an altered epistemological perspective that 
changed the group’s, and later the individual’s, relationship to figures of authority; 
such a conception of honor is also shared by Krause.  Moreover, Mosher examines an 
area of Montesquieu’s thought that is often overlooked, namely how honor is critical 
to sovereignty, and how both are intimately linked to the idea of prerogative.  A point 
also taken up by Keohane and Mansfield, Mosher demonstrates that by not abusing 
his power, the monarch increases the faith his subjects have in him, giving the 
nobility no need or want to exercise their right of remonstrance or even defiance 
against the king.  In this way, Mosher demonstrates not only how honor can be 
positively exercised, but also how honor can maintain a system by not acting.   
 
The suggestion in the title of this chapter begs the question, how can thinking 
more of yourself benefit others?  Indeed, this is what the chapter will seek to answer.  
It will demonstrate that for Montesquieu, honor as a quality of character was a virtue, 
but virtue as a quality of character was outdated.  This conclusion has important 
results for Montesquieu’s political philosophy, and these results are the point of this 
chapter: faction motivated by virtue destroyed political liberty, but faction motivated 
by honor maintained it.   
This chapter will further engage in the debate centered on Montesquieu’s 
principles of government, discussed below, but will deviate slightly by examining the 
connection concerning the governing principles of moderate regimes given by 
Montesquieu, virtue and honor, and the historical stability of the state as it relates to 
faction.  That said, before examining the contemporary scholarship out of which the 
argument of this chapter establishes itself, it is necessary to show how Montesquieu 
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establishes both principles, virtue and honor, in relation the structure of the 
government which they motivate.   
In the first chapter of the second book, Montesquieu establishes his three-fold 
system of government by stating three facts:  
republican government is that in which the people as a body, or only a 
part of the people, have sovereign power; monarchical government is 
that in which one alone governs, but by fixed and established laws; 
whereas, in despotic government, one alone, without law and without 
rule, draws everything along by his will and his caprices.160  
 
For Montesquieu, there existed a difference between the nature of the government and 
its principle: “its nature is that which makes it what it is, and its principle, that which 
makes it act.  The one is its particular structure, and the other is the human passions 
that it set in motion.”161  Montesquieu asserted that the nature of the government does 
not always necessitate its principle, nor does its principle necessarily carry along with 
it its respective nature, but the two are intimately related since the bodies of the state 
could not operate without the quality of character which motivates them.   
Montesquieu not only categorizes government according to the location of 
political power, or the number of individuals who yield it, but elaborates by 
emphasizing how that power is exercised.  He does not make an initial division 
between aristocracy and democracy, for instance, which differ in the location of 
power.  Monarchy and despotism are separated even though the locus of power is 
nearly identical.  Constitutionally, the details may be the same among governments, 
as in a monarchy and a despotism, but the differentiation of the two becomes evident 
in the policies of those who wield power, i.e. in the action of the government, and the 
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161 SPL, III.6, 21.  Cf. Laws 631b-632d, 705d-706a, and specifically 713.  Here Plato remarks that 
regimes take the form of those who control them.  Montesquieu and Plato collide at this point 
concerning despotism, since despotism always necessitates its principle, viz., fear.   
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reaction of the bodies that compose the state.162  Indeed, the principles of the 
government (virtue, honor, and fear) are the motivations for this action and reaction. 
Though Montesquieu had a great difficulty in fully explaining the principle of 
virtue, as he understood it, he described it in The Spirit of the Laws as “a very simple 
thing.”  “It is love of the republic,” he continues, “it is a feeling and not a result of 
knowledge.  The lowest man in the state, like the first, can have this feeling.”163  
Virtue, like honor, is a feeling that is greater than the individual who feels it, but 
unlike honor, virtue causes that individual to love the community more than he would 
love himself for there is no self without the community.  On the other hand, honor, the 
principle of monarchies, “is the prejudice of each person and each condition.”  Here, 
“one will rarely find someone who is a good man; for, in order to be a good man, one 
must have the intention of being one and love the state less for oneself than for 
itself.”164  The honorable man is an individual (indeed, he is what his station dictates 
he be) before he is a part of anything bigger, such as a community. 
Both honor and virtue, as principles of government, do not define the very 
nature of the government for Montesquieu, as they do, for instance, for Aristotle.165  
Montesquieu considered them to be derivative of the nature of the government, 
though this is a general rule capable of exception and not a fact.  Virtuous princes 
could exist.  Montesquieu had “followed all the histories,” he explained, “I know very 
well that virtuous princes are not rare, but I say that in a monarchy it is very difficult 
for the people to be virtuous.”166  For Montesquieu, the purpose of the regime is no 
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longer the way of life that is engendered by the constitution; the way of life 
engendered by that principle does not take precedence over the structure.  Rather, it is 
the extent to which the two in tandem can produce political liberty.  The purpose of 
Montesquieu’s moderate government, those governments who have as their principle 
either honor or virtue, is the creation of political liberty.167  Yet, the arrangement of 
the correct principle with the correct nature, “is a masterpiece of legislation that 
chance rarely produces and prudence is rarely allowed to produce.”168 
In a related manner, Montesquieu asserted the importance of the individual 
over the polis.  Accordingly, each moderate governing principle relates to the way in 
which the individual can obtain political liberty according to his or her own opinion 
of personal security.  Even as virtue pertains to the individual subordinating his or her 
interests to the whole, this is only as a means to the end of individual political liberty.  
Its measure of success is the extent to which such an end can be achieved through the 
conduits of virtue as a governing principle, and the same applies for honor.  
 
Political liberty might be the end of moderate government, but what about the 
justice of it all?  Justice remains a term that, for some, Montesquieu does not 
sufficiently define.  A brief examination of his thought upon it can help to better 
illustrate the relationship between his principles of government and other, more 
familiar, virtues.169  For instance, he refuses to assign it an aesthetic value, such as 
beautiful, good, noble or great; all terms which are merely, as Montesquieu puts it, 
“attributes of objects…relative to the thinkers who consider them.”170  “Justice” in the 
first book of The Spirit of the Laws is put forth as a priori and is at this point 
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seemingly an anomaly, and increasingly so as the reader treads further.  Unlike the 
other laws, “justice” does not contain any empirical evidence in order to take it as a 
given.  Rather, it exists just as the radii of a circle were equal even before the circle 
was drawn (I.1).  As a result, it’s meaning seems incomprehensible in a system of a 
posteriori law.  This is an anomaly, yes, but an anomaly that is cleared by the 
discovery of its purpose.  That is, justice must exist in order to functionally dispel the 
notion that whatever is, is right.171   
Montesquieu describes justice much earlier in the Persian Letters as a 
“relation of suitability, which actually exists between two things.”  Men, “do not see 
these relationships all the time,” and even when they do they turn away from them.  
What they choose to see instead “is always their self-interest.”  Men commit unjust 
acts because they reason (rightfully) that it is in their self-interest to do so, not 
because they are gratuitous.  Justice, however, should instruct men to realign their 
reason and see what is in their ultimate self-interest, though its hold on men is tenuous 
at best.  The hold it has on men is ascribed to God, who is perfect, and “does not 
depend on human conventions.”172  Even if one does not believe in God, Usbek 
argues, it should still be believed for the good it does men in society.  This anti-
Hobbesian Letter attempts to dispel the myth of not only whatever is, is right, but also 
the myth of the right of the strongest. 
A more practical way of explaining justice is to consider it as a virtue.  Most 
virtues, such as friendship or love of country, have particular rapports to virtue.  
Justice, as such, is a general rapport, and all the virtues which destroy this rapport are 
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not virtues, as Montesquieu confided in a pensée.173  Therefore, justice as a meta-
virtue is above all other particular virtues.  Montesquieu believed in and appreciated 
the possibilities that were open to men if they could see above the (hypocritical and 
bigoted) particular to the general, concerning “humanity” in its broadest terms.174  
Nevertheless, there is a caveat.  Rather than espouse general or a priori theories of 
right that had no foundation in human society, Montesquieu looked to the level of the 
particular concerning theories of right (including religious right and morality), law, 
and established constitutional bodies (along with their subsequent histories) in order 
to defend a system of government that provided political liberty.  As will be argued 
below, liberty is better protected under the weight of established law and historical 
practices from the propensity of the self-interested desire for power that will, 
inevitably, override abstract, theoretical and somewhat contradictory principles of 
government. 
Honor and virtue were both accepted codes of justice for Montesquieu since 
they maintained all the other virtues that led to political liberty.  The difference in 
potential between the two, however, underscores Montesquieu’s preference for honor.  
Montesquieu believed that humanity came before citizenship; while honor permits 
this ordering of things, virtue, especially classical virtue, is hostile to the very belief 
that man is an individual before he is a citizen.175  Honor, on the other hand, maintains 
liberty as either “true” or “false” honor; the difference here between “true” and 
“false” was one of sincerity and not substance, for they both shared the same end 
though not deliberately the same means.   
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Why are principles so essential to the maintenance and balance of power in a 
constitution?  Book VIII, beginning with the chapter entitled, “On the Corruption of 
the Principles of the Three Governments,” gives the reader a start.  “The corruption of 
each government,” Montesquieu writes, “almost always begins with that of its 
principles.”176  So it is to the principle that one must look in order to discover how 
and why a government is corrupted.  However, as despotism is already by its nature 
corrupted (VIII.10), the principles which motivate moderate governments, virtue and 
honor, must be examined in order to see how political liberty is both preserved and 
lost.  That said, this chapter will begin first with an analysis of Montesquieu’s 
conception of virtue and demonstrate that since it has historically given rise to 
extremism, most often leading to the despotism of one alone, it has become a 
contradictory and obsolete principle.  Republics, by their definition, dissolve private 
interest and encourage a single general will.  In the abstract, this form of government 
is altogether antithetical to faction since all virtuous citizens put the common good 
ahead of their private interests.  In practice, of course, no form of government, where 
the public interest took precedence over all private interests without interference from 
private concerns, has ever existed.  A dissonance would resonate from the conflict 
between the theory of virtue and the reality of its practice.  The first section of this 
chapter will examine this dissonance. 
On the other hand, the principle of honor explicitly permits private interests 
within the state, so long as they do not interfere with recognized prerogatives.  Since 
honor is really a prejudice encouraging self-interest rather than self-renunciation (as 
virtue does), it is a more stable quality of character.  What’s more, honor has 
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historically established itself within the constitution of European monarchies as a 
noble resistance to the abuse of power, most notably within the French and English 
constitutions, though it has been better maintained within the latter.  How 
Montesquieu comes to these conclusions concerning honor will be examined in the 
second section.  For now, let us examine Montesquieu’s assessment of virtue. 
 
Virtue 
In speaking of virtue, Montesquieu was describing political virtue, not to be 
confused with Christian or pagan virtue, though it could be argued that his form of 
virtue is a substitution for Christian charity, as discussed above.  In fact, Nannerl 
Keohane argues that Montesquieu’s conception of virtue is, “a secular version of 
Christian charity itself.”177  For obvious reasons, Montesquieu could not highlight 
virtue’s incompatibility with Christianity, and so this conclusion may be a bit 
exaggerated, though he would have been wise to make them appear similar enough so 
as not to draw the direct censorship of the state authority.178  Montesquieu had 
difficulty explaining exactly what he meant, even though the description is rather 
clear in The Spirit of the Laws as to what virtue is, and what it is not (III.3-6, IV.5, 
V.2-3, VIII.2).  Specific definitions laid out in the work sometimes contradict one 
another, especially as seen by ecclesiastics who were less willing to accept a theory of 
virtue outside of Christian virtue.  Montesquieu was forced continually to redefine a 
term that for all intents and purposes applied equally to the ancient Greeks, just as 
much as it did to contemporary monastic orders.  For instance, after remarking that in 
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a monarchy it is very difficult for the people to be virtuous, Montesquieu reveals in a 
footnote, “I speak here about political virtue, which is moral virtue in the sense that it 
points toward the general good, very little about individual moral virtues, and not at 
all about that virtue which relates its revealed truths,” and then goes on to tell the 
reader that, “this will be seen in book 5, chap. 2,” where he presents his most clear 
and concise definition.179   
Montesquieu’s own clarifications before and after the work’s publication 
further illustrate the difficulty he had in explaining his understanding of virtue.  He 
was not trying to give virtue a more complicated or complex definition, but the 
opposite.  He sought to define new words, or redefine old words, in order to fit his 
new ideas.  Most of all, however, he wanted the reader to understand how he 
conceived of virtue, as it pertained to the character of man and its relation to 
government, and outside of the dominant discourses to which the reader would have 
been accustomed, principal among such discourses being religion.  Montesquieu 
included an avertissement, preceding the preface to The Spirit of the Laws, in order to 
enlighten his readers as to how he conceived of the word “virtue” itself, even though 
he would supply very nearly the same message later on in the work (III.5).  In the 
avertissement, Montesquieu clarified, “what I call virtue in a republic is love of the 
country, that is to say love of equality.  It is not a moral virtue, nor a Christian virtue, 
it is political virtue.”180  It is significant, and highlights Montesquieu’s concern about 
being misunderstood, that he would attempt to define virtue twice outside of the main 
body of the text before his own referenced (albeit footnoted) definition found in the 
fifth book.  Montesquieu did not stop there: even after the work was published, he 
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explained in an éclaircissement designed to placate his critics that he linguistically 
defined the word “virtue” as something more complex than what one person may 
suppose in a single language signifying one particular object or action.  It is, in fact, 
“that which precedes, or that which follows the word, which fixes the signification of 
it.”181  
Though Montesquieu had difficulty in pronouncing clearly his conception of 
virtue exactly as he understood it, it remains a fundamental aspect of his political 
thought and cannot be reduced or overlooked simply because his thought seems 
convoluted, contradictory, or at times both.  In his Pensées, Montesquieu provides the 
researcher a glimpse into his personal convictions.  Concerning virtue, he wrote: 
“Nothing is closer to divine Providence than that general benevolence and grand 
capacity for loving that embraces all men; and nothing is closer to the instincts of 
beasts than the limits the heart puts upon itself when it is concerned only with its own 
self-interest.”182  In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu explicitly states that, “the 
natural place of virtue is with liberty.”183  Noting the two preceding quotes, it would 
seem natural that such liberal convictions would dictate his political thought, but this 
turns out not to be the case.   
Montesquieu believed that history had surpassed virtue as a quality of 
character, and that new institutions had been formed around new and more self-
interested motivations.  Virtue, as a contemporary governing principle was itself 
contradictory and thus obsolete; this is a conclusion which helps to better explain why 
Montesquieu himself has such difficulty justifying virtue for contemporary 
government.  Montesquieu had decided as much already in the Considerations where 
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he derided the indifference of contemporary republicans, which was no better than the 
tyranny of a prince. 
The advantage of a free state is that revenues are better administered in 
it.  But what if they are more poorly administered?  The advantage of a 
free state is that there are no favorites in it.  But when that is not the 
case – when it is necessary to line the pockets of the friends and 
relatives, not of a prince, but of all those who participate in the 
government – all is lost.  There is greater danger in the laws being 
evaded in a free state than in their being violated by a prince, for a 
prince is always the foremost citizen of his state, and has more interest 
in preserving it than anyone else.184 
 
Montesquieu’s analysis of virtue is fraught with a sense of overriding pessimism, 
evident throughout The Spirit of the Laws.  The section below will seek to examine 
that pessimism in The Spirit of the Laws in order to demonstrate that the role virtue 
played in it was one of critical importance, for it served to highlight the strengths and 
shortcomings of Montesquieu’s other governing principle of moderate regimes, 
honor. 
 
Montesquieu explains in book V that, “virtue, in a republic, is a very simple 
thing: it is love of the republic” (l’amour de la patrie), which translates as both a love 
of equality and frugality, arising from a shared love of public life (V.2-3).  It is a love 
of the state that is stronger than self-love (amour-propre).  In a republic, individual 
happiness does not come from the individual himself but rather from the happiness of 
the whole.  Virtue seeks to elevate human nature from the murky depths of self-
interest and vanity to a higher level of being where collective interest supports the 
republic.  Virtue neither discriminates nor distinguishes among citizens (unlike honor) 
since, “the lowest man in the state, like the first, can have this feeling.”185  Here 
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Montesquieu makes a distinction: citizens of lower birth (including honnête gens) can 
adhere better to virtue when combined with good maxims, than they can to honor.186  
Since virtue does not distinguish or encourage individual passions, it gives stronger 
inclinations to the general order, to which are included most or all of the subjects of a 
state, and not just a select few, as with honor.  Such inclinations, however, can vary 
towards the extreme and in this lies its inherent difficulty.  After all, political virtue is, 
“a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very painful thing.”187  Its adoption 
required an austerity of spirit with a strict adherence to the general order, both of 
which Montesquieu recognized went against man’s natural passions and were 
extremely difficult to maintain.  Indeed virtue, for Montesquieu, was increasingly 
utopian in an historical sense, and seemed to give rise to more difficulties than 
solutions among contemporary states.   
The closest parallel Montesquieu could find to classical virtue was the regime 
one found in monasteries.  Here, the more individual passions are suppressed, the 
more the individual will give himself up to passions for the general order.  For 
instance, Montesquieu asks, “why do monks love their order?”  It is because they love 
that which deprives them of all ordinary passions.  “The more austere it is, that is, the 
more it curtails their inclinations, the more force it gives to those that remain.”188  
What remains are the passions that give rise to extreme virtue – passions which are, in 
the end, in vain because they negate the end which justifies them by not allowing for 
the self-fulfillment sought out by one’s virtuous self-renunciation.  Montesquieu 
changes virtue from an end to a means, “from the end for which the republic should 
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be maintained to the means of maintaining it.”189  Or, as another commentator puts it, 
Montesquieu’s virtue is “not founded on the mastery of the passions by reason, but 
rather on the absorption of the passionate energy of the passions by and in a unique 
passion…It is thus the love of a rule that oppresses and even ‘afflicts.’”190  In order 
for the virtuous man to satisfy his original desire for self-fulfillment, he must disavow 
his individual passions for the interests of the whole.  The virtuous man gives up 
individual and seemingly capricious desires for the promise of something bigger, 
better and more self-fulfilling; yet all that remains after he and those like him have 
given up so much of themselves, “is the passion for the very rule that afflicts 
them.”191  All of the passions for whatever virtues may have existed previously are 
now channeled into the one passion of self-renunciation and ultimately a love of the 
order that represses them. 
 
Interestingly, in the third book of The Spirit of the Laws in a chapter entitled 
“On the principle of democracy,” more time is spent explaining how faction has 
historically corrupted virtue (III.3), than how virtue can withstand faction (IV.5).  As 
will be explained below, extreme forms of virtue can easily surpass rational notions of 
equality and frugality, which are the two principal components that constitute virtue 
as a principle of government.  Though equality is often seen to have a homogenizing 
effect, it can also engender respect for difference.  By its very nature, virtue accords 
itself to the persuasion of the majority.  Thus, it typically does not have a 
constitutional restraint, but if any restraint has been broken, virtue can be employed in 
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achieving extreme equality, something which inevitably nullifies the respect for 
minority interests, destroys the constitution, and leads to the tyranny of one alone 
(VIII.3).192  As a principal weakness of democracies, unrestrained faction can and will 
manipulate virtue towards its own ends. 
After the “fundamental laws,” such as equality or the right to vote (V.5; II.2), 
the laws of education are the most important in a republic.  After all, it is, “in 
republican government that the full power of education is needed.”193  Education in a 
republic aims to curb the natural inclinations towards oneself and to identify and 
marry, as far as is possible, the love of the homeland with the love of self.  Since the 
success of the republic depends on the extent to which each individual can 
subordinate his or her own interests to that of the whole, republics live or die by the 
effectiveness of their education. 
Though education played a large role in the effectiveness of virtue in a 
republic, its success was historically diminished.  As noted above, Montesquieu sets 
his conception of virtue apart from other definitions, particularly those of the classics.  
He believed there existed a significant difference between Greek or Roman virtue and 
modern virtue, the former of which served to highlight a disadvantage of the latter.  In 
the fourth chapter of book IV, Montesquieu remarks that the education of the classics 
had the advantage of never being contradicted:  
Today we receive three different or opposing educations: that of our 
fathers, that of our schoolmasters, and that of the world.  What we are 
told by the last upsets all the ideas of the first two.  This comes partly 
from the opposition there is for us between the ties of religion and 
those of the world, a thing unknown among the ancients.194 
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Though virtue remained a motivating principle, collective virtue seemed to be a thing 
of the past.  Unlike the ancients, modern virtue is, in a way, confused by contradictory 
moral standards.  For the ancients, however, collective virtue was the moral standard.  
Virtue is thus outdated, principally because social conditions, among them education, 
were changing faster than the pace to which virtue could become accustomed.195  As a 
result, lacking the unity that the full force of virtue requires, moderns can only be 
astonished at the things that were done in ancient governments (IV.4).  Without the 
necessary unity required for virtue, modern virtue can only become more extreme.  It 
cannot tolerate the contradictory nature of modern man, nor the hypocrisy caused by 
such contradictions.  Attempts to revive it only secure extreme forms of virtue that, 
like the monk’s virtue, become more severe. 
Montesquieu’s analysis of democracy (as a pure form of government) rests on 
the assumption that virtue, as the principle of modern republican or democratic 
government, is no longer strong enough to withstand the corrupting nature of faction.  
Democracies, Montesquieu explains, lack the flexibility of prerogative, which honor 
allows for and fear does not dare question.  Montesquieu makes clear that the 
executor of the law in a monarchy can put himself above the law without truly 
endangering the constitution, whereas in a popular government he who executes the 
law senses that he is under it at the same time, and knows that he will feel the weight 
of the law if he were to break it (V.2).  Democracies suffer two drawbacks from this 
lack of prerogative.  If the constitution were threatened, and it was recognized that no 
constitutional mechanisms existed to save it, there would be no way to exercise 
constitutionally sanctioned prerogative without having to go outside of the very same 
constitution, an action which if committed would effectively destroy its authority.  
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After all, no one group or person is sovereign, but all are collectively, which 
highlights another difficulty in exercising prerogative in a democracy.  That is, 
prerogative must act quickly and decisively, something which the “people” cannot do. 
Prerogative and collective virtue are things which republics (and democracies 
more acutely) lack, but they are not the cause of faction, and so questions remain 
concerning the relation between the principle of a republic, virtue, and the rise of 
faction.  Corruption of this principle, Montesquieu writes, “seldom begins with the 
people” since they have formed a stronger attachment to that which is established as a 
result of their “middling enlightenment”; virtuous republicans remain virtuous 
because they are attached to that which they have always known.196  Instead of 
beginning with the people, “the corruption of each government almost always begins 
with that of its principles.”197  That said, if corruption of republican government 
“almost always begins with its principles,” but the people “seldom” corrupt the 
principle, it leaves the principle to be corrupted by the political institutions of the state 
that instill virtue, or by those who control or have influence over those institutions.  
Thus, the people are corrupted by interests which aspire to ends that are not virtuous.  
This does not happen as a result of the young, for, “they are ruined only when grown 
men have already been corrupted.”198  Corruption always begins with those who are 
in a position to influence the young.  This indicates that character is shaped by 
political institutions, and not vice versa.199  Montesquieu explained this in the 
Considerations: “at the birth of societies, the leaders of republics create the 
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institutions; thereafter, it is the institutions that form the leaders of republics.”200  In 
The Spirit of the Laws, this belief was echoed much more subtly: once the corruption 
had set in, Montesquieu wrote quoting Epicurus, “It is not the drink that is spoiled, it 
is the jar.”201 
 
Faction can corrupt the principle of democracy not only by inequality but also 
by the spirit of extreme equality, Montesquieu explains in book VIII.  Concerning the 
former, when the spirit of equality is lost, “which leads it to aristocracy or to the 
government of one alone,” virtue will be destroyed by those factions which seek to 
transform the constitution.202  The spirit of extreme equality, on the other hand, is 
shown to be detrimental to the state not because it is unjust in theory, but because it 
leads to despotism in practice and destroys the constitution.  Under a system of 
extreme equality the public funds are evenly distributed, yet remain only in time to be 
bankrupted.  Due to their false self-empowerment, people stop obeying all authority 
from the state and overall license replaces both the liberty and the stability that the 
law once provided.  At this moment, “the more the people appear to take advantage of 
their liberty, the nearer they approach the moment they are to lose it.”203  In an effort 
to reclaim the spirit of self-sacrifice and liberty they once enjoyed, the people will 
give all of the political power of the state to a tyrant who promises to restore what 
they have lost.  Since their earlier passion to increase equality destroyed the 
institutional limits that had been placed on political power, “a single tyrant rises up, 
and the people lose everything, even the advantages of their corruption.”204  
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The corruption of virtue towards either extreme, greater equality or greater 
inequality, transforms the constitution, but only the former will end in despotism and 
destroy it.  Inequality, which tends toward aristocracy or to the government of one 
alone, leads to other forms of moderate government which, as Montesquieu explains, 
is not a “drawback” (inconvenient).205  Extreme equality, however, leads not to 
moderate government, but to despotism.   
There exists a unique balance in democracies and republics between virtue as 
a means and liberty as an end.  Montesquieu recognized that virtue itself tends 
towards excessive equality while individuality or independence tends toward 
inequality.  Therefore, the balance within the state between freedom as independence 
and virtue as a governing principle is extremely difficult to maintain, as the excess of 
one or the other can tip the balance of the constitution.  Montesquieu recognized 
something more, however.  “The difference between a democracy that is regulated 
and the one that is not is that, in the former, one is equal only as a citizen, and, in the 
latter, one is equal as a magistrate, senator, judge, father, husband or master.”206  
Montesquieu believed in equality only in so much as it regarded each individual as a 
citizen.  The state had no role in forcing equality in other arenas of a citizen’s private 
life.  A “regulated democracy,” which Montesquieu prefers, is, in effect, a limited 
one, one which inhibits its own tendency to enforce equality in all domains of public 
(where merit is rewarded) and private life. 
Inequalities themselves, “should be drawn from the very nature of democracy 
and from the very principle of equality,” yet there are certain cases where in order to 
maintain equality itself (a part of the principle of democracy), and the stability of the 
constitution, “equality among the citizens in the democracy can be removed for the 
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utility of the democracy.”207  Fundamentally, a republic suffers from its inability to 
recognize or legitimate any form of inequality.  Montesquieu is not arguing against 
equality, he is arguing against the tendency of democracies to allow its own ethos to 
be used against it by those who lack democracy’s sustaining principle, virtue.  Indeed, 
Montesquieu maintains a qualitative difference between, “the true spirit of equality 
from the spirit of extreme equality,” the former of which to the latter is, “as far as the 
sky is from the earth.”208  True equality exists in having only one’s equals as masters 
(VIII.3), but very rarely can this be established without being corrupted due to man’s 
egoistic nature.209  It is not enough for democrats to be content with political equality 
as citizens; it would be hypocritical to consider equality only in political terms.  
Extreme democrats want equality to stretch as far as it can into the private lives of all 
citizens so that equality is not just a quasi-visible political virtue, but a professed 
social and economic one as well.   
It should be remembered that political virtue is, after all, “a renunciation of 
oneself, which is always a very painful thing.”210  In theory, “the natural place of 
liberty is with virtue,” but in order for this to be so, virtue must be subordinated to 
individual freedom; freedom must exist as an end, and virtue as the means to that 
end.211  In spite of this, Montesquieu recognized, factional interests have more often 
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used corrupt virtue as a means to their disingenuous ends, rather than towards the 
liberty of the individual or even the general welfare of the community.  
Pangle, in his book Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism, contends that 
virtue is a means to the end of liberty as self-rule.212  Indeed, Pangle’s conclusion that 
virtue may be subordinated to freedom is accurate in theory; this much Montesquieu 
does claim, for freedom is something that should always be prior to virtue.  More 
importantly, however, Montesquieu emphasized that virtue subordinated to freedom 
does not remain true in practice.  The republic may aim at individual self-rule as an 
end, but the self-rule is itself contradictory; it is independence only in so far as self-
interest coincides with the general interest.  This is not independence, but coercion.  
As the principles of moderate regimes, both honor and virtue aim at self-rule in 
theory, but as will be demonstrated in the next section, honor as self-rule is a more 
certain means to the end of political liberty.  Virtue may be the means to the end of 
self-rule, but it is also the means to the end of improving the welfare of the 
community.  In the order of things concerning virtue, the community must come 
before the self, and the former cannot stray outside of the interests of the latter.  
Montesquieu demonstrates this by giving the example of the monks whose extreme 
virtue negates the end for which they strive (self-fulfillment).  Pangle neglects the 
importance and inherent danger in the secondary nature to self-rule in a republic, of 
subordinating the self to the general welfare of the community.213 
Virtue, Montesquieu concludes, is too apt towards extremes.  If liberty is the 
end of political life, it is better reached in a monarchy which, unlike democracies, 
does not rely on virtue.  Virtue could have a place in a monarchy, if it could be 
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established that monarchs were always virtuous, but history has proven otherwise 
(XI.4).  Here, comparing the two helps to demonstrate virtue’s weakness.  Virtue can 
easily destroy institutional limits, especially when it is politically manipulated from 
within the government by those who seek to aggrandize their own power.  Honor, 
however, does not seek to destroy institutional limits.  It does not act out against 
tyranny but instead refuses to acquiesce to its demands.  In this way, the institutional 
operations of the constitution are maintained, yet halted through inaction, whereas 
virtue fundamentally requires action, which usually takes the form of seeking glory 
for the homeland (VII.2) but often takes the form of seeking glory or power for 
oneself.  It is this constant action required by virtue which threatens to derail the state. 
 
In the third chapter of book III, Montesquieu gives a brief history of the 
corruption of virtue; of those in Athens who had more love for their pleasures than for 
their city; of those in Carthage who sold their virtue for personal wealth to their 
destroyers; of Caesar, Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, Nero and Domitian of Rome; of how 
the corruption of virtue perverted all proper passions and led to their downfall. 
“Ambition and avarice replace virtue; love for something becomes love no longer; 
where one was free under the laws, one seeks to be free against them; what was a 
maxim is called severity; what was a rule is now constraint; what once was vigilance 
is now fear.”214  After such a lengthy examination of the corruption of virtue (II.2; 
III.3; IV.4-6, 8; V.5, 7-8; VIII.2-5) one would expect Montesquieu’s solution to be 
heavy handed, or at least socially or culturally intense so that the constitution might 
be preserved, as is, for example, Rousseau’s advice to Count Wielhorski in his 
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“Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation.”215  
Yet, Montesquieu’s advice is quite the opposite and could be described as more than 
moderate; it is, in fact, conciliatory.  What is most important when virtue has been 
corrupted, Montesquieu writes, is to, “put an end to vengeances, penalties, and even 
rewards,” since great punishments and great changes cannot be made, “without 
putting a great power into the hands of a few citizens.”216  Calm and diversity, two 
seemingly antithetical things, must be maintained. 
To maintain diversity legislators must remain calm, almost inactive, in order 
to avoid domestic quarrels that can pit faction against faction.  Montesquieu illustrates 
a case to the contrary during the Roman republic.  The plebeians, in a frenzy of 
liberty, lost sight of responsible government and, “in order to establish democracy, 
ran counter to the very principles of democracy.”217  Thus, they created a factional 
tyranny against the patricians – a tyranny of the majority – all the while attempting to 
destroy tyranny itself.  Again, Montesquieu’s examination of this cyclical problem 
highlights another of virtue’s weaknesses – the lack of a clear sovereign.  
On the whole, virtue values the welfare of all over the welfare of the 
individual or the individual interest, especially when there is a question of who holds 
sovereignty in the state.  Since no one person or interest holds sovereignty in a 
republic, but all do collectively, diversity must be maintained in such a way as to 
protect one faction from another.  Even in the midst of a constitutional crisis, faction 
must not be wholly eliminated, for fear of creating (singular) faction that would be 
                                                
215 Rousseau seeks to instill what can only be called a radical form of virtue, almost entirely 
discouraging of faction, found in the fourth section on education, for example, in “Considerations on 
the Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation.”  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch, “Considerations on the 
Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 189.  
216 SPL, XII.18, 202-03. 
217 SPL, XI.16, 176. 
90 
 
even more perilous to the stability of the constitution.  Indeed, Montesquieu would 
rather increase the number of interests within the state, so that there will always exist 
one group who can check another before it gains too much power, rather than allow 
one group with sufficient power to seek the destruction of those who might have an 
unequal privilege in the state, as the plebeians did of the patricians.  On the other 
hand, Montesquieu acknowledges, without a clear sovereign the competing interests 
will always see themselves as the true embodiment of sovereignty, and the other 
interests as enemies to that independence.  
There is, however, a solution to the problems created by a lack of tangible 
sovereignty.  During times of crisis, a mutual external threat can promote domestic 
moderation.  For the constitution to survive, and for virtue to remain animated, “a 
republic must dread something,” as the Athenians dreaded the Persians and the 
Romans feared breaking their religious oaths (VIII.5, VIII.13).  Thus, domestic 
factions must act moderately towards one another so that they can, as the Athenian 
and Roman examples demonstrate, mutually oppose external enemies to the state or 
mutually enforce religious codes, both things which bring together domestically 
antagonistic forces.   
A mutual fear among domestic factions has the same moderating effect that a 
sovereign power has in a monarchy, yet Montesquieu recognized something 
additional to a republic.  Fear of external enemies will unite the people, regardless of 
differences, and make virtue, which is a “very painful thing,” a principle that is easier 
to adopt among competing factions, resulting in principled faction.  Nevertheless, it 
remains extremely important for republics to dread an external threat.  If the populace 
were convinced by one faction that its enemies were a domestic faction (or even 
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multiple domestic factions) in opposition to them, all liberty would be lost, for “on the 
pretext of avenging the republic, one would establish the tyranny of the avengers.”218   
It remains questionable, however, whether Montesquieu believed republics 
could properly restrain virtue.  Did he really believe that the transformation of 
singular faction into principled faction, by the creation of a mutually feared object for 
instance, could be employed to benefit the state?  Montesquieu does, after all, have 
varying conceptions of republics that produce different outcomes.  Concerning 
ancient Greece, Montesquieu identifies two types of republics, of which, “some were 
military, like Lacedaemonia; others, commercial, like Athens.”219  Military republics 
like Sparta created virtuous citizens whose aim and only purpose was state glory.  
Here, personal ambition was inverted towards the, “desire for true glory.”220  Such 
virtue worked when the state remained homogenous, small in size and continually 
feared something (V.5; VIII.16, cf. IX.1; VIII.5); this type of virtue was public.  
Among the Spartans equality meant frugality (V.2-3), and, for those, “who have 
nothing but the necessities, there is left to desire only the glory of the homeland and 
one’s own glory.”221  Here was virtue in its natural setting.  Sparta possessed a 
constitution that could successfully moderate the tendency of virtue to reach 
extremes.  By the wisdom of his laws, Lycurgus combined the desire for glory with 
restraint, “one had ambition there without the expectation of bettering oneself.”222  
Ambition was not destructive until it led to inequality, or until one sought to better 
oneself.  Nevertheless, conditions had changed.  Montesquieu recognized that under 
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these different conditions, “even virtue has need of limits.”223  Once the conditions 
that existed in Sparta and maintained its strength changed, so too did the moderating 
affect those conditions had reflexively on virtue.  As noted earlier, virtue had become 
increasingly utopian.  
The other type of republic, commercial, did not seek glory (which is sought by 
regimes which share public virtue); instead, it sought private interests.  Citing 
Xenophon, Montesquieu illustrates the difference between these two republics: 
“The great difference Lycurgus set up between Lacedaemonia and 
other cities,” says Xenophon, “consists above all in his having made 
the citizens obey the laws; they hasten when the magistrate calls them.  
But in Athens, a rich man would despair if one believed him dependent 
on the magistrate.”224   
 
Yet, not all commercial republics developed like Athens.  The Epadamnians, for 
instance, elected a magistrate who conducted all of the commercial affairs for and on 
behalf of the city (IV.6); they were not deprived of the advantages of commerce, nor 
was their constitution corrupted by it.  Even Athens itself was an example of a 
commercial republic that had successfully moderated the corruptive effects of 
commerce.  In Athens and in other commercial republics, “the spirit of commerce 
brings with it the spirit of frugality, economy, moderation, work, wisdom, tranquility, 
order, and rule,” and so as long as this spirit continued to exist in the state, the wealth 
brought into the city had “no bad effect.”225  Montesquieu strongly believed that if the 
negative effects of commerce were properly moderated, commerce could have a 
positive effect on the state.  Still, he had sincere reservations that such moderation 
could withstand the factious rise of extreme equality or inequality.  “The ill comes 
when an excess of wealth destroys the spirit of commerce,” which produces the 
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disorders of inequality.226  Commerce eventually corrupted Athens’s virtue, resulting 
in an absence of concern for the constitution.  At this point, “no longer rivalrous, the 
Athenians spent their income on festivals.”227  They cared more for individual desires 
than they did for their virtues and, as expected, their republic was lost.   
The Roman Republic, Montesquieu notes, offers a clearer illustration of the 
corrupting effects that faction has upon virtue.  In both his Considerations and in The 
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu drew several similarities between Sparta and early 
Rome.  Indeed, “the Romans, who came from the most part from the Latin towns, 
which were Lacedaemonian colonies…had even drawn a part of their laws from these 
towns.”228  Not only were their laws similar, Montesquieu points out, but so too was 
the unique principle of their government, public virtue.  Just as virtue motivated 
Sparta towards war, so too did Rome, by “the very principle of its government,” seek 
to overcome all other states in war.229  Republican Rome, like Sparta, was constantly, 
“busy with the arts of war and peace,” and always seeking to enhance its glory 
through conquest.230  Concerning luxury, “there was none among the first Romans; 
there was none among the Lacedaemonians.”231  As Rome evolved, however, it 
became more like Athens, even though its desire for war remained.  War initially had 
an equalizing effect in Rome.  It moderated the inequalities by forging unity within 
the republic and distributing wealth in land among the poorer citizens.  At this time, 
Rome was still supported by its old morals which, “made fortunes at Rome nearly 
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equal.”232  Yet, a more elemental difference than commerce existed between the two 
republics, Rome and Sparta, which further illustrates the difficulty Rome had in 
maintaining its principle: size.  “What made Lacedaemonia last so long is that, after 
all its wars, it always remained within its territory.”233  Rome, on the other hand, 
continued to expand.234 
During the course of its expansion, the Roman republic became internally 
corrupt.  One of the primary reasons for this corruption was that it began to separate 
military and civilian functions when they should have been united.  When the two 
functions were separated, “the one who bore arms and believed himself a citizen 
[came] to feel he was only a soldier.”235  Monarchies, on the contrary, are better at 
maintaining empires because they expressly separate the two functions.  What’s more, 
since Rome ruled tyrannically outside of the state, its virtue was easily corrupted 
inside the state.  This in turn engendered a tolerance for tyrannical emperors, and in 
time the Romans, who had become, “accustomed to making sport of human nature,” 
“could scarcely know the virtue we call humanity.”236  Glory for the sake of the state 
was replaced with individual glory.  In his Considerations, Montesquieu describes (in 
the form of a diatribe) the result of this loss of virtue:  
How many wars do we see undertaken in the history of Rome, how 
much blood shed, how many peoples destroyed, how many great 
actions, how many triumphs, how much statecraft, how much sobriety, 
prudence, constancy, and courage!  But how did this project for 
invading all nations end – a project well planned, carried out and 
completed – except by satiating the happiness of five or six monsters?  
What!  This senate had brought about the extinction of so many kings 
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only to fall into the meanest enslavement to some of its most 
contemptible citizens, and to exterminate itself by its own decrees!237 
 
The Romans who by the, “means of their maxims” had conquered all peoples, could 
no longer support a republic, “and contrary maxims employed by the new government 
made their greatness collapse.”238  In the end, virtue could no longer sustain the state 
against the effects of man’s self-interested nature. 
 
As long as virtue remains uncorrupted and democratic tendencies regulated, 
singular faction cannot arise.  Even when faction tries to usurp power, Montesquieu 
explains, virtuous citizens will maintain the constitution.  In Rome, for instance, when 
the plebeians had secured their participation in the patrician magistracies, and virtue 
remained animated, flatterers could not influence the people to act against the 
patricians, which would have been to the detriment of the constitution.  “Because the 
people were virtuous, they were magnanimous; because they were free, they scorned 
power.”239  Virtue not only animated the constitution, it defended and preserved it.  
Things would change, however, when their virtue had been corrupted by the spirit of 
extreme equality, “when they had lost their principles, the more power they had, the 
less carefully they managed it, until finally, having become their own tyrant and their 
own slave, they lost the strength of liberty and fell into the weakness of license.”240  
Indeed, the same was true of Carthage (VIII.14).  Time was the natural death for 
virtue, which could not remain animated in the face of man’s egoistic nature.  
Interestingly, Montesquieu makes mention of the Cretan custom of 
insurrection, which he calls a “singular” means to the end of establishing, “sedition in 
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order to prevent the abuse of power.”241  Constitutional crises were, for all intents and 
purposes, singular faction against singular faction, and normally such a confrontation 
of powers within the state would lead to despotism, but the case of the Cretans was 
different; it was the only form of singular faction that Montesquieu recognized as 
principled.  The Cretans were unique because their love of the homeland was strong 
and genuine enough that the sovereign body, the people, could correct the abuses of 
power extra-constitutionally.  Though the people were sovereign in all republics 
(more or less so according to the composition of its constitution) and the principle of 
virtue aimed to suppress those who sought their own interests over those of their 
fellow citizens, rarely was virtue strong enough to withstand the inevitable corruption 
of the constitution brought on by man’s self-interest, nor did it possess the prerogative 
necessary to save it.  The Cretan’s love of the homeland was stronger than any other 
republic Montesquieu mentions.  They could exercise prerogative and withstand the 
risk of putting all the power of the state momentarily into the hands of a few 
(virtuous) citizens.   
True virtue could give strength to sovereignty; the more virtuous the people 
are, the more they can “feel” their own sovereignty.  Yet, only if virtue is strong and 
singular enough can the sovereignty of the people truly be maintained.  Otherwise, it 
will be corrupted and the people will be confused as to the locus of sovereignty.  
Among this confusion, singular faction can arise.  The laws of Poland, Montesquieu 
notes, resulted in a similar insurrection to that of Crete.  Because the conditions there 
were considerably different, however, “the drawbacks that result from it show clearly 
that only the people of Crete were in a state to use such a remedy successfully.”242  
                                                
241 SPL, VIII.11, 120. 
242 Ibid. 
97 
 
When the people recognize their own sovereignty, like the Cretans, and find strength 
in that sovereignty from their uncorrupted virtue, faction can remain principled.   
The Cretans were, however, an anomaly, even in their own time.  History, it 
would seem, had played a trick on virtue.  While the ancient Greeks who lived under 
popular government, “recognized no other force to sustain [their governments] than 
virtue…those of today speak to us only of manufacturing, commerce, finance, wealth, 
and even luxury.”243  Montesquieu’s contemporary world was no longer fit for virtue; 
something else would have to take its place.  Historically, virtue failed because it, 
“has an emptiness and a powerful tendency to fill that emptiness with war, conquest, 
slavery, and despotic empire.”244  Political virtue is not a stable means to the end of 
political liberty, and tends toward ends that, though they may seem just in principle, 
were easily manipulated by factional interests.  
 
Honor 
 Unlike virtue, honor does not require the difficult self-renunciation of oneself 
nor the inculcating forms of education that are necessary for such self-renunciation.  It 
relies instead on man’s natural passions including those of charity, love and 
benevolence.  More importantly, it relies on the passions of self-interest, greed, and 
the desire for power.  Whereas virtue discourages self-interest, honor is predicated 
upon it.  This section will examine how honor as a principle guiding political action 
utilizes motivations which would seemingly arrive at singular ends, for ends that 
maintain the political liberty of the state and are, in fact, principled.   
Montesquieu defines honor, which in a monarchy takes the place of political 
virtue, as “the prejudice of each person and each condition” demanded in order to 
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fulfill individual interests.245  Montesquieu admits that virtues may exist here, but 
they are nothing like the political virtue he has in mind for republics.  The virtues that 
exist in monarchies, “are always less what one owes others than what one owes 
oneself; they are not so much what calls us to our fellow citizens as what 
distinguishes us from them.”246  Whereas political virtue requires of each citizen a 
certain amount of self-renunciation for the benefit of all, honor is concerned with 
what each citizen owes himself or herself with little or no concern for the welfare of 
others.  Being honorable means being independent.  It is, in this way, entirely 
prejudicial; each individual acts according to the code of honor relevant to his or her 
station.  An act that might dishonor a nobleman, for instance, would have no 
consequence if committed by someone of a lower station.  
The honorable man does not see himself for who he is as much as he sees 
himself for what he represents.  As noted above, the principle of honor rests not only 
on the prejudice of “each person” but, more importantly, on “each condition.”  The 
prejudice of one’s appointed station, so foreign to modern minds, keeps 
Montesquieu’s honorable man constantly striving to be (or appear to be) worthy of it.  
In fact, the honorable man prejudges his principles and their worth according to his 
condition and not on any rational (in the modern sense) analysis of them.  In this way, 
honor is self-examining insomuch as one’s principles concur with the code of honor 
and not necessarily with any code of morality.  It may be hypocritical according to 
certain standards of religion or morality, but it is, at the least, consistent.  Having been 
educated by the world in the code of honor, and having had his reason shaped by that 
very education, the honorable man considers himself synonymous with what he 
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represents.  He is a good citizen, though not necessarily a good man.247  An honnête 
homme is thus formed, “who has all the qualities and all the virtues required in this 
government,” none of which are ostensibly political or moral virtue, the absence of 
which results in less internal contradiction.248  Thus, by limiting the individual’s self-
awareness of moral or virtuous character vis-à-vis his fellow citizens and enlarging 
his or her overall sense of self-worth, an honorable man is capable of being much 
more self-confident than a virtuous man could be. 
Sharon Krause makes a similar point in Liberalism With Honor, but notes that 
the honorable man is, “perhaps even self-confident because not so very self-
examining.”249  Yet, the honorable man must be self-examining in order to reflect 
upon the codes of honor in which he himself has been educated and to which he 
himself subscribes, according to his station.  The honorable man is self-examining of 
his person, which has been largely shaped by his condition, though he does not take 
stock in the moral or virtuous quality of his personal character in relation to others (as 
would a virtuous man).  Krause insists, on the other hand, that because of the 
honorable man’s confidence in his station, he is not so very self-examining.  
Nevertheless, the honorable man must examine himself in order find the motive, and 
subsequent confidence, for which he defends the principle of honor.   
At this point, honor appears to be a singular principle; it is, indeed, self-
serving.  But it is also self-respecting.  Unlike virtue, honor is not based on self-
renunciation but on self-love (amour-propre), though in its purest form as true honor 
it is love of self (amour de soi), which is closer to personal dignity.  A fundamental 
tenet of honor’s code places self-command above subservience, though it does not 
exclusively select the end for which that self-command must be directed, as does 
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virtue (i.e., the welfare of all).  This is not to say that an honorable man is wholly 
autonomous, but he is more self-governing than the virtuous man.  This singularity 
allows for the resistance to anything contrary to what the code of honor permits. 
The honorable man does not select, create or in any great measure alter the 
code of honor which he is to follow, yet he is left to judge and execute honorable 
actions as situations present themselves.  The honorable man is left to choose for 
himself, though he is limited by what the code of honor will permit; nevertheless, the 
available choices are more than what virtue will permit.  Limited choice, combined 
with individual responsibility makes the decision much more meaningful to the 
individual, especially as the standard of appropriate honorable action is really a 
prejudice and not a selfless act of virtue, which must be appropriate to one’s station.  
The virtuous man has only one choice of action, one end for which he must strive, the 
welfare of the community.  The honorable man, on the other hand, may choose to 
benefit only himself, his family, his community, or his nation; the end for which he 
strives is not objectionable to himself or to others unless he were to operate outside of 
the code of honor.  More importantly, there exists a material difference between honor 
and virtue in the intended end and the actual end achieved.  Virtue (and virtuous 
actions) always has the intention of achieving a single end.  In a monarchy, however, 
“each person works for the common good, believing he works for his individual 
interests.”250  Honor still allows each individual to strive for his or her own interests 
(singular ends), yet in doing so there is an unintended benefit to the common good 
(principled ends). 
Honor does not consider itself analogous or answerable to the law, and in fact 
its code can prescribe or proscribe different actions than what the legal boundaries 
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will allow.  Whereas virtue in a republic must be instilled and regulated, especially 
when it comes to the moral character of its citizens, honor in a monarchy has no need 
of censorship since, “the nature of honor is to have the whole universe as a censor.”251  
Laws in a republic punish the breaches of virtue, but in a monarchy it is different.  
Here every man, “who commits a breach of honor is subject to the reproaches of even 
those without honor.”252  Law has little to do with the regulation of honor.  Indeed, 
one of honor’s “supreme rules” states that, “what honor forbids is more rigorously 
forbidden when the laws do not agree in proscribing it, and that what honor requires is 
more strongly required when the laws do not require it.”253  In a monarchy, however, 
both honor and the law prescribe obedience to the prince, unless of course, the prince 
were to command an action that would dishonor the nobility since, “it would make 
[them] incapable of serving him.”254  Honor is in this way closely related to the use 
and abuse of sovereign power. 
Because it holds sovereign power, the monarchy itself is the only body of the 
state in a monarchical regime that has the right to exist as a singular faction.  Honor, 
however, requires the principled resistance of the nobility to any abuse of power or 
usurpation of established prerogatives.  The only way that this principle can be co-
opted for singular ends is if it is corrupted by the sovereign power.  When the 
nobility, or certain nobles in particular, cease to revere their code of independence, or 
“when one can be covered at the same time with infamy and with dignities,” the 
principle of honor is corrupted.255  One can no longer defend his or her rightful 
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privilege, and subsequent duty, to preserve the rightful prerogatives of the state’s 
established bodies against an encroachment of power from the monarch, usually 
because of an alliance with the monarch that was sold at the price of some mark of 
dignity and bought with the promise of humble obedience.   
 In a monarchy, therefore, “the highest dignities are the marks of the greatest 
servitude.”256  Recognition from the prince can signal the loss of autonomy.  As the 
prince will be forever seeking to increase his power, the nobility, incorporated, have a 
responsibility to maintain the proper balance that constitutes a moderate monarchy.  
Being honorable means being independent enough to contribute to the maintenance of 
this balance.  But, when individual dignity has been bought at the price of 
subservience to the prince, usually through the conferring of honors, the corporation 
of the nobility is weakened.  Honor is at the same time independence and obedience, 
but it is never subservient unless it is corrupted.  Corrupt honor can weaken the liberty 
of the state but honor itself is a natural bulwark to the tyranny that can arise under a 
monarch.  The rest of this chapter will examine this theory.   
 
It is not until the eighteenth book of The Spirit of the Laws that Montesquieu 
outlines the origin of his conception of honor.  Notably, Montesquieu’s conception of 
honor does not derive from the Romans, but rather from the “barbarians” and 
“pastoral peoples” for whom honor was independence from corrupt political control; 
this is essentially his definition of political liberty, and it is intimately tied with 
honor.257  Honor, he explains, traces its roots to these peoples (XVIII.11-14), who 
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preserved their natural liberty as a result of their way of life.  Among these peoples, 
“if a leader wanted to take their liberty from them, they would immediately go and 
seek it with another leader or withdraw into the woods to live there with their 
family.”258  The people here, who led the same way of life as the German Franks, 
were not only independent in spirit but also in practice.259  They were not attached to 
any one place, whether that be a city or a particular piece of land, and because of this, 
they retained the custom and ability of moving.  No single political authority or 
system could legitimately lay a claim upon them and so their liberty lay in their 
possibility of exit.  Montesquieu considered such action to be motivated by individual 
interests, with a result that would benefit all.  “Among these peoples, the liberty of the 
man is so great that it necessarily brings with it the liberty of the citizen.”260  
By Montesquieu’s time honor was an established code among a settled (landed 
and aristocratic) people, though they retained the spirit of noble resistance to political 
tyranny regardless of any inherent virtuous or moral value.  Montesquieu makes the 
connection between the Germans and modern political liberty; when he writes, “Our 
fathers the Germans,” he is placing himself on the side of the thèse nobilaire in the 
debate centered around royal power, which claimed the nobility were descended from 
the German Franks who conquered Gaul.261  
Montesquieu believed the English to have inherited the same forms of 
government as the French, though their history speaks to a closer following of the 
Frankish customs: “one will see that the English have taken their ideas of political 
government from the Germans,” Montesquieu wrote in the sixth chapter of book XI, 
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“this fine system was found in the forests.”262  Nevertheless, a pivotal change 
occurred concerning honor and its relationship with the form of government it 
motivates.  In both France and England, philosophically speaking, what was once 
“true” honor has now become “false” honor (III.6-7).  The true honor of the pastoral 
peoples is now something quite different; the cause of honor has, in a way, been 
tainted, but its effect is the same.  Indeed, the spirited resistance that Montesquieu so 
admired of the pastoral peoples had been internalized, and as will be shown below no 
longer relied upon conscience or morality, as it once did, as much as it is relied on the 
instinct of prejudice.  
In modern monarchies, Montesquieu acknowledges, “the honor that guides all 
the parts of the state is a false honor.”263  It is false because, philosophically speaking, 
it does not suppose perfect virtue or seek to directly benefit the community.   
Nevertheless, false honor is not corrupt honor; it, “is as useful to the public as the true 
one would be to the individuals who could have it.”264  Though false, it still provides 
a spring to the government until it no longer defends a standard of self-sufficient 
right.  That is, it still aims at principled ends.  Montesquieu is not making a moral 
judgment of honor, but a politically pragmatic one.  True honor is intrinsically tied to 
principle, something that sets it apart from false honor, which by appealing to vanity, 
is more attached to self-interest.  The man whose code of honor is “false” may have 
personal interests which correspond with certain morals, but they need not correspond 
with them in order to fulfill his personal interests, whereas true honor without a code 
of moral standards is not true honor. 
Honor has another advantage over virtue in that it is, in a sense, universal in 
monarchies, particularly because it appeals more to individual interests and ideas of 
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glory, both of which accord themselves better to human nature.  Unlike virtue (which 
must be instilled, even though it is contradictorily done so), “honor begins when one 
enters the world.”  The world is, in fact, “the school of what is called honor, the 
universal master that should everywhere guide us.”265  Honor does not require that its 
virtues be defined in every aspect of one’s life, in religion, politics or morality, but 
rather honor, “shapes the virtues into what it wants as it wants; it puts rules on 
everything prescribed to us; according to its fancy, it extends or limits our duties.”266  
Honor as a principle defends its own operating code, which is really an established 
system of prejudice, whereas virtue aims to defend the general welfare of the state.267  
Thus, the code of honor defends the individual while virtue defends the community, 
sometimes at the cost of the individual.  Honor does not seek to defend territory, or 
fellow citizens, as does virtue, but rather it seeks to defend the code of honor as an 
established way of life.  In particular, honor does not seek universal standards of right, 
such as religion, but fluctuates according to the defense of the code of honor to which 
the nobility apply themselves. 
Montesquieu does not expect the people in a monarchy to be virtuous.  Rather, 
in comparing government forms, he is concerned with the most effective spring to 
government action regardless of moral implication.  Personal ambition, something 
akin to immorality among virtuous citizens because it can lead to inequality, has no 
place in a republic.  Yet, it is beneficial to a monarchy where it has “good effects,” 
and can be constantly repressed if it were to become pernicious.268  For Montesquieu, 
monarchies function, and the common good is inadvertently though systematically 
looked after, primarily because of personal ambition (III.7).  Just as ambition 
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stimulates the common good, so too does inaction preserve the constitution, even if it 
may be at the cost of enduring tyranny.  If honor has been offended, the honorable 
response is not to react, but to retire, as such dishonor, “permits or requires one to 
withdraw to one’s home.”269  Furthermore, as will be seen below, honor can serve 
liberty most notably by not acting.  For instance, regional parlements act honorably, 
or as Montesquieu puts it “never obey better,” than when they, “drag their feet and 
bring into the prince’s business the reflection that one can hardly expect from the 
absence of enlightenment in the court concerning the laws of the state and the haste of 
the prince’s council.”270  In this way, the parlements act defensively against the 
prince’s tendency towards tyranny.271  They are independent and obedient at the same 
time, but never subservient. 
Honor, Montesquieu writes, is like the system of the universe, “where there is 
a force constantly repelling all bodies from the center and a force of gravitation 
attracting them to it.”272  In this way, honorable actions can be active or inactive; they 
can support, resist, retire or respond to sovereign power according to the dictates of 
the situation.  It is thus more flexible, and in the end more moderate, than virtue, 
chiefly because its code relies on (and does not exclude) inaction as well as ambition.  
 
Montesquieu preferred honor for the way in which it could harness the natural 
passions of men, ultimately uniting responsibility with self-interest.  He did not, 
however, prefer the effects that monarchy could have on the state due to its 
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extravagance and lavishness.  Montesquieu was witness to the weaknesses that court 
life put upon the political life of the state, i.e., the vanity of women, fanaticism of 
priests, stupidity of courtiers, and the ambition of ministers (III.5).  After all, it is with 
a hint of irony that Montesquieu writes, “if wealthy men do not spend much, the poor 
will die of hunger.”273  Moreover, honor lacks a certain amount of tact; it is at times 
too self-serving and can be at odds with the rest of human nature, even though it 
appeals to one’s self-interest.  A critical weakness is its running counter to equality; 
since the code of honor is structured upon prejudice, it does not allow for much of a 
common humanity.  Honor is also at odds with religious faith and, at times, with 
commercial interest.  Nevertheless, honor is a stronger and more defensive standard 
of political right than any other governing principle.  It appeals more readily and 
naturally than virtue to individual self-interest, but more importantly, as one 
commentator notes, it, “can animate actions that self-interest, at least conventionally 
conceived, never would allow.”  In this way men will risk what they hold most dear – 
their lives – for principled ends.  Thus, honor becomes, “more reliable than altruism 
but also spirited and courageous.”274   
Harnessing self-interest for principled ends, allowing one’s vice to pay 
homage to virtue, allows for greater flexibility and provides for a more robust 
individual agency.  Whereas virtue can withstand force from without, especially in 
large numbers as against an invading force for example, honor can withstand force 
from within the state on an individual basis.  Montesquieu gives two examples, 
Crillon and the Viscount d’Orte, which demonstrate this individual agency: 
Crillon refused to assassinate the Duke of Guise, but he proposed to 
Henry III that he engage the duke in battle.  After Saint Bartholomew’s 
Day, when Charles IX had sent orders to all the governors to have the 
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Huguenots massacred, the Viscount of Orte, who was in command at 
Bayonne wrote to the King, “Sire, I have found among the inhabitants 
and the warriors only good citizens, brave soldiers, and not one 
executioner; thus, they and I together beg Your Majesty to use our 
arms and our lives for things that can be done.”  This great and 
generous courage regarded a cowardly action as an impossible 
thing.275   
 
Both men acted as constitutional buffers against the monarch’s demands because the 
actions they had been commanded to execute were dishonorable.  More to the point, 
the actions were, for them, impossible to execute as it was against the very nature of 
their self-love (amour-propre), which was the foundation of their individual agency.  
For the Viscount d’Orte massacring Huguenots was not as objectionable as the 
thought of disrespecting his station, and disrespecting his station would have made 
him subservient to the monarch’s whim.  Likewise, Crillon could not conceive of 
committing a dishonorable act.  Both men resisted the tendency of the monarch to 
assume power, but they did not do this because the king’s actions seemed politically 
disadvantageous or, more importantly, immoral.  Their actions were consistent with 
the code of honor, even though the benefits were hypocritically accrued.  Both acts of 
noncompliance were moderating checks upon the monarch’s tendency towards 
tyranny, motivated by the instinct of honor.  Indeed, their obfuscation upon the 
monarch’s will was a constitutionally embedded check, albeit of a non-institutional 
form, upon the executive’s actions.   
Since honorable actions are not judged, “as good but as fine, not as just but as 
great, not as reasonable but as extraordinary,” Orte’s actions were seemingly good, 
just, and reasonable from the outside; yet, he did not commit his act of defiance 
against the king for moral or what seem to be rational reasons.276  His actions were 
obedient to the point at which his independence was at risk of being reduced to 
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subservience, something which would be dishonorable.  In this way, as one 
commentator puts it, honor as a motivating principle, “affords its possessors an 
epistemological perspective that fundamentally alters their relationship to 
authority.”277  Honor does not subscribe to acting within a moral framework, and is 
indeed its own judge.  “As soon as honor can find something noble here,” 
Montesquieu writes, “honor becomes either a judge who makes it legitimate or a 
sophist who justifies it.”278  What Orte did was certainly extraordinary, but it was 
neither right nor wrong in the moral sense.  For Orte, sparing the lives of the 
Huguenots was not an end in itself, but rather the Huguenots were a means to the end 
of his own self-respect and distinction.  As honor is independent, not only of political 
demands but also of moral and religious ones as well, it could be imagined that Orte 
would similarly defend himself against the excesses of zealous religious persecution 
or excessive moral condemnation, both of which virtue as a principle tends only to 
inflame.279  His actions may have been singular, but the end result was principled. 
 
Nobles, such as Orte or Crillon, were not the only actors to exhibit honor in a 
monarchy.  Honnête hommes, Montesquieu pointed out, also acted in ways that were 
refined according to the code of honor.  What’s more, it was important that honor, as 
a social code, not pertain simply to the nobility since the ennobling of those who 
benefited the state was a means to its preservation.  
Montesquieu encouraged venality (the selling of titles), “because it provides 
for performing as a family vocation what one would not want to undertake for virtue, 
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and because it destines each to his duty and renders the orders of the state more 
permanent.”280  Honor in a monarchy can have two very different effects on different 
social classes.  For the nobility, it can stifle economic progress as it is not honorable 
to work manually for a living or engage in commerce (XX.21).  Yet, for the bourgeois 
class, who aspire to attaining a higher social rank, venality can encourage and channel 
commercial spirit, as those who are not noble will strive economically to attain the 
wealth necessary to purchase noble titles.  For instance, Montesquieu admired the 
practice in England where those successful enough in trade “may become nobles.”  
Such men, “can have the expectation of becoming noble without the drawback of 
being nobles.  They have no surer way of quitting their profession than to do it well or 
to do it successfully: something usually linked to prosperity.”281  In this way, “a 
profession will be better pursued when those who have excelled in it can expect to 
attain another.”282  Such a practice of venality aids in the general prosperity of the 
state.  It can also serve to reinvigorate honor since the draw of honor persistently 
furnishes diligent and lasting functionaries who give stability to the government.   
Though honor motivated even those who were not noble, its source came from 
the monarch, especially in a moderate monarchy.  Moderate monarchy is a difficult 
term to define, as Montesquieu understood it, partly because terms such as pouvoir 
absolu, or absolute power, had entirely different connotations in the eighteenth 
century than what one finds in nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought.283  
Accordingly, a deeper analysis of Montesquieu’s understanding of moderate 
monarchy will help to better clarify his understanding of the role of honor in 
producing political liberty. 
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Established law recognizes the prince as sovereign, and therefore the only 
singular faction permitted to exist; he is in some ways the law, but also above it.  
Since the monarch exists as the only singular faction in a constitution of established 
law, he will have no desire to upset that constitution.  A monarch governs according 
to the established law (II.4) that maintains his power, for if the monarch were to abuse 
the power granted him under the established system of law, it would no longer be a 
monarchy but a despotism.  Indeed, as one commentator notes, “through trial and 
error the sovereign discovers, counter-intuitively, that delegating rights and 
responsibilities to others preserves power.”284  A moderate monarch holds power (the 
laws and his subjects recognize as much), though he does not necessarily use it since 
he obeys the fundamental laws of his state, which require the express recognition of 
the constitutionally established bodies within that state.  It is a circular pattern 
wherein not exercising power increases his subjects’ opinion of security and 
subsequently, the moral force of the monarch that provides that security.285 
The monarch should not concern himself with the details of the government 
and should be, as Montesquieu puts it in one pensée, “the soul, and not the arm” of 
the government.286  The self-disablement of power through constitutional restraints 
also establishes a more secure opinion of personal liberty for each citizen.  Power still 
exists, but in not exercising it, the opinion of one’s security – Montesquieu’s 
definition of political liberty (XI.6) – is greatly increased.  As Mansfield writes of 
Montesquieu, “opinion reflects confidence; fear shows the lack of it.”287  In addition, 
individual initiative on the part of the subject as well as cooperation with the 
established political system comes along with the opinion of one’s security, both of 
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which contribute generally to the success of the state and the increased legitimacy 
(and subsequent authority) of the monarch.   
 The exercise of justice and the power of pardon in a monarchy illustrate this 
subtle use (or non-use) of power.  In administering the justice of his state, the 
monarch does not exercise his power directly but rather delegates it to ministers or 
tribunals who exercise his authority.  This preserves the monarch’s power, and 
protects the liberty of the citizen from injustice and abuse.  By not deciding directly in 
the cases of his subjects, the monarch does not side with any party and ideally 
remains an impartial third party.  In a pensée discussing European constitutions, 
Montesquieu explained the relation between the moderated power of a recognized 
sovereign and political liberty: “If there were not a king in England, the English 
would be less free.  This is proved by the case of Holland, where the people have 
become more enslaved since there is no longer a Stadtholder: all the magistrates of 
each town, little tyrants.”288  The non-use of power not only removes the judgment 
from the influence of courtiers, but it also gives strength and credibility to the letter of 
the law.  “The laws are the prince’s eyes,” Montesquieu writes; the monarch 
establishes the rules of justice but he does not perform the roles of the tribunals, for if 
he did, he would work, “not for himself, but for those who would deceive him.”289  
Such a system does not occur overnight.  Montesquieu remains adamant that such 
systems are rooted historically and continually evolve as honor becomes increasingly 
institutionalized.  Indeed, moderate monarchy is a system of historical enlightenment 
which has gradually evolved and earned the trust of subjects by not employing power 
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– what are essentially constitutional restraints – thus increasing both the sovereign’s 
power and the subjects’ liberty.290  
Regional parlements and noblemen, Montesquieu acknowledged, were not the 
only things in a monarchy which could moderate the power of the prince, since 
institutions such as regional parlements and actions such as those executed by Crillon 
and the Viscount d’Orte were only the effects of a foundational cause.  Indeed, the 
cause was the code of honor.  The code of honor, by which those who composed the 
parlements regulated their actions, was the foundation for the motivation behind the 
defense of political liberty.  Additionally, since codes of honor are grounded in the 
histories of families, institutions and collective traditions, all of which have come to 
be constitutionally embedded in the state, honor is historically conditioned.   
 
Montesquieu, like Hobbes and Locke before him, did not seek to define or 
attain the nature of the highest goods.  Rather than defend timeless political orders 
that aim for the perfection of the soul, Montesquieu sought to defend political systems 
that had historically established political liberty as their end.291  Honor was thus 
constituted by the collective acts of historical obeisance and resistance to the 
sovereign.  Such a historical balance of political power gives to the principle of honor 
the additional powers of permanency, right and agency.292  What’s more, its source of 
strength comes from the reverence given to the principles of its code, which reinforce 
the nobility’s prerogative and constitutional standing vis-à-vis the sovereign.  By 
checking the power of the sovereign, the nobility help to provide for the liberty of all 
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while maintaining the legitimacy of the system as a whole, for without the nobility as 
an intermediary body the monarch would instead be a despot.  “In a way the nobility 
is of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamental maxim is: no monarch, no nobility: 
no nobility, no monarch; rather, one has a despot.”293  The two bodies depend on one 
another for their mutual existence.  Though it is true that both the nature and principle 
of republics and monarchies are necessary ingredients to the outcome of political 
liberty, monarchy’s form – which takes the shape of intermediary bodies, cumulative 
history and tradition – is of more consequence when it comes to sustaining the liberty 
of the state and arresting the slide towards despotism, since it is composed of factions 
that are more often principled than singular.294   
History and tradition give to honor a weight of permanence which virtue lacks.  
The events that transpired some thirty-five years after Montesquieu’s death provide an 
example of this.  Up until that point, honor had served to increase what there was of 
political liberty in the state; political virtue had no comparable precedent, at least in 
the recent past of French history.295  Yet, the ideas that were promulgated after 1789, 
and the men who promulgated them, gave little or no credit to their predecessors.  It 
must be wondered, as Michael Mosher asks, how, “such an open and independent 
spirit [could] have been nourished for so long under a form of rule, monarchy, which 
was evidently wholly inimical to it?”296  Virtue was to be the new creed of political 
liberty, not prejudicial honor.  Yet, 1789 could certainly not have been the “birth” of 
the French Republic, as the storyline of French national history recalls.  The ideas that 
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came to the fore in 1789, ideas that were claimed to have originated outwith of the 
archaic and repressive regime they were said to have shattered, were in fact nourished 
under the ancien régime.  Indeed, the two systems were not as radically different in 
their epistemological perspectives, concerning liberty in particular, as the writers of 
the new French history led future generations to believe.   
 
Faction 
Montesquieu’s “faction” is only faction when it becomes political, or at the 
point in which it is capable of destroying the constitution by allowing an individual or 
an individual group to put its interests above the authority of the law; indeed, this is 
singular faction.  Nevertheless, inherent in Montesquieu’s understanding of faction is 
a liberal belief that the potential benefits of principled faction (faction as positive 
competition within the state), if controlled, outweigh the potential risks posed by 
singular faction.  The problem lies in finding a way to engender principled faction 
without giving rise to singular faction.  Montesquieu’s solution to this problem is not 
to root out faction, but rather to incorporate it into the constitution while maintaining 
the governing principle so that it may become principled faction.  Montesquieu’s 
understanding of faction is politically pragmatic and not moral as he is not seeking to 
describe the best state, or even the best possible state.  Rather, he is giving an account 
of what is necessary in order to maintain a moderate state.297  It is the principle of 
honor, Montesquieu concludes, that best maintains principled faction in a state. 
Liberty is more frequently believed to exist in democracies since the people 
appear to have sovereign power.  However, in this sort of government, “the power of 
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the people has been confused with the liberty of the people.”298  Similarly, liberty 
from faction is more often believed to exist in republics than in monarchies because in 
republics laws appear to govern more so than men.  Liberty, Montesquieu explains, is 
the right to do what the laws permit, but it is not independence.  Liberty and 
independence are two separate things; in fact, in a democracy these two things are 
antithetical to each other.  To have liberty, one must be governed by laws.  Princes are 
the only people who are truly independent and not governed by civil laws but by 
force, and are therefore not free.  Thus, in a democracy where there are no princes, 
one can only have liberty if one is under civil law.299  If all were independent, that is 
independent of the law, they, “would no longer have liberty because the others would 
likewise have this same power.”300  What is most dangerous about the power of the 
people (a power which tends towards extreme equality and ultimately disruptive and 
uncontrollable independence) is that it allows for singular faction to arise; in most 
cases singular faction which considers itself independent from and above the law.  
Here it is not liberty, but in fact license, and can only end in despotism.   
Two paths of thought could be taken at this point.  First, all citizens could be 
made exceedingly equal, allowing none to be independent.  This, however, is neither 
practical nor moral.  Montesquieu fears the destructive capability of extreme equality 
but also sees the unreasonableness of its purpose.  Equality is at the heart of a 
democracy, but, “this equality is so difficult to establish that an extreme precision in 
this regard would not always be suitable.”301  What’s more, when the spirit of extreme 
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equality pervades a constitution the purpose of its function, that is to attain equality, 
negates all attempts at independence.  Under extreme forms of equality all respect for 
the law is lost, which in turn leads to every citizen believing that he or she is above 
the law, replacing the liberty once promoted by the state with license.  This can only 
lead to a conquest of the state by singular faction and eventually, “the despotism of 
one alone, as the despotism of one alone ends by conquest.”302  
Virtue could no longer sustain the delicate balance between liberty and 
equality, Montesquieu believed.  As a result, Montesquieu prefers a second, more 
stable, course of action, which is to utilize honor as the key to that balance.  This 
permits human nature to tend towards independence, but institutionally controls its 
negative tendencies.  At the same time that Montesquieu allows for the tendency 
towards independence, he seeks to establish a system of government that best controls 
and directs its passions.  Such a balance is difficult to find, as Montesquieu illustrated 
in the third chapter of book III.  It is historically evident that virtue cannot always 
contain faction: “it has eternally been observed,” Montesquieu writes, “that any man 
who has power is led to abuse it,” which leads to the conclusion that, since power 
corrupts virtue, “even virtue has its need of limits.” 303   
Contrary to virtue, honor permits independence, limits license, and increases 
political liberty.  Components of the monarchical form of government – prerogative, 
for instance – moderate the will to power by recognizing a sovereign who is the only 
singular faction permitted in the state.  The Cretans were the only virtuous citizens 
who could recognize their sovereignty and therefore exercise prerogative, but their 
time and place, Montesquieu tells us, is long past.  Honor can utilize prerogative in 
order to extinguish singular faction that seeks to usurp power, but an inherent 
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weakness in the democratic form of government is that it relies on virtue alone in 
order to hold together the constitution.  A distinction in the principles, virtue and 
honor, illustrates this difference.  Political virtue obeys the common will; this is 
indeed central to its spring of government.  Honor, on the other hand, appeals to 
individual interests and so cannot be reduced to obedience.  Honor obeys individual 
will, which is a principal reason for its success in maintaining liberty.  It also obeys 
the will of the monarch up until the point at which obedience becomes subservience, 
an act which honor cannot tolerate, making honor principled in resistance to corrupt 
power as long as the code of honor remains principled.304 
Virtue makes one sacrifice one’s own good for the welfare of all; only in this 
way is it moral.  It is disinclined to the natural passions, but in the end this restriction 
– what Montesquieu compares to a monk devoted to the self-deprecating laws of his 
order – gives it a much more potent vigor than any other principle if it can be 
appropriately instilled, something Montesquieu doubted.305  Honor, on the other hand, 
appeals to man’s natural passions by centering on the duty that is owed to one’s 
station.  The virtues that exist in a monarchy are always less what one owes others 
than what is owed to oneself, and are not so much what makes us like our fellow 
citizens as what might distinguish us from them (IV.2).  While virtue represses the 
natural passions, leading to extremism, honor moderates action by linking individual 
ambition with the established, albeit prejudicial, codes of social practice, directing its 
purpose towards the good of the state and not against it.  This distinguishes the 
individual in pride of place and ultimately appeals to one’s natural passions, without 
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encouraging extreme liberty or license.  The honorable man can recognize inequality 
(not only of wealth, but of talent, effort, etc.) without reacting violently to it, since in 
order to have the prejudicial pride of place, one must acknowledge and respect the 
position of others.  This also means that one must be tolerant of the prejudice and 
inherent hypocrisy built into the system of honor. 
Republican virtue has its strength in numbers, but honor itself is not limited to 
the individual.  There remains some form of altruistic sense of duty to others, albeit 
others of the same condition; it is not only the prejudice of “each person” but of “each 
condition.”  By its very nature, honor establishes conflicting bodies within the state.  
Those who are “of the same condition” recognize the “collective liberties” to which 
they are due (though “prejudices” would be a more apt term), and utilize their 
prerogative in order to maintain those liberties.  One can only imagine, as Franklin 
Ford illustrates, the medieval nobleman clutching his bundle of prerogatives, crying 
“liberté” when he really meant “mon droit.”306  Liberty here is a false term, for it is 
not the intention of the nobleman that everyone should enjoy his prerogatives.  His 
rights motivate his actions.  All the same, along with individual rights under 
established law comes political liberty.  Self-interest is not only the cause of self-
fulfillment, it is also the cause of liberty in a monarchy.  The means of maintaining 
one’s honor may be singular, but the ends are principled. 
The nobleman shouting “liberté” and meaning “mon droit” must recognize 
two things.  First, he has to be demanding “mon droit” from someone or somebody 
who holds sovereign power over him.  In this way, he recognizes a power within the 
state to which he is subordinate and from which political power emanates.  
Furthermore, if he demands “mon droit” (and not le droit) it must be opposed to 
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someone else’s right who might also be appealing for their right.  Rights in this way 
are not universal but prescribed, making them more tangible.  Recognizing a 
sovereign power posits that sovereign as a supreme power within the state to whom 
all parties can submit their claims, and more importantly, subject themselves to so as 
to free the domestic sphere from struggles for power.  Consequently, the second 
recognition is the right of other interests, or factions, to demand their respective 
prerogatives from the sovereign without hindrance or offense.  Factions accept their 
own prerogatives as an agreement with the sovereign that those prerogatives will not 
be relinquished to any other group; it is also an agreement based on the condition that 
they likewise respect the rights of other groups.  Thus, factions that are motivated by 
the principle of honor maintain the political liberty of all by guarding against two 
tendencies: the dangerous concentration of political power by one social or political 
body that is not the recognized sovereign, and the tyrannical usurpation of political 
power by that recognized sovereign.  Honor stipulates not only a balance of power 
among the established bodies of the state, but also a balance between those bodies and 
the sovereign.  Those bodies, acting as principled factions, recognize that it is in their 
own interests to remain principled and to acknowledge the one legitimate singular 
faction of the state, the monarch.   
Both Crillon and Orte’s association with a constitutionally legitimate body in 
relation to other constitutionally legitimate bodies is what made it possible for them, 
as honorable individuals, to exercise their prerogative and disobey the king.  Such 
actions were, more importantly, defensive.  As honor does not have the tendency to 
concentrate power but to divide it among these constitutionally legitimate bodies, it is 
a stable guarantor of liberty; restlessness and internal division mark all free 
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governments.307  In contrast, virtue has the tendency to unite the wills of everyone in 
the state, and perfect unity, Montesquieu reminds the reader, is not far from the 
perfect subjection of a despotism: “whenever we see everyone tranquil in a state that 
calls itself a republic, we can be sure that liberty does not exist there.”  Indeed, in 
such a state, “if we see any union there, it is not citizens who are united but dead 
bodies buried one next to another.”308 
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3  §  The Practical Side of Party Politics 
 
 
 
 
Let us, therefore, rest contended with asserting, that two opposite vices 
in a state may be more advantageous than either of them alone; but let 
us never pronounce vice in itself advantageous.309 
 
 
 
Though today Hume is studied mostly in departments of philosophy – a fact 
that would most certainly please him – his greatest success came via his power of 
political observation, first in the Essays and later in The History of England.  At 
times, his observations carried him beyond the borders and recent past of the British 
Isles, but for the most part he was an observer of his own political country, his own 
time, and the differences that existed within the former, during the latter.  Hume 
himself never felt comfortable in this, his own yet foreign, political scene.  He could 
not avoid it, however, and his political observations read accordingly.  He was 
intimately familiar with the political debates, and often the politicians themselves, but 
he never adopted the role of an insider.  As a Scotsman, he was always an outsider 
looking in on a system that, though admirable, had taken precedence over his own.   
Hume considered himself to be, first and foremost, a philosopher, never a 
politician.310  “Those who employ their pens on political subjects, free from party 
rage, and party prejudices,” Hume self-assertively begins his essay “Of Civil Liberty” 
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by writing, “cultivate a science, which, of all others, contributes most to public utility, 
and even to the private satisfaction of those who addict themselves to the study of 
it.”311  He was emphatically not a man of party, and though often close to those who 
were, his philosophy maintains a respectable distance from engrossing itself in the 
right or wrong of the political debates of his day.312  On a more personal level, Hume 
recognized that the path to official recognition in his time, “both in the state and in 
literature,” lay with the Whig party.  Yet, he would not sacrifice his impartiality for 
popularity.  In discussing the reception with which the first volume of The History of 
England was received by the Whigs, Hume wrote that he was, “so little inclined to 
yield to their senseless clamour, that in above a hundred alterations, which further 
study, reading, or reflection engaged me to make in the reigns of the two first Stuarts, 
I have made all of them invariably to the Tory side.”313  Hume was not, however, the 
overly impartial observer he considered himself to be.  That he considered himself, 
“the only historian, that had at once neglected present power, interest, and authority, 
and the cry of popular prejudices” did not mean that he could absent himself 
completely from the politics of the day, especially as a Scotsman.314  He was 
influenced enough, for instance, to hold off publishing his essay “Of the Protestant 
succession” in 1748, only three years after the last Stuart rebellion, though it would 
eventually be included in the Political Discourses in 1752. 
Hume could also not avoid the debate on luxury or commerce.  As a Scotsman 
he undoubtedly held opinions on the economic effects of political union in 1707, as 
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well as the effects of British Empire that continued to grow throughout his lifetime.315  
Theories of mercantilism, which saw a surplus in foreign trade (and thus specie) as 
contributing to national power, were set against more traditional economic theories 
that considered the soil the true source of all wealth.  Additionally, a new economic 
interest, the monied interest, was gaining power and its ascendency in politics 
instigated debates on corruption, opposition to power, and on the principle to maintain 
the latter in the face of the former.  The subject remains important for Hume’s thought 
on party and principle for the simple reason that the two could not easily be separated.  
Commerce had indelible effects upon liberty, and vice versa.  Indeed, Hume would 
come to believe that some modicum of corruption by the executive was necessary in 
order to properly balance the power of the House with the Crown.316 
Though his own contemporaries recognized him as an apt political 
commentator, Hume believed that political “thought” was merely thought, and 
nothing more.  Since it had been unable to generalize on the necessary level of a 
science it was, at best, conjecture upon the short history of civil society.  Hume 
doubted the truth that science could lend to a study of politics, but this did not stop 
him from drawing conclusions upon political subjects.317  Though one will not find 
Hume the politician as one finds Burke the politician, one finds in his writings on 
politics both Hume the philosopher and Hume the citizen.  As such, he believed that 
public opinion is fundamental to all political authority.  In this way, his Essays had a 
special role to play.  Hume hoped to have an influence upon the public opinion that 
was constitutive of politics.318  
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 This chapter will examine the conclusions inherent in the above claim by 
looking at Hume’s Essays Moral, Political, and Literary.  Though it will borrow from 
the Treatise, the Enquiries, and The History of England, its focus will be principally 
upon these essays, and the ideas contained therein.  Knud Haakonssen notes that 
while Hume’s political philosophy is found in the Treatise, the Enquiries, and some 
of the Essays, his political observation is found in most of the Essays.  While The 
History of England remains political history, the Essays, “function both as a political 
supplement to the Treatise and as an extension of the History from 1689 to 1740.”319  
By examining his political observation, more so than his political philosophy, this 
chapter will share a trait with the others: party and principle will, for the most part, be 
examined through the lens of existing constitutions, not imagined republics. 
 A good portion of the scholarship published on Hume deals strictly with his 
system of philosophy.  These can be tedious, unapproachable and, as it concerns the 
topic of this chapter, rather distantly related.320  Nevertheless, there is a great deal to 
be examined in the Essays that could not only be interpreted as derivative of or 
complementary to Hume’s other works (the Treatise, in particular), but could also 
help to better explain Hume’s political thought, or what might today be called his 
“advice concerning public policy.”  On understanding Hume, his time, and his work, 
E.C. Mossner’s The Life of David Hume and Duncan Forbes’ Hume’s Philosophical 
Politics remain two standard intellectual biographies that are without parallel.321   
There exists much secondary literature that concerns Hume’s thought on party 
and principle.  On Hume’s understanding of “singular faction,” as termed in this 
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thesis, Jennifer Herdt’s Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy is of much 
use.322  Nicholas Phillipson’s Hume offers a much more nuanced view of a Hume that 
by and large, detested faction.323  John Robertson’s chapter, “Scottish Enlightenment 
at the limits of the civic tradition” divides Hume’s opinion on faction according to 
earlier (“Of Parties in General”) and later essays (“Of Commerce”).  Though he 
highlights the development of economic thought in the later essays, Robertson does 
not conclusively explain the division of Hume’s thought on faction that he originally 
determined to demonstrate.324  Alternatively, Robert Manzer in his article, “Hume’s 
Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional Democracy” firmly places 
Hume’s thought among the political debates of his day; Frederick Whelan and 
Richard Dees do likewise in their respective articles.325 
Much of the work on Hume’s understanding of principle focuses upon Hume’s 
concept of justice, which is indeed a fundamental concept in his political thought.326  
John Stewart’s Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy contributes 
greatly to an understanding of Hume’s thought on men and passions, but its focus is 
primarily upon Hume’s understanding of human nature and bypasses any meaningful 
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discussion about parties in political society.327  David Miller and Knud Haakonssen 
both do an excellent job of contextualizing Hume in the proper perspective 
concerning his view of modern political principle.328  
 
As with the previous chapter, faction will be discussed in two ways, singular 
and principled.  The former term, singular faction, is understood to be malicious, 
power seeking, and independent to the point of unreasonableness.  It more often than 
not refuses to recognize any established power as sovereign and is closer to how 
Hume commonly employed the term “faction” overall.  Hume writes: 
As much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honoured and 
respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and 
factions to be detested; because the influence of faction is directly 
contrary to that of laws.  Factions subvert government, render laws 
impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same 
nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each 
other.329 
 
As will be explained below, “interested principle,” or principle motivated by 
ideological premises that are based on material gains, motivate this type of faction.   
 Principled faction, on the other hand, recognizes an established sovereign.  It 
too can be power seeking and may conflict with other factions in the state, but a key 
difference lies in the appreciation of two conditions.  First, a constant tension among 
powers in a state promotes the spirit of liberty, and second, a constitutional sovereign, 
to whom all rival or competing factions must submit, is necessary.  Though they 
submit to a sovereign, this does not mean that they are completely submissive.  A 
critical addition to the definition of principled faction is its guardianship of 
established prerogatives, which brings up questions of right, abuses of right, and 
                                                
327 John B. Stewart, Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton 
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sovereignty.  The actions of principled factions may still be self-interested and self-
promoting but will be so only to a point.  In the end, they make up a government that 
Hume calls “wise and happy” because ultimately their interests concur with those of 
the public.330   
Hume’s essays are a rich source of thought on which to explore the concepts 
of principle and faction.  By the conclusion of this chapter, a trend that exists in his 
thought will be teased out by examining five complementary topics.  First, the chapter 
will look at how Hume’s thought on human nature and the origin of faction come 
together.  Second, the chapter will look at Hume’s understanding of husbandry and 
commerce, and how the two produce social division, and ultimately stability, in a 
state.  The third segment will look at the concepts of principle and interest at the level 
of the individual and the level of the party, while the fourth section will examine the 
ways in which Hume employs these two concepts, principle and interest, according to 
government form.  The final segment will begin by taking a look at how Hume 
interprets the form and function of the English constitution and will conclude by 
examining the improvements he would make upon it, concerning, in particular, his 
understanding of moderation.   
Hume had a conservative understanding of the English constitution.  He saw 
in its operation not the best possible form of government, but a form of government 
that was the best given its historical evolution and its propensity for reform.  He also 
recognized the delicate balance between liberty and authority that had been 
established in the English constitution and understood that this balance was not a 
trifle, nor an accident.  The constitution had been established and reformed, stretched 
and occasionally tipped to one side or the other, but its stamina remained a testament 
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to the strength of its moderation.  Hume therefore went to great lengths to describe the 
establishment of society, but in doing so he was concerned more with the effect that 
process had on political liberty, rather than the legitimacy of what was established.   
There is a great consistency in Hume’s thought throughout the Essays, but it is 
detailed and well qualified.  Often the same terms describe different concepts, and the 
subtle differences between and among the essays can be difficult to recognize.  
Throughout this chapter, and in the third section in particular, every attempt is made 
to map out these differences when terms overlap, such as principle or interest.  To 
begin, however, let us examine a key difference in Hume’s thought between the two 
types of faction, singular and principled.  That is, principled faction, unlike singular 
faction, recognizes the “justice” of submitting to a common sovereign.   
 
Though it is in many ways similar to his broader concept of justice found in 
the Treatise and both of the Enquiries, the concept of justice used throughout this 
chapter is taken explicitly from the essay “Of the Origin of Government.”  In 
employing this definition of justice, this chapter does not focus upon concepts that are 
derivative of, though they may be related to, Hume’s notion of justice, such as 
property, which are discussed in greater length in the Treatise.331  This chapter 
borrows from these other more drawn out definitions in order to give his concept of 
justice in “Of the Origin of Government” a larger framework but ultimately a more 
concise meaning.  The seventh section of the third book in the Treatise, “of Morals,” 
posits the same concept of justice that is later found in the essay entitled “Of the 
Origin of Government,” and thus cannot be entirely separated from it.  Indeed, the 
section contained in the Treatise has the exact same title, Of the origin of government.  
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Most of the material found in this section of the Treatise provides the foundation for 
the later essay.332 
Hume’s concept of justice in “Of the Origin of Government” is both practical 
and temporal.  It is practical as its account of morality is predicated on a previously 
established understanding of justice, instead of it being one part of, and dependent 
upon, a system of morality.  James King highlights this dichotomy by differentiating 
between modern and classical theories of justice, the former which take systems of 
morality to be prior to any sense of justice, and the latter which make explanations of 
justice prior and fundamental to any system of morality.  King is right in pointing out 
that Hume’s concept of justice belongs to the latter.  Similarly, Charles Cottle 
examines the implications inherent in Hume’s differentiation between natural and 
artificial virtue, and concludes that the latter, under which justice falls, is not only 
regulative of such things such as property, but constitutive.333   
The temporal aspect of Hume’s “justice” differentiates between an 
individual’s short and long-term understanding of justice, as what may be justified in 
the short term is not always what is “just” in the long run.  Even though all men 
recognize the necessity of justice, that is to maintain peace and order in society, it is 
near impossible to keep them in the paths of justice, as men generally seek to satisfy 
their own passions before they employ common reason.  The avidity to acquire goods, 
Hume writes in the Treatise, “is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly 
destructive of society.”334  However, Hume does not retreat to pessimism.  There are 
times, he admits, when one’s gain by fraud will be greater than the hurt given in a 
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breach of justice, but, for the most part, man is concerned with greater interests that 
are more distant, and those more distant interests are what is agreed upon as just.  
Justice is therefore a sort of meta-virtue that instructs other virtues (as Montesquieu’s 
understanding of justice was), even though it serves individual interests. 
In establishing government, individuals, “endeavour to palliate what they 
cannot cure,” – that is, our short-term view of things – by institutionalizing the means 
of justice in order to reach the ends of our long-term interests.335  Certainly, 
government has no other purpose but to administer justice, without which there could 
be no peace, safety, nor mutual intercourse.  Government acts as a mechanism that 
prevents against our natural inclinations to abandon the long-term view of justice for 
an ephemeral satisfaction.336  The conclusion that justice is only justice when all men 
cannot break the rules without being detected, as Jonathan Harrison argues, goes too 
far.337  This is in some ways a non sequitur, since there does not exist a way for men 
to be certain that all fraud can and will be detected.  Therefore, for justice to exist one 
has to assume that the possibility for fraud also exists, but that it is more often 
detected than not.  What level the threshold of fraud versus detection may be for men 
to enter into a society based on justice is vague (and most likely intentionally so); one 
need only believe that joining society is ultimately in one’s interest.  In this regard, 
Hume distances himself from those philosophers who see codes of justice as 
representing the interests of the stronger, or the ruling or dominant class.  Justice 
exists regardless of natural strength, wealth, or power because it is the motivation of 
self-interest that compels men to join society.338   
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At this point, Hume remarks upon a second duty, obedience, which he writes, 
“must be invented to support that of JUSTICE.”339  Realizing it is in their own 
interest, men submit to magistrates who deliver justice and make evident to 
shortsighted men their real and permanent interests.340  Men, “though often led astray 
by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible interest in the impartial 
administration of justice.”341  A part of one’s personal sovereignty is sacrificed in 
obeying the magistrates so that one might benefit from their impartial enforcement of 
the law, or what was agreed upon as just.  By enforcing justice, government is a 
means to the end that is ultimately in our long-term interest.  Thus, through the 
mechanism of government, civil laws are instituted which are chiefly for the sake of 
natural laws, self-interest being the primary among them.342 
 
On the Origin of Government 
Sovereignty is not an easy topic to discuss succinctly, nor, Hume admits, is it 
an easy task for the philosopher to rationalize, let alone define.  “Almost all the 
governments which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in story, 
have been founded originally, either on usurpation of conquest, or both, without any 
pretence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people.”343  Government has 
always commenced with the usurpation of power by one individual or one group, and 
can never be legitimated antecedently.  This much Hume maintains – almost too 
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strongly – so as to make the point that all governments (and most political thinkers) 
are hypocritical when it comes to this topic.  
Hume maintains that as man is born into a family, he is compelled, 
predominantly for reasons of utility, to maintain society for three reasons: necessity, 
natural inclination, and habit.344  The point of an original contract is moot because it 
never existed; besides, Hume goes on to say, even if there was an original contract, it 
would do no good to those who are born into established governments.345  Thus, 
Hume targets Locke and his concept of tacit consent:  
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to 
leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and 
lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires?  We 
may as well assert that a man, by remaining in his vessel, freely 
consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on 
board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish, the 
moment he leaves her.346 
 
A government’s legitimacy derives from its utility, not from its consent, though 
consent can follow from the recognition of the government’s utility.  Utility is a 
necessary cause for consent but not necessarily a sufficient one.  It is not an objective 
measure that once reached obliges a subject to political allegiance.  Rather, a more 
fundamental motive is the measure of utility: self-interest.347  Though the recognition 
of a government’s utility is a passive form of consent rather than an active one, Hume 
argues against contract theories that bypass utility altogether and translate historical 
acquiescence into political consent.348  If you were to preach that political connections 
were, “founded altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual promise,” Hume goes on 
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to write, “the magistrate would soon imprison you as seditious for loosening the ties 
of obedience.”349 
Though philosophers have explained contract theory in terms of obligations on 
the part of both the sovereign and the subject, as if a choice and a promise were 
willingly made by each, Hume maintains that the opposite is true in practice.  Princes, 
“claim their subjects as their property, and assert their independent right of 
sovereignty, from conquest or succession.”  Likewise, subjects, “suppose themselves 
born under obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the ties 
of reverence and duty to certain parents.”350   
Hume sees human nature as a mix between self-interest and benevolence 
confined to those dependent upon us or those we know.351  These are natural virtues 
that regulate most human interactions.  Rules of right and wrong, irrespective of the 
goodness or badness of the agent, i.e. his intentions, are what Hume calls artificial, 
and our observance of them artificial virtues.  Such socially constructed rules are the 
foundation for what will be called below “genuine principle.”  When government is 
established, those in power must devise a speculative (and thus artificial) system of 
rules, or principles, upon which they base their system of government.  Some trace 
this system of principles to a deity while others trace it to an original contract.  
Interestingly, Hume argues that both systems are just, though not in the way intended 
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by the parties.352  Regardless of the truth of either claim, government remains a 
practical construct.  Hume points out the falseness inherent in most of the theories of 
a society’s founding because the value of government is in its operation and its 
usefulness for the subject.  Thus, both sets of speculative principles are inherently 
moderate and just: one must start with a recognized balance of power and the other 
must allow for power sharing, both by the logic of their own right to exist. 
 
On Husbandry and Commerce 
“A state is never greater,” Hume writes, “than when all its superfluous hands 
are employed in the service of the public.”353  Beginning with the initial husbanding 
of the land, and the initial surplus husbanded from it, to the commerce that both it and 
industry encourage, Hume describes in the Essays the progress that results in the 
division of society, and the stability produced from this division.  Thus, there is a 
direct link from one end to the other, from the production of the land to the stability of 
the state.  In this section, a closer look will be taken at this process in order to 
examine how Hume’s understanding of husbandry and commerce complement 
sovereignty and liberty, in particular regarding division within a state. 
Class difference and class structure do not appear instantaneously upon the 
formation of society, but stem from the practice of husbandry and increase upon the 
improvements of it.  The different classes that exist and must exist in a healthy 
society, other than the landed and peasant classes, come from a natural progression of 
a society’s needs.  As a result of the improved methods of husbandry and the division 
of labor, these divisions form factions, or interest groups within society.  Artisans, 
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merchants and those engaged in all forms of industry evolve to become the 
middlemen between the highest (landed) and lowest (peasants) ranks of society.   
Much of Hume’s understanding of faction originates with man’s basic needs, 
and the things that result from these needs.  “Every thing useful to the life of man 
arises from the ground; but few things arise in that condition which is requisite to 
render them useful.”354  Thus, only from a surplus of produce of the land can there 
arise a surplus of available workers who, as needs and invention require, may become 
artisans, manufacturers, soldiers, etc.  Each group serves to make the initial produce 
of the land more useful and secure.   
With a surplus production and the rise of industry, men develop private 
passions such as the desire for goods and luxury.  These private passions serve to 
benefit the state by moderating the will of the monarch – that is, by limiting the 
monarch’s potential for achieving ambitions that may be detrimental to the subjects of 
the state.  “The greatness of the sovereign, and the happiness of the state,” Hume 
writes in “Of Commerce,” “are in a great measure united with regard to trade and 
manufactures.”355  The monarch is obliged to promote commerce to a certain extent 
by appealing to the private passions of his subjects so that they might willingly 
produce a surplus of the land, believing they can spend it upon the commerce of 
private pleasures, the products of merchants.356  The majority of the surplus produced 
will be regulated by the government and converted into a tax that can then be 
employed for doing such things as waging military campaigns or building palaces.  If 
the monarch were to force his subjects to produce a surplus, rather than go about it by 
this sleight of hand, he would not be a monarch but a despot.  “Furnish him with 
manufactures and commodities, and he will do it himself; afterwards you will find it 
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easy to seize some part of his superfluous labour, and employ it in the public service, 
without giving him his wonted return.”357  As individuals become accustomed to 
luxury goods, they become less willing to part with them, and, “as the ambition of the 
sovereign must entrench on the luxury of individuals, so the luxury of individuals 
must diminish the force, and check the ambition, of the sovereign.”358  Thus, ancient 
states, with their lack of luxury and commerce, were proportionally more powerful 
than modern states, since all or much of their excess production was put to martial 
campaigns instead of luxury goods.359  Their lack of self-interest, or redirection of 
self-interest, made state accomplishments greater. 
Commerce has a similar taming influence upon the state; industry replaces 
ferocity, which is the expression of martial spirit, and honor, a more governable 
principle that, “acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from 
knowledge and a good education,” replaces courage.360  Both industry and 
manufacturing contribute to the social stability of the state because where luxury 
encourages commerce and industry, all classes stand to benefit: “the peasants, by a 
proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent: while the tradesmen and 
merchants acquire a share of property, and draw authority and consideration to that 
middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty.”361  These 
“middling rank of men,” “covet equal laws, which may secure their property, and 
                                                
357 MPL, “Of Commerce,” 262.   
358 Ibid., 257.  Cf. SPL, VII.4 
359 Hume recognized in “Of Public Credit” that public credit could be a modern equivalent of public 
aggrandizement. (349-351)  Robertson goes on to conclude that government is turned into the efficient 
cause of its regression if government is not framed to meet society’s increasing need for security with 
the minimum diversion of resources.  Though he is right to consider the relation between industry, 
resource allocation and power, what Robertson neglects is Hume’s emphasis on how the sovereign 
power, acting politically and economically in its concentration of wealth, is the antecedent effect which 
prevents against the causes of regression in government. (154-56) 
360 MPL, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” 274.  
361 Ibid., 277.  Hume was describing the liberty provided in England by the number of those men who 
were merchants or involved in industry, though it may include the landed gentry as well.  Cf. “Of 
Public Credit,” 358.  It could be argued that Hume, and other notable Scottish literati of the day, sought 
in this example to encourage the increase of such men in Scotland. 
138 
 
preserve them from monarchical, as well as aristocratical tyranny.”362  Hume sees 
social division as a necessary step towards progress; commerce and industry promote 
and foster social division.  A state without social differences that are reflected 
commercially will fail to progress, or at least lack enlightenment: “We cannot 
reasonably expect, that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a 
nation which is ignorant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected.”363   
Hume directed “Of Commerce,” to legislators and advised them to use their 
reasoning to appeal to the self-interest of every citizen.  They should forget the 
ancient ethic of virtue that animated men along with like principles that Hume 
considered “too disinterested and too difficult to support.”364  Instead, legislators 
should understand the self-interested nature of men and harness the motivations which 
result from such self-interest.  Indeed, it is the, “best policy to comply with the 
common bent of mankind, and give it all the improvements of which it is 
susceptible.”365  By not encouraging legislators to reject or confirm the effects of 
commerce, Hume is encouraging them to appeal to reason over the right to rule, 
making government less harsh.  By encouraging legislators to govern invisibly, he is 
promoting the reason that lies in independence without the desire for greater power, 
which constitutionally lies in “that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest 
basis of public liberty.” 
 
Once divisions are established within a state, the form of government and its 
associated principles promote or inhibit certain types of faction from forming.  
Commerce, Hume explains, neglected by the ancients, has today been the concern 
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primarily of moderate states, in particular maritime powers such as England and 
Holland.  Commerce contributed greatly to principled faction by stipulating and 
encouraging social division, which in turn helped to promote the liberty of the state.  
Additionally, the arts, like commerce, are, “rather favourable to liberty, and [have] a 
natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free government.”366  History, Hume 
claims, has shown that the arts flourish better when they are under a free state, though 
when such states lose their liberty (Greece after Alexander’s conquest and Rome after 
the republic became an empire, for instance) the arts decline due to the control a 
singular faction had upon the state.  Both commerce and the arts are effects of the 
same cause – liberty – and liberty can only flourish where different interests are 
constitutionally permitted and pursue their own ends within the bounds of that state’s 
constitution.  Thus, where different factions coexist the flourishing of both the arts 
and commerce are measures of the liberty that exists in the state.367   
Though moderate government should rely upon commerce and industry, it 
cannot be compared directly to it.  Government itself cannot be built, tested, scrapped, 
redrawn and rebuilt like machinery: it must progress by “gentle alterations and 
innovations.”368  The most important aspect of government is not to attain perfection 
upon its founding, but to establish it in such a moderate form so as to have the 
potential to progress.  On this point, Hume metaphorically compares government to 
influential discoveries made in the natural sciences, and the insignificance such 
discoveries had upon the history of man’s progress.  For instance, though Huygens 
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would in time design a nautical clock that would revolutionize travel at sea, its 
nonexistence did not stop Columbus from sailing to America or Drake from sailing 
around the world.  Likewise, government must serve the purpose of contemporary 
society, in all its imperfections, of which the absence of true harmony is one.   
Faction must be permitted because it is a part of human nature.  It is not only 
natural in a free state, but necessary for its survival as the imperfections of a free 
society lead to reform.  “In a settled constitution [the people’s] inclinations are often 
consulted; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, 
military force or political craft usually decides the controversy.”369  In order to have a 
government that serves the interests of the people, it is better to permit numerous 
factions to reform a constitution, Hume informs his readers, than to have one single 
faction decide its fate.  This is especially true when factions represent the natural 
divisions of the state. 
 
On Principle and Interest 
Faction, for Hume, is not unique to any form of government.  It can exist just 
as readily in a monarchy as it can in either a democracy or an aristocracy.  To make 
this point, Hume references the Annals (6.42) in which Tacitus writes: “Supremacy of 
the people is similar to freedom: the distance is small between the domination of a 
minority and the whim of a monarch.”370  A fine line exists between freedom and the 
tyranny that can result by allowing faction to go uncontested, especially when that 
faction’s stated principles or interests appear benevolent.  
Division and the subsequent presence of faction is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon once men are joined in society.  It is not only sown into the fabric of 
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human nature, but results directly from man’s inevitable association “for defence, 
commerce, and government” in political society, from which moral and intellectual 
differences arise, as well as differences of principle and industry.  These differences 
are not produced in “like proportions,” however.371  While political society makes 
men more similar by the adoption of a national character, distinctions such as talents, 
abilities, passions, morals and levels of understanding inevitably set them apart from 
one another. 
The differences stemming from political society bring about private interests, 
which Hume insists men can only pursue within a political framework founded on 
opinion.  In “Of the First Principles of Government,” Hume understands faction via 
the concept of opinion, of which there are two kinds: interest and right.  Faction can 
arise as a result of both of these types of opinion, though the former contributes more 
towards principled faction and the latter towards singular faction.  By interest Hume 
means, “the sense of the general advantage which is reaped from government; 
together with the persuasion, that the particular government which is established is 
equally advantageous with any other that could be settled.”372  When a faction is of 
the opinion that an existing government can best and most peacefully meet their 
interests (or possesses the potential for them to secure their interests), they will adopt 
the principles of that government, recognize the rights of other factions, and submit to 
the established sovereign.  
Opinion of right is divided into the right to power and the right to property.  
The right to power is linked to men’s attachment to antiquity which, “always begets 
the opinion of right.”373  When of this opinion, a faction questions the very 
foundations upon which the government was constituted; the controversy between the 
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thèse nobilaire and the thèse royale of the Old Regime is one notable example.  As he 
writes in “Of the Coalition of Parties,” the right to power questions such things as the, 
“essentials of government, the succession of the crown, or the more considerable 
privileges belonging to the several members of the constitution.”374  The right to 
property is all times an issue with which government is concerned, and should be one 
that is settled upon its founding.375  These two opinions of right are inextricably 
linked, for wherever, “the original constitution allows any share of power, though 
small, to an order of men who possess a large share of property, it is easy for them 
gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power to coincide with 
that of property.”376 
Between these two types of opinions, of right and interest, there exists a 
difference of sincerity and intensity.  When men are of the opinion of right, “they are 
apt, without shame or remorse, to neglect all the ties of honour and morality, in order 
to serve their party.”377  If there is a faction set upon an opinion of right that is 
contrary to the previously established rights of power or property, that faction will 
seek to subvert the sovereignty of the constitution.  Yet, when the interests of a 
faction match those of the established government, “there is no occasion where men 
discover…a more determined sense of justice and equity.”378  Opinions of interest 
motivate factions to acquiesce to the established government whereas opinions of 
right can inspire opposition and confrontation.   
Faction is further understood by the passions that inform its principle(s) and 
by which it is motivated to act, passions which Hume describes as general or unique.  
More natural and ordinary passions such as greed are categorized as general passions 
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and, “are fitted to operate on a multitude, are always of a grosser and more stubborn 
nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced by whim and private fancy, than 
those which operate on a few only.”379  Thus, something like commerce can be 
explained more easily as a cause than can learning, which is more prone to chance 
due to personal curiosity, cultivation, and a love of knowledge.  Learning itself may 
arise from a general cause, which is the cultivation of a whole people, but only a few 
may have the aptitude or desire to acquire it, making the desire for knowledge a 
unique passion.380  Unique passions do not necessarily aim at attaining the truth; the 
aim is more the skeptic recognition that the general rules we follow are in fact socially 
constructed.381  Interestingly, some unique passions may in fact be general ones, even 
though society has termed them otherwise.  For instance, men may invert normal 
moral judgments into virtues by the appreciation of those qualities that are normally 
regarded as vicious: celibacy, fasting, mortification, etc.382  
Faction does not break down exactly according to the passions it promotes, 
since the many members who compose a faction hold various passions.  Passions can 
relate more or less so to the dominant interests or principles held by a faction, 
however, and in this way have more or less influence within the faction.  Accordingly, 
a faction’s size depends upon the passions that it may promote.  For instance, a 
passion for commerce, which follows from the more general passion for self-interest, 
will appeal to a greater number of people and subsequently have a larger force in and 
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among factions than, say, the passion for philosophical truth.  Unique passions will 
not always be so benign, however, nor general passions so self-serving.  
Each faction acts upon a unique principle and interest, “without which they 
could scarcely ever be dangerous or violent.”383  Regardless of virtue, “there are 
enough of zealots on both sides, who kindle up the passions of their partisans, and, 
under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of their particular 
faction.”384 The Court and Country parties, being unique products of the British 
constitution that resulted from the two Revolutions of the seventeenth century, are 
motivated by both principle and interest, principle being the cover for interests 
imbedded in the parties themselves.385  The difference between the two, principle and 
interest, is critical to Hume’s concept of faction, as one can be a cover or smokescreen 
for the other.  Leaders of the parties are more often motivated by interests, while 
members of lower ranks are commonly motivated by principle.386  Nevertheless, there 
are unique differences among the two, interest and principle, and times when one is 
often mistaken for the other.  
Concerning the above, it is best to understand what Hume means by 
“interests” as that which may be an unprincipled, or rather material, motivation.  In 
his essay “Of Parties in General,” Hume expands upon the notion of “interests” by 
designating categories for the motivations that describe the ways in which each 
faction may act, or may be interested to act.  These motivations may be “real” or 
“personal.”  By “personal,” Hume means a faction founded on friendship or animosity 
among contending parties and which arise most easily in small republics, where every 
domestic quarrel can become an affair of state.  Here, factions may have a personal 
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interest, namely, interests that are respective of and dependent upon the interests of 
other factions.   
By “real” is meant factions that may be, “founded on some real difference or 
sentiment or interest.”387  Real motivations can be broken down further into three 
types: interest, principle or affection.  “By parties from affection,” Hume writes, “I 
understand those which are founded on the different attachments of men towards 
particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them.”388  This 
affection, the closest to Hume’s description of “personal” motivations, can be 
moderate though it can also rise to extremes as it questions the right to power, as 
discussed above, becoming very violent.  This type of faction also tends to persist 
after the initial difference that instigated the faction is lost.  “When men are once 
inlisted on opposite sides,” Hume writes, “they contract an affection to the persons 
with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these 
passions they often transmit to their posterity.”389   
Animosity will almost always exist where factions are founded on real and 
material differences, which is what Hume typically means by a motivation of interest, 
though this is not always the case, as will be explained below.  The orders in society, 
“nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have all a distinct interest.”390  Due to the 
selfishness inherent in human nature, factions that are primarily motivated by material 
interests are the most reasonable and excusable since for Hume, they reflect material 
differences more so than ideological ones.  Even though real differences of interest 
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always appear to be material, they may actually be as slight as a difference in 
complexion, as Hume remarks when discussing the Moorish civil wars.391  
Parties may also be formed on a “real” difference of principle, by which is 
meant a shared religious or political principle, though parties formed on real 
differences of principle, Hume insists, are known only to modern times.  He did 
recognize, however, that, “sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more 
zealous than parties of religion,” and yet, he maintains that, “in modern times, parties 
of religion are more furious and enraged than the most cruel factions that ever arose 
from interest and ambition.”392  Hume admits that theological principles, when set in 
opposition to passions, do not often have a great influence over men or kings, “yet 
when they become symbols of faction, and marks of party distinctions, they concur 
with one of the strongest passions in the human frame, and are then capable of 
carrying men to the greatest extremities.”393  There is an obstinacy found in parties 
based on real differences of principle which is intolerant of any different principle.394  
The problem lies in human nature, which parties based on real differences of principle 
have manipulated.  They cannot let pass the opinions of others without knowing them, 
and once those opinions are known, they cannot accept any contradictions without 
becoming offended.  They profess an extreme form of virtue, intolerant of 
contradictions, and cannot tolerate any apparent difference or hypocrisy in men.  
Thus, Hume insists, the persecution of differences in principles of religion, 
particularly the Christian religion, has been the “poison” and main cause of faction in 
every government.395   
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This is not, however, the whole story.  Religious factions, when engendered 
by the people, are founded upon the difference of principle (by which they are 
motivated), but when they are engendered by priests, “who are the prime movers, they 
are really factions of interest.”396  This reasoning helps to better explain Hume’s 
conclusion that the leaders of parties are motivated by interests, while the party 
followers are more often motivated by principle.397  Hume had in mind more recent 
examples, such as the religious division of English politics that changed Court and 
Country parties into Cavalier and Roundhead respectively.398  In this way, factions 
that appear to be motivated by principle may actually be led by those whose interests 
are ideological, and ultimately material in the form of power or wealth, for instance. 
Hume is walking a fine line here: “genuine” principle is benign (think 
gallantry, virtue, honor or even religious principle that accepts such principle as 
useful for society) but other forms of principle, or what is often seen as religious 
principle led by priests, are actually interests; hence what is meant above by a 
“smokescreen.”  It is an understatement to assert that Hume had little faith in religion, 
and his passion to expose the blanket of ignorance organized religion kept over 
society comes to the forefront at this point.  Religious principle he saw as dangerous, 
but not necessarily the fault of the followers.  The fault, and the difference, lay with 
the leaders of religion, or those who created and maintained the falseness of religious 
principle for their own interests.  The same goes for leaders of groups who may not be 
religious but whose principle may have a similar negative impact upon society. 
As not to further complicate the issue, this difference will be referred to as 
genuine principle: principle that is held by followers or those who recognize the utility 
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of principle while not necessarily accepting its credibility; and interested principle: 
principle that is held by those who have more sinister interests at heart, often 
ideological or otherwise.  The term “genuine principle” is used here as Hume defines 
artificial virtues in the Treatise.  That is, they are guides of conduct that are not 
naturally observable traits of behavior, but socially constructed (and rather inflexible) 
rules that regulate human behavior.399  That said, it should be emphasized that Hume 
had no belief in principle, whether genuine or interested; the former, however, he 
believed to be much more innocuous than the latter.  All principle for Hume was 
socially constructed and moreover lacked the truth it claimed to possess.  It took a 
“reasonable” man to recognize this, even though most reasonable men subscribed to 
certain principles, usually for reasons of utility, habit or self-interest.   
The difference between these two types of principle becomes clearer in 
examining what Hume means by the terms “enthusiasm” and “superstition.”  As 
Hume explains it, enthusiasm, which is engendered by genuine principle, is the spirit 
of “bold and ambitious tempers,” and leads men to question, challenge and confront 
authority.400  Enthusiasm maintains independence, and a reasonable man would 
recognize this, even though he may also recognize that such enthusiasm may be, at 
the end of the day, a social construct.  On the other hand, superstition “renders men 
tame and abject.”401  The superstition that derives its force from religious (i.e. 
interested) principle makes passive followers of men, no matter what principle that 
religion or group may profess.  Enthusiasm, on the other hand, though not free of 
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prejudice or violence, helps to preserve the spirit of liberty, even in those nations, 
such as France, where it may be thought lost.402  
Faction is governed by both principle and interest, yet the leaders are more 
often than not concerned with the latter though they profess the former.  Indeed, 
leaders may be motivated more by ideological premises based upon material interests 
(interested principle), which seek such things as wealth or power, than philosophical 
premises.  Men who are motivated by genuine principle may be more reasonable, but 
reason cannot vindicate many of the judgments we normally make, even though we 
nonetheless are led (by a natural necessity) to make these judgments.  Because of 
these two contrasting facts, reasonable men recognize the existence of contrary 
impulses within the mind and endeavor to achieve some kind of internal balance that 
does not give way to a naïve confidence of our judgments nor to the full extent of 
skepticism.403  Reasonable men also recognize that reason can never provide a motive 
for action, and that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”404  They recognize 
that men are inherently hypocritical in their actions, something which cannot be 
avoided.  This is why, for Hume, genuine principle such as gallantry or honor is 
unobjectionable.  Hume may have even been quite an honorable man in his actions, 
indeed he was known to be, but it is doubtless that he also recognized and accepted 
the absurdity of the claims upon which such principles rested. 
It might be asked in review of the above, should not the leaders of faction, the 
few, hold unique passions (the love of knowledge) and subscribe to genuine principle 
(honor), as these men would be the most reasonable and impartial, especially in 
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political affairs?  Not necessarily, Hume concludes.  Among a people where principle 
is valued in society, the political system must mirror the social one, no matter how 
contradictory that may be.  Nothing bars the leaders of faction from being duplicitous, 
just as most men are.  Leaders may be genuinely principled men who hold general 
passions (greed), or alternatively, men of interested principle who in the end have 
only their own interests at heart and yet still, for some reason, cling to unique passions 
such as the love of knowledge.405  Though men may be more consistent in their 
private lives, the contradictory nature of their public ones is quite evident.406  It is, “a 
just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same 
time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is 
false in fact.”407  Because men are inconsistent in their public and private lives, 
political hypocrisy must be tolerated.  This conclusion is an important one in Hume’s 
thought and will be reexamined below.  After examining political man, one finds 
Hume’s solution in the political system; it is the government form that must adapt to 
man, and not man to the government form. 
 
The question remains, what tips the balance for politicians, genuine principle 
or personal interests?  As Hume concludes, leaders of faction will most often be 
motivated by interest and not principle (even though such actions may be reasonable).  
In moderate governments, however, Hume identifies two fundamental limiting factors 
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which force politicians and magistrates to adhere to forms of genuine principle, 
namely sovereignty, a subject which will be discussed in greater length throughout the 
rest of this chapter, and gallantry, the external quality of character that pervades 
English politics.   
Though Hume calls gallantry “the produce of courts and monarchies,” he 
equates it with politeness.  This deviates from a Montesquieuan conception of honor 
and resonates more so with that author’s description of the principles that motivate the 
English government; a mix of principles which, like their government form, does not 
originate from monarchy alone, but from the republican elements of the government 
and from the commercial spirit that pervades public affairs.408  To wit, gallantry is the 
public recognition of a superior/inferior relationship, and the public reversal, or public 
renunciation, of it, though privately the relationship of authority is always maintained.  
It is hypocritical at the point of expression, where the potential use and abuse of 
power meet, and moderates the selfish instincts of the more powerful.409  Thus, 
chivalry, hospitality and charity are examples of gallantry.  This reversal, in effect a 
false one, moderates the bond of authority between superior and inferior subjects.  
The modesty of the superior is a form of tribute given to the inferior for his or her 
compliance in the structured relationship; this tribute in turn reaffirms the authority of 
the relationship.   
Gallantry is necessary in a monarchy, Hume maintains, and particularly so in a 
mixed monarchy like England, though it is not necessary in a republic.  An example 
of this difference can be seen in government form, one form that requires principle to 
moderate and regulate passions, and another form that does not: 
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In a government, such as that as FRANCE, which is absolute, and 
where law, custom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the 
people fully satisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot 
entertain any jealousy against his subjects, and therefore is apt to 
indulge them in great liberties both of speech and action.  In a 
government altogether republican, such as that of HOLLAND, where 
there is no magistrate so eminent as to give jealousy to the state, there 
is no danger in intrusting the magistrates with large discretionary 
powers; and though many advantages result from such powers, in 
preserving peace and order, yet they lay a considerable restraint on 
men’s actions, and make every private citizen pay a great respect to the 
government.410 
 
In a monarchy, the imbalance is so great that the monarch fears the jealousy of his 
subjects.  In order to bring about a more moderate relationship, he grants his subjects 
liberties that he might not otherwise have granted (and which are already granted in a 
republic).  In this way, the relationship between the monarch and subject is guided by 
a principle of give and take (similar to the taxing of surplus labor), which is how 
Hume’s concept of gallantry functions. 
Forms of genuine principle, such as gallantry, bind one’s actions to the code of 
justice.  Nothing can, “restrain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of honour 
and virtue; which if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in 
ages of knowledge and refinement.”411  This is a reciprocal relationship, Hume tells 
us.  Virtue and good morals, “proceed entirely from the virtuous education of youth, 
[and are] the effect of wise laws and institutions,” which, in turn, educate us to follow 
those laws.412  Gallantry, Hume writes, “is not less compatible with wisdom and 
prudence, than with nature and generosity; and, when under proper regulations, 
contributes more than any other invention to the entertainment and improvement of 
the youth of both sexes.”413  Gallantry instructs the young to seek out the unique 
passions that may serve them best in their lives, but also gives them the prudence to 
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see the justice in genuine principle over flagrant self-interest.  Principle instructs a 
subject to follow the laws of his state, and he does so because to be seen doing so is 
the principled thing to do.  Most importantly, it is now in his self-interest to be seen as 
principled.  Principled motivations overcome interested motivations because 
principled actions are pursued for self-interested ends.  Such motivations also help to 
smooth over the inconsistencies between one’s public and private self.   
 
On Government Form 
In an ideal world, one could assume from a cursory reading of his essay, “Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth,” a republican form, complete with local democratic 
politics, would constitute Hume’s preference for a national government.  He did not, 
however, write practical essays for perfect worlds.414  He recognized the danger of 
hypothesizing ideal outcomes with conditions that were, and always would be, 
flawed.  He thus attempted to write political essays that could be interpreted by his 
contemporary audience in contemporary terms; an educated public opinion was, for 
Hume, an essential aspect of political authority. 
Hume explains this view in his essay, “Whether the British Government 
Inclines More Towards Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic.”  In Britain, “the tide 
has long run, and with some rapidity, to the side of popular government, and is just 
beginning to turn towards monarchy.”415  Yet, if the British government were to 
expire, Hume sardonically remarks, he would rather see an absolute monarchy run the 
nation to ruin than a republic, for the republic that would arise is a far worse 
alternative to an absolute monarchy.  It is indeed conceivable that there could exist 
republics more perfect than absolute monarchy, but Hume doubts that any of them 
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could ever exist in Britain.416  If one did, however, and the House of Commons were 
to govern the nation alone, Britain would, “suffer all the tyranny of a faction, 
subdivided into new factions,” until an absolute monarchy were again formed.417  
Absolute monarchy is therefore the better of two evils, the less painful and quicker of 
two deaths; it would be, Hume mordantly warns those who seek perfection in 
government, “the true Euthanasia of the BRITISH constitution.”418  
Both a student of history and well aware of the diverse reality of the 
contemporary political scene, Hume’s preference became one not of form, but of 
substance.  He sought to capture what it was about free states that made them so, 
focusing primarily on the liberty provided by a mixed form of government.  Hume 
defined a free state as an improvement upon both the monarchical and republican 
forms.  It is, simply put, a state, “which admits of a partition of power among several 
members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater, than that of any 
monarch; but who, in the usual course of administration, must act by general and 
equal laws, that are previously known to all the members, and to all their subjects.”419  
Nevertheless, free states are not free of faction.  In fact, “to abolish all distinctions of 
party may not be practicable, perhaps not desirable, in a free government.”420   
Free states by their nature are the cause of faction, though they can also 
provide the means for their improvement.  Factions, Hume writes in “Of Parties in 
General,” “propagate themselves faster in free governments, where they always infect 
the legislature itself, which alone could be able, by the steady application of rewards 
and punishments, to eradicate them.”421  Thus, in a free state, there is a give and take 
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which provides the liberty for factions to exist but also reins in that liberty before it 
becomes mere licentiousness.422  “Liberty is the perfection of civil society; but still 
authority must be acknowledged essential to its very existence: and in those contests 
which so often take place between the one and the other, the latter may, on that 
account, challenge the preference.”423  A free state must therefore not only provide 
liberty, but maintain the necessary authority needed in order to limit the degenerative 
tendency liberty may encourage. 
 
Hume called the “balance of power” in a state a secret, known only to the 
present age.424  He insisted that all European states had undergone a great change for 
the better in modern times.  Monarchical government had vastly improved and, Hume 
writes, “it may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in 
praise of republics alone, that they are a government of Laws, not of Men.”425  
In contrast to Eastern populations, Europeans are more independent because of 
their many divisions and distinctions.  Hume demonstrates this independence by 
examining the different relationships that exist between Eastern and European peoples 
and their respective princes.  The former make little or no distinction among the 
whole of their subjects, while in Europe, a monarch provides other sources of honor, 
“beside his smile and favour.”426  These sources of honor, all sources of division 
within a state, might include birth, titles, possessions, valor, integrity, knowledge, or 
achievements.  If these divisions do not exist when an Eastern people is conquered, 
Hume explains, there will not be a single distinction with which to raise them from 
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defeat.  Rather, they are uniform in their submission to whomsoever conquers them.  
On the other hand, in Europe, those who hold positions of distinction would not only 
fight to retain those distinctions, but if they were defeated they would, “encourage the 
vanquished to take arms.”427  In this way, the division of the European state into 
multiple corporate bodies defends the collective liberty of the state.  
 “I am apt to think,” Hume writes in “Of Civil Liberty,” “that in monarchical 
governments there is a source of improvement, and in popular governments a source 
of degeneracy, which in time will bring these species of civil polity still nearer an 
equality.”428  Hume gives the example of public debt, which often weakens republics 
in the exorbitant debts they contract, to illustrate this point.  A monarch, on the other 
hand, can claim bankruptcy, and his people be not oppressed by his debts; a republic 
must groan under the debt that only the people can relieve, until it becomes a prisoner 
of its own liberty.  A monarch will also be more tolerant of conquered or newly 
acquired territory, whereas the opposite is often true of a republic.  The subjects of a 
monarch are all the same to him, old or new territories alike, and so he will (or 
should) treat all with benign indifference when it comes to enforcing law.  Until men 
learn to love their neighbors as themselves, as Hume notes, a republic composed of 
legislators, who are also the conquerors, “will be sure to contrive matters, by 
restrictions on trade, and by taxes, so as to draw some private, as well as public 
advantage from their conquests.”429   
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Though monarchy may provide certain cures to ills the republican form cannot 
remedy, this should not lead one to conclude that Hume considered republics 
completely degenerative.  In fact, Hume maintained that, “however perfect, therefore, 
the monarchical form may appear to some politicians, it owes all its perfection to the 
republican.”430  Though Hume was talking about separate polities, he also had in mind 
mixed constitutions where one part of the constitution, in this case the republican, 
could continually refine the other, the monarchical.  Before exploring the mixed 
constitution Hume had in mind – England – this section will continue by examining 
Hume’s thought on three separate concepts: monarchies, republics, and the influence 
various characteristics of each can have upon a state. 
 
Hume believed that men were at first awed by the force of government and 
subsequently convinced of its necessity by the justice it brought about; this necessary 
force being brought about by the influence of one man.431  In the initial stages of 
government – a state of nature if you will, though Hume employs the term sparingly – 
the first man to rise and create peace and order out of chaos was a man of valor and 
superior talents.432  Such men, in time styled monarchs, were at first unrestrained and 
barbarous, as were the powers they delegated to their ministers or magistrates.433   
Hume does not dwell on the how and why of a monarch’s ascendancy to, or 
usurpation of, power but continues directly by examining how such a claim to power 
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gained credibility.434  It is only natural that from a position of power, and the natural 
obedience of those in his society that followed, the newly positioned monarch would 
dispense stations to those who proved their loyal service to him.  Shortly thereon, an 
army would be kept in order to protect the interests of the society, and this 
corporation would soon discover its interest in supporting the king’s authority.  In this 
way, government was raised, and continued, as, “habit soon consolidates what other 
principles of human nature had imperfectly founded; and men, once accustomed to 
obedience, never think of departing from that path, in which they and their ancestors 
have constantly trod, and by which they are confined by so many urgent and visible 
motives.”435  Once the question of credibility has been satisfied and sovereignty 
established, monarchies, especially European monarchies, have a way of moderating 
themselves, a trend which, as noted above, continues more often in monarchies than 
in republics.436   
The increasing stability of the state resulted from the moderation of the 
monarchs themselves.  Even when a constitution permitted tyranny, it was not always 
the case that the state would succumb to it; the quality of its leader more often 
determined the moderation of the state.  Between Henry III and Henry IV, for 
example, “the difference of the temper and conduct of these two sovereigns,” directly 
resulted in the moderation of the state.437  Hume recognized that this process of 
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moderation could function the other way around as well: certain forms of monarchy 
could stabilize the state.  Namely, Hume had an ingrained preference for hereditary 
monarchy, instead of elective ones since in the latter, “the filling of the throne…is a 
point of too great and too general interest, not to divide the whole people into 
factions: whence a civil war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended, almost with 
certainty, upon every vacancy.”438 
The tendency Hume recognized in monarchies to more firmly establish law 
and sovereignty begets his concept of an ideal sovereign.  This relationship (similar to 
gallantry) is one where the, “people cherish monarchy, because protected by it: the 
monarch favours liberty, because created by it.”439  If the monarch were to take away 
the liberty of his subjects, he would be taking away the same liberty, or conditions of 
liberty, which placed him upon the throne.  In this way, the concept of the sovereign 
becomes more important to the operation of the government than the sovereign 
himself.  Thus, the founding of government by usurpation becomes an increasingly 
moot point.  That a government has become moderate and will remain moderate (by 
settling the questions of the right to power) is the only important issue with which 
Hume concerns himself.  The “justice” of a state is determined by its utility, not the 
manner in which it was founded. 
 
Like a monarchy, a republic is barbarous in its initial founding, though in time 
it, “necessarily, by an infallible operation, gives rise to LAW, even before mankind 
have any considerable advances in the other sciences.”440  Republics, like monarchies, 
are thus moderated by the necessary existence and operation of their constitution; 
both forms evolve to become moderate states.  Unlike monarchies, however, the force 
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of a single man cannot create a republic; the balance of power laid out in its 
constitution is too complex.  Whereas monarchy depends on the will of one man, a 
republic relies on the wisdom of its laws and institutions.  A republican government 
would be an “obvious absurdity,” Hume explains, “if the particular checks and 
controls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the 
interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.”441   
Between two contemporary republican examples, the aristocratic constitutions 
of Venice and Poland, Hume preferred the former as it relied more upon the system as 
a whole than upon the autonomy of its parts.  That is, the Venetian constitution 
depended on each noble’s purchase into the system whereupon each noble’s authority 
rested solely on the mutual recognition of the authority held by the other nobles.  In 
this way, a nobility, “who possess their power in common, will preserve peace and 
order, both among themselves, and their subjects; and no member can have authority 
enough to control the laws for a moment.”442  The Polish constitution, on the other 
hand, granted autonomy to each of its nobles, regardless of any purchase into the 
system.  As a result, singular faction capable of destroying the constitution could arise 
from any individual fief because it was not beholden to any other power in the 
state.443  Under this constitution, individual powers had no way of being checked.  
Two differences, of substance and not of form, mark these constitutions: liberty and 
authority.  In contests between these two, Hume maintains, authority may “challenge 
the preference.”444  In the Polish constitution, factions were given too much liberty to 
act on their own behalf, which in turn led to the lack of recognition given to any 
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central authority.  In the Venetian constitution, however, the combined authority of 
collective recognition mitigated each faction’s liberty. 
 
The characteristics that a state may possess, such as climate, terrain and size, 
can further influence the types of faction that may or may not arise within the 
government.  As a result of their climate and terrain, different areas of the world have 
historically produced many small nations living in close proximity which, “by 
breaking the progress of authority, and dethroning the tyrannical usurpers over human 
reason,” have encouraged the rise of the arts and sciences and been the birthplaces of 
free or moderate governments.445   
The size of a nation can also have an influence upon faction, particularly if the 
appropriate checks are not in place.  Extended territories, Hume concludes, result 
more often in absolute governments.  Small countries are more often free because 
they are more capable of stopping both power and authority from being usurped by 
dominant factions.446  Over extended territories, Hume remarks, the Catholic Church 
has assumed the role of educating the areas of its influence, forcing the disappearance 
of different sects, and different forms of learning.  Similarly, a large state like China 
can spread a single form of learning since no one has the courage to resist the torrent 
of popular opinion, which is controlled by the faction in power.447  As a result, unless 
otherwise mitigated, large states can give rise to one dominant faction, while small 
states possess the ability to resist the usurpation of power by one faction.   
Hume’s thought on this topic is not so simple, however.  As will be shown 
below, Hume reverses the above thinking on state size and faction, in order provide 
republican cures for democratic ills.  Hume had little faith in pure forms of 
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democracy, especially in small states, though this is not to say he was not a democrat, 
of sorts.  He believed strongly that the people should have a voice in government, but 
he also knew that the weakness engendered by the multitude of their numbers as well 
as their inclination to follow popular trends would need to be corrected if the people 
were to have any voice in government that did not lead them directly into the hands of 
a tyrant.448  The effects of unmitigated democracy (which was nothing more than 
uneducated public opinion) without representatives or constitutional checks resulted 
in, according to Hume, a typical pattern of decay, as was demonstrated by the Roman 
republic awaiting the despotic power of the Caesars and the stability they promised.449    
The constitution must be made to fit the size and temperament of the people, 
and so where a country is too large for a democracy, Hume found republican cures for 
the democratic ills of faction.  Size appears to be the problem for the democracies 
Hume discusses, though it can also be the solution, if the size of the state is enlarged 
and the republican form is adapted.  The large size of a republic does not hinder its 
ability to deal with pernicious faction, but instead contributes to the control of it.  A 
large government could help remedy, Hume believed, both the tendency towards mob 
rule in a democracy and the oppressive and jealous nature of an aristocracy. 
As a democracy’s ability to deal with faction is also related to the size of the 
state and the proximity of its citizens, no matter how divided the people are into 
separate groups or interests, “their near habitation in a city will always make the force 
of popular tides and currents very sensible.”450  Hume assumes that the people may 
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already be divided into parties, but regardless of such division, the intense proximity 
of their habitation can break down their factional barriers and contribute to the 
destruction of the established sovereignty of the people via an immoderate and 
disingenuous popular tide.  This mode of thought is in some ways contrary to what 
Hume writes in “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” discussed above, 
yet when discussing his “perfect commonwealth,” Hume is attempting to cure the 
inconveniencies of democracy by inventing a republican system that divides the 
people.  This makes them at once closer to their local politics and yet farther from the 
national affairs where the locus of sovereignty is held.  Hume does not want to do 
away with local politics, he just wants to separate the negative tendencies of local 
politics from national affairs. 
The people have a literal right of debate through their representatives, Hume 
explained, and not just a right of resolution, which is the only result of a body that is 
too large for debate.  The solution, therefore, is to, “divide the people into many 
separate bodies, and then they may debate with safety, and every inconvenience 
seems to be prevented.”451  The closer the people are to their representatives the better 
able they are to choose them,  
The lower sort of people and small proprietors are good enough judges 
of one not very distant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, 
in their parochial meetings, will probably choose the best, or nearly the 
best representative: but they are wholly unfit for country meetings, and 
for electing into the higher offices of the republic.  Their ignorance 
gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.452 
 
This means, as well, that the representatives should reserve their independence and 
not remain delegates; for if they did, there would be little or no difference made in 
removing the people from the national meetings.453  Indeed, Hume’s republican 
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thought continually stresses the limited role the people should play in the affairs of 
government.  
If faction is allowed to exist in the legislative branch, it can resist the force of 
popular currents since the people are “more susceptible both of reason and order” 
when broken down into smaller bodies.454  By breaking them down and incorporating 
the people into smaller bodies, one creates numerous factions that will cling to and 
defend their opinion of the right to power and property.  But, like the Venetian 
republic, such opinions are only valid upon the mutual recognition of the rights of 
others, thus limiting the negative tendencies of faction motivated by an opinion of 
right.  
A republican form of government should be constituted to fit the state so that 
the distance from the people to the executive is drawn out.  In this way, momentary 
popular tides could not have the capability to easily execute their actions.  A 
graduated system of elections according to merit or ability, for instance, of a large 
state makes it, “very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion to hurry them 
into any measures against the public interest.”455  Though Hume admitted it would be 
more difficult to form a republican government in an extensive country than in a city, 
he remarked that, “there is more facility when once it is formed, of preserving it 
steady and uniform, without tumult and faction [since] it is not easy for the distant 
parts of a large state to combine in any plan of free government.”456  Accordingly, if 
popular tides brought about by singular faction do arise, they will be unlikely to form 
a majority large enough to execute constitutional change.  Extended size also prevents 
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both the unnecessary combination and division of the magistrates in a republic.457  
Thus the government form prevents spontaneous acts of a majority that might be 
immediately disingenuous to a minority, and ultimately harmful to all, save the few 
whose real interests would be served.  Thus, a republic’s size can be a part of the 
“justice” of the system. 
 
On Political Moderation 
The development of law, which Hume calls, “the source of all security and 
happiness,” “arises late in any government, and is the slow product of order and of 
liberty.”458  Though law may arise sooner in a republic, it becomes an integral part of 
a monarchy as well.  Once men experience the rule of law, whether in a monarchy or 
a republic, it, “will scarcely ever perish through the ill culture of men, or the rigour of 
the seasons.”459  Hume insists that when under established law and a common 
sovereign, factions will not want to work against or destroy the laws if the absence of 
law is worse than its imposition or its constraints.  In this way, faction intuitively 
learns to work within the law and adopts a long-term understanding of justice.  
Hume’s concept of justice thus comes full circle, and just as it applied to individuals 
who give up their sovereignty to the magistrate in order to stop themselves from 
committing acts that are not in their long-term interest, so too do factions within the 
government submit to the sovereign in order to stop themselves (and others, more 
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importantly) from destroying the same laws which protect their long-term interests.  
This is, of course, principled faction. 
The English constitution, according to Hume, evolved as a result of natural 
social division, subsequently adapting a concept of justice into its operation.  The 
English, Hume writes, are a politically fragmented people who do not have an 
established national character, “unless this very singularity may pass as such.”  In 
England, “all sects of religion are to be found among them; and the great liberty and 
independency which every man enjoys, allows him to display the manners peculiar to 
him.”460  Like human nature, faction is sown into the fabric of the English constitution 
as a result of the discordant character of the nation.  So long as England continues to 
be governed by a moderate monarchy that allows for individual liberty, parties will 
exist to represent the factional interests which make up that nation.461  Politically, this 
is the result of a government that is “neither wholly monarchical, nor wholly 
republican,” but instead a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy where 
clergy, gentry and merchants are all in positions of authority.462 
The differences between the republican and monarchical elements of the 
government also result in differences within the state.  Republics, Hume maintains, 
favor the growth of science, and as a result, more “useful” men can succeed.  
Monarchies, on the other hand, favor the growth of the polite arts, denoting that more 
“agreeable and witty” men can rise to the top.463  Additionally, the slight differences 
in the characters of those in power can have a more general influence upon the 
national character, since, “the imitation of superiors spread[s] the national manners 
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faster among the people.”464  As England is a mixed constitution, therefore, the 
respective parts of government will encourage the rise of different types of men.  
These distinct groups will find preference in and with different elements of the 
constitution.  In England, a natural division occurred between men who preferred the 
monarchical and men who preferred the republican elements of the constitution.  
Those who are more mild, more apprehensive for peace and order will prefer the 
monarchy, while those who are of bold and generous spirits, who are “passionate 
lovers of liberty,” will identify with the republican elements of the constitution.465  
Interests will likewise separate according to the principles that motivate them.  The 
clergy, for instance, will tend to side with the monarchy (and thus the Court party), as 
the liberty of thinking and action promoted more often by the Country party is almost 
always dangerous to priestly powers.  Propertied faction, in contrast, finds its 
representation in the republican element of the constitution as a bulwark to the power 
of the Crown.466  
This division was an evolution, Hume is careful to stress throughout his 
political essays.  English history provides valuable lessons as to the effects faction can 
have upon the state, effects which are both accommodating and unsuitable to the 
constitution.  More recent cases of singular faction arose as a result of the party 
rivalry preceding the English Civil War, Hume explains, creating the Roundheads and 
the Cavaliers, later to be the Country and Court parties, respectively.  Whig and Tory 
parties subsequently arose under Charles II, which was an anachronistic development 
in Hume’s opinion, but they changed, adapted, lost and gained power, to such an 
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extent since then that Hume had trouble defining exactly what they stood for; as they 
are “sometimes without any material difference,” “we are at a loss to tell the nature, 
pretensions, and principles, of the different factions.”467  Indeed, the Whigs, who in 
principle are an opposition party, “must be sensible, that the very principle, which 
made the strength of their party, and from which it derived its chief authority, has now 
deserted them, and gone over to their antagonists.”468  To make the correlation of 
Tories to Cavaliers, and Whigs to Roundheads, is correct, though there remain 
differences: “A TORY, therefore, since the Revolution, may be defined, in a few 
words, to be a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty, and a partisan 
of the family of STUART: as a WHIG may be defined to be a lover of liberty, though 
without renouncing monarchy, and a friend to the settlement in the PROTESTANT 
line.”469  Hume is not judging the party system here as much as he is observing it.  
Regardless of the appellation or correlation of the parties, Hume observed that their 
existence and survival through both civil wars, along with their subsequent 
contributions to the balance of power within the government, greatly contributed to 
the strength of the English constitution. 
As an observer more so than a critic, Hume had an extraordinary laissez-faire 
attitude towards the English constitution, in part because he recognized the checks 
and balances inherent in its operation.  This was also because he believed the 
constitution to be elastic in times of crisis, not only as a result of the prerogative 
lodged in the executive but also because of the concession given by the legislative to 
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the concept of a sovereign, even though (and partly because of), as mentioned above, 
he or she that filled that concept might be fungible (and indeed was).  In the Treatise, 
Hume even goes so far as to suggest that the “wise” allow the “vulgar” to select the 
person who might rule.470  In this case, Hume’s wise man is principally a man who 
recognizes that consensus around authority is more important than the selection of a 
particular person to wield it.471  The result of this is that faction had not been able to 
disrupt the English state since the last decade of the seventeenth century, primarily 
because those involved in internal politics had settled their disputes on the right to 
power and agreed upon a common sovereign, desiring stability over dominance.472  
Such reasoning led to two conclusions.  First, factional strife in the English 
constitution could never be eradicated.  Second, and because of the first, faction must 
be permitted, and one’s trust put in the constitution to control its effects.  Hume gives 
two examples as proof that one could trust the resiliency of the constitution: the 
Revolution of 1688/9 and the accession of 1714.  Indeed, to the idea of constitutional 
failure, Hume remarks: “if our constitution…does not, in fact, provide any such 
remedy, we are rather beholden to any minister who undermines it, and affords us an 
opportunity of erecting a better in its place.”473  It is the constitution that forms the 
ministers, not the other way around.  Hume therefore pleads to the Court and Country 
parties to limit their zeal, admit they are not fighting for “hearth and home,” and not, 
“change a good constitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions.”474  
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Still, Hume struggled with one major problem: if the need were to arise, what 
could be considered legitimate opposition to the sovereign?  We have seen that Hume 
recognized the danger of faction, as evidenced by his warning above.  Additionally, 
we have seen how the key to the stability of the state is the submission of all faction 
to a common sovereign.  If faction were to reverse this stability, collectively or 
individually, by deposing of a sovereign, there would no longer be any check upon 
that faction.  So, how could faction help to save the constitution? 
Recent history taught Hume not only that the established rules of sovereignty 
could be rewritten, but that partisans on both sides of the issue could rationalize their 
conclusions, regardless of historical accuracy.  Unlike most Whig writers, he did not 
attempt to rewrite British history in order to better support a cause, nor did he 
maintain that 1649 and 1689 were acts of regicide.  In the end, his conclusion, 
expanded upon in his essay “Of Passive Obedience,” skirts both of these answers but 
maintains two points.  That is, the welfare of the public is necessary above all else, 
and in order achieve what is in the public interest, the nominal sovereignty provided 
by a monarchy must be maintained. 
Hume insists that tyrannicide and assassination, instead of making monarchs 
more fearful or passive, make sovereigns more severe and are dreadful alternatives to 
keeping sovereigns in awe.475  A sovereign cannot be effective if a coequal (or 
greater) branch threatens its existence.  There remains the additional problem of 
obedience to an enraged or fearful sovereign, particularly when that sovereign may be 
reacting against perceived threats and acting tyrannically.  “Common sense” teaches a 
subject to obey the government, “only on account of its tendency to public utility.”   
So, if the sovereign threatens that utility, “duty must always, in extraordinary cases, 
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when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original 
obligation.”476  The original obligation Hume is referring to is an obligation to justice, 
which, “is founded entirely on the interests of society.”477  Even though the act of 
resistance may be a rare occurrence, when the execution of that justice no longer 
serves the interests of society and would cause more harm than good, “that virtue 
must be suspended, and give place to public utility.”478  The obligation to the 
sovereign must be loosened. 
Hume was rather silent with regard to the doctrine of resistance, though he 
believed, as one commentator puts it, that “to keep too quiet about it would be to 
disable forms of political action that [he] saw as crucial to liberty.”479  Though he 
appreciated the ways in which enthusiasm reacted against encroaching power, he 
believed that resistance should really be, “the last refuge in desperate cases, when the 
public is in the highest danger, from violence and tyranny.”480  Elsewhere, Hume 
described the “true rule of government” as “the present established practice of the 
age” for the simple reason that it has the, “most authority, because it is recent: It is 
also best known, for the same reason.”481  Stability, therefore, should be valued above 
civil war.  Even though men are self-interested, that self-interest is limited, even in the 
defense of political liberty.  Certainly it is not in one’s interest, for example, to die for 
the defense of liberty, even though that liberty may be in one’s interest.  In this way, 
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men endure political tyranny, because self-interest is not a strong enough motivation 
to overcome the risk of death; or, better put, it is in one’s interest to stay alive.  
Enthusiasm, however, is a stronger motivation, stronger at least than normal self-
interest.  Enthusiasm incites men to risk their greatest possession (their lives) for the 
defense of an intangible principle, liberty.482  
There are only two valid reasons that one may use to resist a sovereign.  The 
first is if one’s antagonists carry the doctrine of obedience so far as not to admit of 
any exceptions.  It is always necessary, Hume clarified, to insist upon such exceptions 
when they are positively excluded by others.483  Only singular faction cannot tolerate 
contradictions in men, and so exceptions must always be allowed for.  Obedience, 
complete with a lack of any opposition, inevitably leads to tyranny.  English factions 
after the Glorious Revolution had settled their opinions of the right to power, 
according to Hume.  This was the largest and most important issue to settle, even 
though the factions still differed in their real interests of affection (their affinity for 
ruling or previously ruling families) that could (and some Jacobins would) eventually 
question the right to power.  If, however, all those who differed in their real interests 
of affection were excluded, the Whigs would have been acting tyrannically and there 
would have been no settlement, which was an act carried out in coalition.484 
 The second right to resistance has to do with the arbitrary nature of an 
immoderate sovereign.  The sovereign, though limited by the law, is also above the 
law.  Because he is above the law, he feels a level of safety, which he encourages 
                                                
482 Krause, “Frenzy, Gloom, and Spirit of Liberty in Hume,” 299.  Dees, “Hume on the Characters of 
Virtue,” 57-58.  Montesquieu equally recognized the difficulty of resisting despotism.  See SPL, V.14. 
483 MPL, “Of Passive Obedience,” 491.  Hume explains this as the Whig reasoning at the Revolution.  
Part of the reason for resistance at that time, and why it was tolerable in hindsight, was that there was 
no political recourse to do otherwise.  As Hume explains, the laws of England still made resistance 
treason, with no exceptions.  Here, “the greatest virtue will be exposed to the most severe 
proscription.”  Ironically, the same laws that declared resistance a high crime could only be saved by 
committing such high crimes. History, VI, 389. 
484 History, VI, 502. 
173 
 
others to have as well.  Since neither the laws nor the people can attack the prince, he 
has no legitimate reason to attack them in turn; the people should be free from 
monarchical oppression.  If, however, the monarch were to abuse the liberty of his 
prerogative by acts of injustice, the people have one remaining right; as, “a right 
without a remedy would be an absurdity; the remedy in this case, is the extraordinary 
one of resistance.”485  
Such reasoning gives legitimacy to struggles of resistance, but Hume does not 
say where and when resistance should start.  Instead, he appeals to history.  
Resistance, according to Hume, should occur more often in a limited monarchy since 
where a king is an absolute sovereign he should have little reason to tyrannize his 
people.  In a limited monarchy, such as that of Charles I or James II, their, “imprudent 
ambition, without any great vices, [ran them] into that perilous situation.”486  As a 
result of mistaking the nature of the British constitution for something it was not (a 
more absolute monarchy than it really was), these two men acted imprudently and 
indiscreetly by attempting to extend the authority they were never given.  
It was not that either of these two men acted recklessly; Hume is quick to 
explain their actions as logical, though ill timed.  Unlike many of their predecessors, 
they were never granted the absolute power exercised by their continental 
counterparts, and as limited monarchs, they were expected to maintain a balance of 
power by enforcing its division among the different bodies of the state.  This included 
resisting the temptation to usurp power in performing this function.487  Yet, under 
Charles I and James II, the great constitutional questions had not yet been settled, and 
controversy arose over the use of prerogative:   
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men knew not upon what principles they could deny that prerogative, 
they saw, that, if they would preserve their laws and constitution, there 
was an absolute necessity for denying, at least for abolishing it.  The 
revolution alone, which soon succeeded, happily put an end to all these 
disputes: By means of it, a more uniform edifice was at last erected: 
The monstrous inconsistence, so visible between the ancient Gothic 
parts of the fabric and the recent plans of liberty, was full corrected: 
And to their mutual felicity, king and people were finally taught to 
know their proper boundaries.488 
 
The monarch should be a legal authority who, though with great authority, is also 
possessed of legal bounds, “which terminate both the hopes and pretensions of the 
person possessed of it.”489  These bounds are the laws established to limit excesses, 
and as such, the monarch has more to fear than hope for in usurping power past the 
prescribed limits of the law.   
 
 How is such a delicate balance of power maintained in the state?  Even though 
it may seem unreasonable, what keeps the sovereign from seeking to permanently 
appropriate the power that emanates from his position?  Alternatively, what keeps the 
republican power in check when it becomes too great?  Indeed, how does England 
stop the rise of arbitrary power?  By drawing on conclusions from above, the 
remainder of this chapter will examine Hume’s answers to, and elaborations upon, 
these questions in order to demonstrate how his understanding of principle and faction 
was used to explain the balance of power in the state. 
Hume recognized that the answer to the above questions lay in the separation 
of the branches of government, and in particular how the interaction between these 
branches was regulated.  The British monarchy was operationally moderate because 
the monarch’s veto to any legislation was applicable only after it had passed through 
both houses of Parliament.  Alternatively, if the negative were placed before 
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legislation entered Parliament, as a censor upon the will of the people, the monarchy 
would have been absolute.  Yet, since “few princes will venture to reject the 
unanimous desire of the people” they remain freer to govern themselves.490  
As remarked above, Hume’s republican thought stresses the limited role of the 
people in government affairs.  This does not mean, however, that they should not 
involve themselves in other ways.  Thus, another part of Hume’s answer to this 
question lies in an alternative, almost organic, solution, one that has nothing to do 
with government form: the liberty of the press.  This solution constantly fluctuates 
according to popular opinion, though it is not dictated by it and could be said rather to 
dictate popular opinion.  This liberty rests on something greater and more essential, 
and is a result of established law, though law and liberty are parts of a complementary 
process.  Hume explains how this established law creates an environment where the 
liberty of the press can be used to balance power in the state: “as the republican 
element prevails in ENGLAND, though with a great mixture of monarchy, it is 
obliged, for its own preservation, to maintain a watchful jealousy over the 
magistrates, to remove all the discretionary powers, and to secure every one’s life by 
general and inflexible laws.”491  This phenomenon is unique to the English who 
maintain a general “spirit” discouraging of arbitrary power.  “The spirit of the people 
must frequently be rouzed, in order to curb the ambition of the court; and the dread of 
rouzing this spirit must be employed to prevent that ambition.”492  It is the liberty of 
the press that rouses this spirit.  “As long, therefore, as the republican part of our 
government can maintain itself against the monarchical, it will naturally be careful to 
keep the press open, as of importance to its own preservation.”493  The press ensures 
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political actions are not contradictory to their intended end; if they are, the press 
reports them.  Established law creates the stability that is needed for the liberty of the 
press, and in turn, the liberty of the press exposes and checks the rise of arbitrary 
power.   
 
Faction cannot and must not be wholly independent, as it was in the Polish 
republic.  Figuratively speaking, different factions within the state must be tied into 
the constitution, complete with a buy-in on their part; or in other words, they must be 
made to purchase what they cannot return, thus making that purchase more valuable.  
What factions purchase is the right to be represented under a common sovereign, this 
sovereign being the one who holds their currency as well as the power to reject that 
currency should it be proven counterfeit.   
As explained above, Hume considered a political position more important than 
the person who filled it.  This belief held true for political branches, as well.  Indeed, 
“no part ought to decide for itself.”494  An individual interest should not decide for 
itself or the nation except by the agreement of the whole.  Hume is not specific on 
how such a system of annulment would work, though he does remark in his 
description of a perfect commonwealth that every county law could be vetoed by 
either the senate (a national body) or another county.  This type of veto moderates 
factions by limiting their potential to assume unwarranted power.  In a monarchy, of 
course, a process of annulment would be much simpler as it comes from a sovereign.  
Yet, in Hume’s “ideal” republic, the lack of a recognized sovereign is overcome by 
distributing the veto power so that collectively it still carries as much weight.  
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Hume is more specific, however, on the distribution of veto power in England, 
where he insists that the privileges of the British people have increased as a result of 
the enfranchisement of a greater percentage of the population during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  Larger interests were dissolved to create more numerous 
ones, “by the division of church lands, by the alienations of the barons’ estates, [and] 
by the progress of trade.”495  According to Hume, this weakened the sovereign with 
regard to the other branches of power in the state, most notably the Commons.  As a 
result of this, Hume was insistent that the House of Lords ought to be strengthened to 
provide a balance to the Commons, as well as a concerted resistance to the sovereign.  
Hume characterizes this resistance as “interests” within the House of Lords, meaning 
those factions who have an interest in maintaining their privileges and no more.  
Indeed, a means of balancing the House of Lords vis-à-vis the Commons is to instill 
in or connect to the House of Lords, rather than the House of Commons, those men 
who have a concerted interest intimately linked to the welfare of the nation, including 
the preservation of liberty and sovereignty, both of which in turn safeguard their 
interests.  Thus the House of Lords, “would consist entirely of the men of chief credit, 
abilities, and interest in the nation…[whereupon] such an aristocracy would be an 
excellent barrier both to the monarchy and against it.”496  
Manzer assumes that Hume’s “middling rank of men” was represented in the 
House of Commons.497  However, they were in both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords.  In fact, if Hume were being prescriptive, it would seem he was 
encouraging that “middling rank of men” to be instituted in the upper House as a 
result of his general weariness towards the tendency of popular rule in the lower 
House.  In “Of the Coalition of Parties,” Hume explains that those who argued for an 
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increase in the power of the Commons were appealing to “ancient institutions” which 
were not analogous to the contemporary constitution.  The Commons had originally 
held almost no power, and the only power that could restrain the King was the 
“seditious” feudal barons, as Hume puts it.  The barons eventually lost the ascendancy 
over the King, and the Commons only gained power (in particular via property) as a 
result of the liberty and security that was provided by the power of the monarch over 
that of the “seditious” barons.498  Furthermore, in The History of England, it was the 
Lords, in the absence of the Commons, who took control of handling the revolution 
settlement.  Perhaps Hume had a greater appreciation for the permanency found in the 
upper House.499  
Hume recognized that the English constitution divides those who hold the 
most powerful opinions of the right to power and property into a separate branch of 
government.  From this separate branch, the power of the individual monarch is 
moderated even though the importance of the position is maintained since, like the 
Venetian Republic, the House of Lords’ authority only comes from a mutual 
recognition of the other branches in the state, most importantly the monarch.  This 
keeps the republican element subordinate in the constitution to the monarchical 
element, but still allows it to demand the rule of law.   
 
In the essay “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” Hume posits many additions 
and changes to the republican form of government, as it was generally known at that 
time, though his basis for comparison comes mostly from England’s mixed 
constitution.  In this essay, Hume highlights how he would deal with the passions and 
principles that beget singular faction.  As much as he sought to mitigate against the 
                                                
498 MPL, “Of the Coalition of Parties,” 498. 
499 History, VI, 518. 
179 
 
rise of arbitrary power by combination or usurpation, he also sought to provide 
division sufficient enough for honest representation and protection against cabal, 
though not so much as to render the senate ineffective.  “There are two things to be 
guarded against in every senate,” Hume writes, “its combination and its division.”500  
Against malevolent combination Hume provided the following remedies: the 
dependence of the senators upon the people by annual elections, the limited amount of 
power they could delegate, and the court of competitors.501  Hume’s answers to the 
problem of malicious division were: their limited size, the reluctance to give into one 
single faction as a result of their dependence on the people and not simply one 
separate interest, their ability to expel any factious member, and finally, the stability 
inherent in the character of the senators themselves, a stability which will carry over 
into the regulation of their own affairs within the senate. 
 No improvement is more interesting or novel, however, than Hume’s concept 
of the “court of competitors” which acts as a nominal shadow government, though it 
holds no power and concerns itself primarily with the inspection of public accounts, 
the accusation of wrongdoing, and the proposition of new laws.  This body, composed 
of men who were not successfully elected to the body of the Senate but received more 
than one third of the votes, remains ineligible for any office for one year, or while 
they are seated in the court of competitors.  In this way, Hume channels a natural 
passion inherent in faction, jealousy, and employs it towards two ends, both to the 
benefit of the state.  First, those seated in the court of competitors are allowed to 
exercise their time and energy towards the discovery of corruption in the body to 
which they failed to be elected.  Jealousy, spite, intrigue – all human passions that are 
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known to destroy government – are here employed to encourage integrity and limit 
hypocrisy in the highest level of the government, the senate.   
That said, the second end concerns the dialectical and comprehensive 
relationship between the senate and the court of competitors.  The court of 
competitors, “being composed of men that are their rivals next to them in interest, and 
uneasy in their present situation, will be sure to take all advantages against them.”502  
The faction composed of those who might remain envious of power and spiteful of 
the system that led to their electoral loss – indeed, the faction that might be most 
pernicious to this form of government – is institutionally corralled into the court of 
competitors.  As noted above, the senators, those who have been successful in their 
election against those who compose the court of competitors, must be above reproach 
in all of their dealings, for if they are not, they risk exposure by those who most covet 
their position.  The potential for unmitigated faction is institutionally limited and 
controlled.  In this way, Hume permits of faction, in fact he institutionally fosters it in 
order to head off the potential, one could say anticipated, clash of interests within the 
state.  Most importantly, those in the court of competitors do not question the right to 
power because they cling to the belief that their interests can still be served in the 
governing process, if not adequately when out of the senate, then adequately when 
they are (eventually) in office.   
At this point, we begin to see that Hume is describing something extremely 
similar to the British system with which he was intimately familiar.  His court of 
competitors has faint echoes of an opposition party.  Even though this is a “perfect 
commonwealth,” Hume has the British example constantly in mind; indeed, this 
“perfect commonwealth” cannot be properly understood unless it is seen in the light 
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of the British example.503  In comparing the two Hume writes: “The chief support of 
the British government is the opposition of interest: but that, though in the main 
serviceable, breeds endless factions.  In the foregoing plan, it does all the good 
without any of the harm.  The competitors have no power of controlling the senate: 
they have only the power of accusing, and appealing to the people.”504  Here Hume 
improves upon the British system as he notes that this is a part of what faction should 
be and do: it is operationally negative against other faction, in that it only has the 
power of oversight by accusation and no positive powers with which to manipulate 
the constitution towards its own interests.  By doing this, Hume also makes a sleight 
of hand concerning government composition, one which he never outwardly 
discusses, for reasons that should become evident.  That is, party and personal loyalty 
are divided by awarding first and second place.  Institutionalizing the human passions 
according to second-best (natural passions such as jealousy and spite) and victor 
(constructed or feigned passions according to the responsibility of the position) 
reforms these passions and guards against the negative potential of factious parties to 
question the right to power. 
 Hume’s concepts of principle and interest, discussed in the third section of this 
chapter, now become more relevant.  The duplicitous and often hypocritical nature of 
party leaders is now directed to ends that benefit the state.  Those who are victorious 
in elections may feign genuine principle (it should be remembered that the leaders of 
parties are more often motivated by interest, while members of lower ranks are more 
commonly motivated by principle) so to pretend one is acting on principle is to be 
expected.  Yet, the presence of the court of competitors makes sure that even though 
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such genuine principle may be feigned, it nevertheless provides the motive for one’s 
actions instead of momentary and personal interests.  It limits the hypocrisy of party 
leaders so that principled ends are achieved.  
Another key concept resurfaces in this essay: justice.  The interaction between 
the court of competitors and the senate is akin to the individual’s understanding of 
justice.  Long-term interests are acted upon in the senate because the court of 
competitors makes sure that they are.  Senators, or factions within the senate, are not 
permitted to exercise their authority for temporary and personal gain.  They can only 
act upon what would be justifiable to all.  Just as the individual is hampered in 
attaining ephemeral and decidedly personal interests by established law, the senate is 
hampered in attaining ephemeral and distinct factional interests by the scrutiny of the 
court of competitors. 
 
Like his contemporary Montesquieu, Hume encouraged “moderation” and a 
“moderate monarchy,” but precisely what he means by the term moderation is 
difficult to define.  Perhaps it is best to understand what Hume meant by 
understanding what he did not mean, and certainly he did not intend moderation to 
mean inactivity.  Likewise, he did not believe that the subjects of a state should be so 
constantly vigilant as to be paranoid, a state of mind that was all too easy to reach 
when party politics were involved.  Even in Great Britain, “where the utmost liberty is 
allowed,” Hume recognized that partisans were more than likely to take their attacks 
or defenses of ministers to an extreme, allowing the republican form of government, 
and the liberty it allows, to incur the greatest factional strife.505  Though Hume 
acknowledged the importance of party politics, he also recognized the neglect such a 
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system of politics could have for the public.506  Because of this, Hume, for his part, 
sought to encourage moderation, something which he thought might be best 
encouraged by increasing the zeal for the public, not the private, realm and trying, “to 
draw a lesson of moderation with regard to the parties,” which divide a country.  At 
the same time, he sought to make sure that this moderation did not, “abate the 
industry and passion, with which every individual is bound to pursue the good of his 
country.”507  When the interest of each branch of government (or their respective 
factions) concurs with that of the public, meaning that they are settled upon the same 
opinion of the right to power, “we may pronounce that government to be wise and 
happy,” but if separate interests are not checked and do not have the same ends as that 
of the public, “we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny from 
such a government.”508 
“All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult 
to be decided,” Hume confessed in “Of the Independency of Parliament.”509  
Conflicted between these two extremes, moderation becomes for Hume a golden 
mean.  “Moderation is of advantage to every establishment: And an over-active zeal 
in friends is apt to beget a like spirit in antagonists.”510  Faction must not add 
unnecessary fuel to factional strife, but should rather encourage the recognition 
among and between interest groups that natural divisions within the state can benefit 
the public, as well as individual interests.  This requires what Hume called 
“reasonable men,” those who recognize the absurdity and the utility of social 
constructs like party politics.  Those who will recognize this most easily are what 
Hume calls the “middling rank of men” who, after all, “are the best and firmest basis 
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of public liberty.”511  Hume was not encouraging a government run by elites, nor one 
where absolute equality leads to a communal existence.  The former he insisted led to 
tyranny, the latter to stagnation, and ultimately tyranny. 
These “middling rank of men” are capable and reasonable men whose actions 
are mitigated by opinions of interest and not opinions of right.  Their motivations are 
indeed personal, but as reasonable men they realize the social utility of principles 
such as gallantry and enthusiasm.  And, acting according to self-interest, they 
recognize that multiple factions are necessary in order to guarantee not only their 
individual rights and interests, but their own usefulness to the public.  They become 
factions that follow Hume’s advice in “Of the Coalition of Parties”: 
There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, 
than to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party 
over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper 
medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may 
possibly be sometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise 
and blame, which we bestow on either side.512  
 
Hume sums this up by writing, “let us, therefore, rest contended with asserting, that 
two opposite vices in a state may be more advantageous than either of them alone; but 
let us never pronounce vice in itself advantageous.”513  Vice is not advantageous but 
useful, if used in the right proportion.  Reasonable men who act out of utility, habit, 
self-interest, or a combination of the three, realize the practical side of party politics 
and so permit it for the good that it can do. 
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4  §  A Prudent Party for Remarkable Men 
 
 
 
 
Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours 
the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are 
all agreed.514 
 
 
 
It is a constant wonder to the liberal mind as to how far tolerance should 
extend.  Often, such a lack of consideration on this topic has allowed the forces of 
either political extreme, which are not after all so far apart in their ends, to dictate the 
object of their agendas.  States have been lost when the question of indecency has 
gone unanswered, or even worse, unasked.  Political correctness gone awry or the 
overt tolerance of evil doctrines have both been reasons for the collapse of states.  
Those who do not seek to find in practice the balance between liberty and authority, 
but rationally assume their appropriate extent, are left with the dilemma of where to 
draw the line between the two.  Though vociferous in his attack on those who had 
crossed the line, Burke himself was vague on where exactly that line was situated.   
When does tolerance lead to danger, or worse to anarchy?  How does the most 
tolerant nation on earth, and the most prolific writer on that nation, deal with this 
“liberal dilemma”?  Indeed, what is the political balance between tolerance and 
discrimination whereby the former provides for the liberty of the subject and the latter 
the security?  The dilemma rests upon the (ever illusive) point where the two meet, 
without infringing upon either liberty or security.  Before examining this in detail, it 
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is worth remarking on a related story with which Burke begins the third of his Letters 
on a Regicide Peace.  Here, he recounted the fabled story of an English country 
squire gone on a continental tour in order, “to see the world, and to become knowing 
in men and manners.”515  After arriving in Constantinople, the squire set out on a 
stroll whereupon he was assaulted by a Turk who proceeded to kick him for being an 
infidel in a city of true believers.  Not knowing what to do, and wanting to avoid 
further insulting his host-of-sorts, “he thought it better, as better it was, to assuage his 
bruised dignity with half a yard of square balmy diplomatick diachylon.”516  His 
fellow travelers soon inform him that it is simply the customs of the country, and that 
he should try his luck in enjoying Constantinople on another promenade.  The squire, 
however, thought differently.  “What! have I come at all this expence and trouble, all 
the way to Constantinople only to be kicked?  Without going beyond my own stable, 
my groom, for half a crown, would have kicked me to my heart’s content.”517  The 
squire, tolerant to the point where his tolerance got him assaulted, returns to England, 
and Burke says he is right to do so.   
 In this way, Burke’s tolerance is unique.  It is not the typical English 
tolerance; remember, the squire’s fellow travelers encourage him to stay and to accept 
the difference in manners as foreign customs.  Burke’s squire will not accept or 
apologize for the Turk’s base customs.  Rather, he will hold the moral high ground 
and refuse to understand what it is that makes the Turk’s customs what they are.  Any 
attempt at understanding or tolerating them would be to the detriment of his own 
character, and he does not mean to debase his own high principles in the name of 
diplomacy, or what today one might call political correctness.  Patience, for instance, 
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is not always a virtue, and neither is tolerance.  When the patience of fortitude 
becomes the patience of sloth or weakness; when personal character is derided in the 
name of tolerance; when character stands for accepting all customs, even base 
customs, in the name of tolerance; when character is tolerant of dangerous, derisive 
and derogatory custom in the name of political correctness, virtue has turned into 
vice.  By way of allegory, Burke explained to his reader that principle was under 
attack.  His response to the French Revolution would be his counter attack, as well his 
clearest answer to the “liberal dilemma.” 
 
There is great consistency in Burke’s thought, though it may be more apt to 
say there was consistency in the thought that was a product of his life-long pursuit.  
Exactly what he pursued is debatable.  Burke’s legacy lives on in people who have 
identified his pursuit with their own, and it has been at times destroyed by those who 
have systematically undermined any credibility to such a pursuit, namely by, and by 
those associated with, Sir Lewis Namier.  Conor Cruise O’Brien, the man who did the 
most to discredit the Namierites, perhaps best understands this pursuit.  According to 
O’Brien, Burke was fighting the arrogance of power, identified as the area where 
overconfidence and cruelty overlap.518   
Throughout his parliamentary career, four main themes composed Burke’s 
“great melody,” as O’Brien put it: Ireland, America, India, and France.  Over each 
issue Burke would be accused of inconsistencies or ulterior motives, but his actions 
were consistent and surprisingly selfless.519  Burke maintained his opposition to Irish 
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independence in 1781, for instance, while supporting American independence.  
Though he was much maligned for this ostensible inconsistency (why freedom for 
America and not his homeland?), the two positions were consistent.  By 1781, Burke 
considered America lost from the Empire; moreover, independence was for a people 
demanding its freedoms.  Ireland, it could be said, was not yet found; Irish 
independence was wholly inimical to Burke’s vision of progress.  It would mean 
putting government into the hands of an oppressive minority, something he could not 
support.520   
Burkean scholarship largely agrees that Burke’s reaction to the events 
surrounding the French Revolution was consistent.  What he is accused of, however, 
is first holding fast to a position that sought to weaken the power of the crown (the 
same position that brought the Rockinghams to power), and later switching sides to 
one that supported absolute monarchy.  Such an argument neglects the fact that the 
nature of royal authority had been altered between these two events, due largely to the 
actions of the Rockingham Whigs.521   
Though resolute when acting in or writing upon political affairs, Burke had no 
choice but to come to terms with who he was, or more aptly put, who he would 
always strive to be.  It took many years, years that are indeed little studied, for 
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Burke’s principles to develop.  Yet, by the time Burke’s political career began, his 
principles were well established.522  Isaac Kramnick puts more emphasis on these 
years than perhaps any other biographer and calls this period of “crisis” a “second 
birth.”523  If Burke was a contradiction by the very nature of his situation, it is within 
these years that it could be said he resolved the crises of conscience that arose from 
such a contradiction.   
Burke believed in tolerance over discrimination, but he did not tolerate apathy; 
he believed that all men could make of themselves what they wanted.  He was an 
outsider, a beneficiary of the English tolerance he would come to embrace and 
promote so vigorously in his writings.  He was an Irishman in a world of English 
empire.  He was a Member of Parliament in the constant minority.  Yet, in spite of all 
this, Burke the Irishman came to represent all that was English: its virtue, its 
principle, its reserve.  This did not come easy for Burke, as he explained in one of his 
last works, A Letter to a Noble Lord: 
I possessed not one of the qualities, nor cultivated one of the arts, that 
recommend men to the favour and protection of the great…At every 
step of my progress in life (for in every step was I traversed and 
opposed), and at every turnpike I met, I was obliged to shew my 
passport, and again and again to prove my sole title to the honour of 
being useful to my Country, by a proof that I was not wholly 
unacquainted with it’s laws, and the whole system of it’s interests both 
abroad and at home.  Otherwise no rank, no toleration even, for me.524 
 
Burke could never avoid the accusations of being an outsider, accusations that 
followed him throughout his life; A Letter to Noble Lord was composed only a year 
before his death.  Yet, until his death, in 1797, Burke maintained the constancy of 
character for which he was known, and, as this chapter will demonstrate, for which he 
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became misunderstood as a reactionary.  It is worth asking, as O’Brien does in the 
epilogue to The Great Melody, if Burke had died in 1789, would his legacy been 
labeled reactionary?525 
In the past half century, the study of Burke’s thought has undergone a small 
revival, which has in many ways contributed to the varied use of it that is found 
today.526  The most complete and just treatment of Burke’s life and intellectual 
thought can be found in O’Brien’s The Great Melody, discussed above.  Burke’s 
thought, however, is most often put into what could be best, though too easily, called 
the conservative camp, though some studies have focused on how Burke diverged 
from such an understanding.  Russell Kirk’s intellectual biography, A Genius 
Reconsidered, does perhaps the most to cement Burke’s place as a “conservative” 
thinker by emphasizing Burke’s understanding of prescription and prudence.527   
The most qualified of these “conservative” interpretations is Harvey 
Mansfield’s Statesmanship and Party Government, in which he concludes that Burke 
failed in creating his version of party government, but in doing so created the modern 
form of conservatism which still embodies Burke’s rules of prudence.  Though his 
study is based primarily on Burke’s earlier works and their relation to Bolingbroke, 
Mansfield tends to pick and choose what he likes from Burke’s later writings.  
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Nevertheless, it remains one of the most thoughtful of all the studies to date, and gives 
Burke’s thought a well-deserved depth of meaning.  His examination of Burke’s 
understanding of virtue is unparalleled, as is his analysis and placement of 
prescription, prudence and prejudice in Burke’s thought, though Francis Canavan’s 
article, “Burke on Prescription of Government” comes close.528  
In an earlier work, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke, Canavan maintains 
that though Burke was as rational as any other thinker, his reasoning took on the 
added aspect of being put into practice.  Canavan is right in pointing this out; many 
commentators have misinterpreted Burke as an antirationalist.  Burke’s thought, 
Canavan notes, assumes natural law and relates it through reason and prudence to 
political problems.529  Reason here is the key for Canavan, for it is Burke’s reasoning 
in political affairs, which he equates with prudence, that informed Burke’s political 
philosophy.  Canavan concludes in the second part of the book with a thorough 
defense of Burke’s belief in a system of “natural rights” based in society (not in a 
state of nature) that stems from natural law and presupposed through prudence.530  
Canavan must be seen in contrast to those who interpret Burke’s understanding of 
natural rights as simply being replaced with conventional civil rights.  Instead, 
Canavan gives to Burke’s understanding of civil rights a core of natural right.  
Following in the path of Canavan, Peter Stanlis and Bruce Frohnen both find 
coherence in Burke’s thought in the natural law tradition.  (As a student of Stanlis’ it 
comes as no surprise that Frohnen reads Burke in much the same way.)  Both 
concentrate heavily on Burke’s understanding of a moral natural law and the idea of 
prudence, as well his reaction against the Jacobin rationalism and sensibility that had 
its roots in many of Rousseau’s works.  For Stanlis, who has contributed greatly to the 
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scholarship of Burke’s theory of revolution, Burke had a “tragic sense of life,” that 
was informed by his religious views.  He also accepted the eventuality that all human 
affairs were subject to, “revolutionary transformations, alterations that are often 
beyond the control of human will or rational understanding.”531  Stanlis employs this 
view to explain why Burke rejected the optimism of the eighteenth century as both 
immature and unfounded.  Burke’s idea of history, according to Stanlis, was not 
progressive as much as it was cyclical.  Though too much emphasis is put on this 
cyclical view of nature, he rightly notes Burke’s skepticism concerning a progressive 
history.  This chapter argues that though skeptical, Burke ultimately believed that 
history could progress.  Reform was possible, though it did not come through radical 
change.  Rather, it came through a slow transformation to, and appearing to be as 
much an adaptation of, inherited customs and institutions. 
According to James Conniff, Burke did not focus on natural law but on 
history, in which he discerned the realms of possibility for society as an “evolving 
corporation.”532  Conniff goes beyond Burke’s idea of prescription by expanding upon 
Burke’s idea of “trusteeship,” which was largely defensive and intimately related to 
an understanding of party that advanced reform by attempting to remove some of the 
causes of and opportunities for corruption.  Indeed, the fact that Burke spent so much 
time writing on party demonstrates, “his view of party as the concrete embodiment of 
his theory of trusteeship.”533  In forming party, Burke was trying to form an 
aristocratic interest, inclusive of their political principle, that could provide a guide 
for action by assisting men in judging situations.534  Unlike Mansfield, who 
considered party to be a necessary expedient, Conniff considers Burke’s party to be 
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morally neutral, though he contradicts this conclusion when remarking on Burke’s 
later split with the Whig party.  If resisting the Revolution was a moral choice, as 
Burke argued it was, then the reason for breaking with the Whig party, resistance to 
the Revolution, reinforces the fact that party was for Burke, especially later in his life, 
a moral force.535 
C.B. Macpherson remarks that Burke’s later writings contain little in the way 
of a coherent political theory, by which he means Burke did not draw upon a theory 
based on first principles.  Though he admits there are, “the rudiments of such a 
general theory,” his point is a valid one, shared by Mansfield, J.G.A. Pocock, and Iain 
Hampsher-Monk.536  Mansfield, discussing the Discontents, is more vague about this 
idea, however.  For a more succinct Straussian opinion on this one must go the 
source: “Burke did not write a single theoretical work on the principles of politics.  
All his utterances on natural right occur in statements ad hominem and are meant to 
serve immediately a specific practical purpose.”537  Strauss claims Burke did not write 
a coherent theory of political principles, thus agreeing with Macpherson, yet he is 
adamant that Burke himself followed and defended the same political principles 
throughout his career, demonstrating that he adhered to a set of first principles. 
Unlike Hobbes or Locke, Burke did not lay out a set of first principles from 
which he drew his conclusions.  Yet, the reader cannot help but pick up on the 
admittedly various and scattered principles laid down by Burke throughout his 
writings.  Though scattered, this does not mean they are not present, nor does it mean 
Burke’s system of political science lacks coherence, as Macpherson claims.  In 
rejecting the idea that Burke was a natural law theorist, Macpherson distances himself 
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from both Stanlis and Frohnen, and emphasizes instead Burke’s utilitarian 
tendencies.538  For instance, in the Discontents Burke was, “proposing no more than a 
way out of the decay he saw around him: it was a short-run expedient for the 
immediate situation.”539  Macpherson sees Burke’s use of rhetoric as a substitute for 
reasoned discussion.  Such an absence of real argument is meant, according to 
Macpherson, to gloss over the intent to maintain the status-quo, a point Pocock also 
maintains, particularly concerning society’s economic relations.540  
Similar in approach to Macpherson is Isaac Kramnick, who suggests in The 
Rage of Edmund Burke that Burke was both a staunch defender and a severe critic of 
the aristocracy.  Kramnick contends that “much of Burke’s life was a charade” and 
that “while he hated the ambitious Jacobins who saw themselves repudiating received 
notions of natural superiority and subordination, he also shared some of their 
aspirations.”541  The extent to which Burke helped bridge the divide between the 
aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, a divide that would grow closer in the nineteenth 
century, is a much neglected topic in studies on Burke.  To his credit, Kramnick 
contributes to an area that has largely been ignored.  Nonetheless, making a 
schizophrenic out of Burke, as Kramnick is wont to do (“one part of Burke loyally 
served and defended his betters while another despised and sought to replace them”) 
is stretching the truth.542   
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This chapter will proceed in three parts.  The first section will examine 
Burke’s thought on principle, and how this thought was applied to both his 
understanding of English and Jacobin principle.  The second section will take a look 
at Burke’s understanding of party and faction, looking at the events of both the 
Discontents and the French Revolution.  For the sake of interpretation, the various 
terms used by Burke such as party, faction, cabal, interests, connexions, etc., defined 
more or less so according to application, will be examined in this chapter as they have 
been throughout the thesis, that is, principled and singular faction.  Finally, the 
chapter will conclude by demonstrating how Burke’s understanding of reform and 
change, informed by both principle and party, contributed to his understanding of 
legitimate resistance. 
 
Principle 
As Burke explained in the Reflections, the state is a tool through which virtue 
can be improved, and since our nature was to be improved by our virtue, God gave us 
the state as the necessary means to that perfection.543  Creating and maintaining virtue 
in a state, however, are not such easy tasks, and perfection, for Burke, was never a 
realistic end.  En masse and without leaders, Burke writes in the first of his Letters on 
a Regicide Peace, men, “remain what the bulk of us must ever be when abandoned to 
our vulgar propensities, without guide, leader or controul.”  “We must have leaders,” 
he continued, “If none will undertake to lead us right, we shall find guides who will 
contrive to conduct us to shame and ruin.”544   
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Leaders are needed because men are inclined towards both good and, when 
left to their own devices, evil.  “Men are in public life as in private, some good, some 
evil.”545  On men in general, Burke followed an old aphorism remembered from his 
school days, “the man who lives wholly detached from others, must be either an angel 
or a devil.”  For Burke it was simple: “We are born only to be men.  We shall do 
enough if we form ourselves to be good ones.”546  Burke’s understanding of human 
nature was thus a balance.  Since men have a tendency to err towards either extreme, 
evil or hostile righteousness (itself a form of evil), men should not expect to achieve 
perfection when living in the company of other men.  Men must realize, “that all 
virtue which is impracticable is spurious.”  That virtue cannot be perfected does not 
mean it cannot be improved, however.  It is better to, “run the risque of falling into 
faults in a course which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our 
days without blame, and without use.”547  Virtue needs only to be practical in its 
application if it can be improved in its practice. 
As a result of this balance in human nature, some degree of evil must be 
tolerated in society.  It was, “no inconsiderable part of wisdom,” Burke wrote in the 
Discontents, “to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated; lest by attempting a 
degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, instead of cutting off 
the substituting ill practices, new corruptions might be produced for the concealment 
and security of the old.”548  By maintaining that the possibility for evil must always be 
permitted to exist, Burke was not dogmatic; as he remarked much later in the Letters, 
he was not against committing an evil in order to avoid a greater evil.549  If evil is 
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stamped out so too will virtue be lost.  “It is better to cherish virtue and humanity,” 
Burke wrote in the Reflections, “by leaving much to free will, even with some loss to 
the object, than to attempt to make men mere machines and instruments of a political 
benevolence.  The world on the whole will gain by a liberty, without which virtue 
cannot exist.”550   
Burke disregarded any theory of virtue that aimed at the idea of perfection 
because virtue was reflected in and maintained by the structure of society itself.  It is 
the natural (and hierarchical) division of society which maintains and instructs virtue 
as a governing principle, incorporating the ideas of prejudice and prudence which 
teach men to appreciate both their rights and their duties in civil society. 
   
Burke’s understanding of the rights given to men in civil society is similar to 
both Montesquieu’s balance of political liberty and Hume’s conception of 
government as what is in our long-term interest.  Civil society should be made to the 
advantages of men in that society.  Those advantages naturally become rights.  Law is 
thus a rule that keeps men in the path of justice so that they can enjoy those 
advantages.  “Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, 
he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which 
society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour.”551  In the 
Reflections Burke could afford to speak generally on this topic, but as a result of the 
pamphlet war that ensued, he later clarified his position in the Appeal by criticizing, 
in language that was singularly directed, those who do not separate abstract rights 
from political rights: “The pretended rights of man, which have made this havock, 
cannot be the rights of the people.  For to be a people, and to have these rights, are 
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things incompatible.  The one supposes the presence, the other the absence of a state 
of civil society.”552  For Burke, rights only exist in civil society as they are created by 
virtue of their application, not their rationale.  Government is not “made in virtue of 
natural rights,” rights which are defective in their abstract perfection.553  For Burke, 
the fulfillment of rights should tend more towards genuine needs, the fulfillment of 
which is the end of all government, than desires.  Francis Canavan calls the public 
good the end of political reason (which he equates with prudence), but political reason 
is in this case only the means to the same end of meeting these genuine needs.554 
Men have the right to control the passions of others, with their passions 
controlled in turn, so that neither infringe upon the liberty or security of others.  “In 
this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among 
their rights.”555  Burke is detailed and cautious in his approach.  He is loath to 
establish such rights, “settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to 
discuss them upon that principle.”556  Rights of men, “are in a sort of middle, 
incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned.”557  Men enjoy the 
advantages of society as their right (this, for Burke demonstrates their consent) but 
such advantages must at all times be balanced in each society between the different 
conceptions of good, between conceptions of good and evil, and even between 
different conceptions of evil.  This is why the decision to establish abstract rights as 
principles is a folly.  “The question is not concerning absolute discontent or perfect 
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satisfaction in Government; neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or 
upon any system.”558  The choice faced by the statesman will rarely be between two 
good options, with both options being satisfactory and sufficient to all parties.  
Circumstances may often dictate that the choice be between two evils; theoretical 
rights leave no room for such a political decision.  Canavan correctly remarks that 
Burke’s political reason aimed at the good (or the right) and not the true.  Though 
complex and imperfect, it must be practicable.559  
Since men’s rights are more in line with needs rather than wants, and since the 
advantages of society are not always easy to decipher, a quality of character is 
required to help maintain those rights in the face of men’s selfish will.  Burke calls 
this quality of character virtue, by which he means any principle that can restrain 
men’s selfish will for their own good; it is any virtue that might regulate men’s 
natural passions of self-interest and direct them towards ends that benefit the whole.  
Principle thus defines, where the law does not, what each citizen should do, and more 
importantly what he is at liberty to do.  Principle is not the law, but it is the 
constitutional mediator between law and liberty, making men observant of the former 
and jealous of the latter, and engaging them publicly in ways that their private vices 
might otherwise disregard.  Mansfield calls this “manners,” and though he is right to 
promote the public benefits that accrue when private vices are curbed by manners, he 
too easily equates manners with principle without noting the tendency of manners to 
degenerate into prejudices.560   
Government exists by contract, which entails duty and limits will.  People love 
to express their will, however, but are reluctant to hear of their duty.  Duty entails the 
limitation of one’s power, and people, when given the choice, do not want to hear of 
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their limitations.  The number who might express their common will should have no 
impact on this contract, if it is contrary to their duty.  “The number engaged in 
crimes,” Burke wrote in the Appeal, “instead of turning them in to laudable acts, only 
augments the quantity and intensity of the guilt.”561  Thus, power should reside with a 
government that can appropriately exercise the will according to the national interest, 
so that the advantages of society can truly be the rights of men.  This is not to rule the 
people out of the function of government.  The people should act as, “the natural 
control on authority,” Burke maintained, “but to exercise and to control together is 
contradictory and impossible.”562   
“Duties are not voluntary,” and “without any formal act of his own,” a subject 
attaches himself to the standing covenant of civil society.563  Burke admits the 
founding of society may have been voluntary, but he also maintains that it is no 
longer so; duties trump individual will because men have unknowingly and 
unwillingly joined themselves to a contract governing civil society.  As mentioned 
above, men give their (implied) consent to a government when they enjoy the 
advantages of society.  Admittedly, this does not seem fair, though Burke’s reasoning 
follows a natural course.  Just as one is born into a family, so too does one join a 
community and therefore a nation.  The fact that children are all born unknowingly 
and unwillingly into a family does not lessen their obligations to that family.  In fact, 
it is their, “relation, without their actual consent, [that] binds them to its duties.”  
“Men come in that manner into a community with the social state of their parents, 
endowed with all the benefits, loaded with all the duties of their situation.”564  Duties 
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trump will, at least when that will directs one towards ends that might be detrimental 
to others in the family.   
As Francis Canavan points out, two principles can be taken from this 
passage.565  First, relationships are established by consent, but once consent is 
established (and for Burke it has been established), obligations that are independent of 
and superior to consent are created.  That is, consent becomes redundant and more 
important obligations take precedence.  Second, men do not have a right to, “free 
themselves from that primary engagement into which every man born into a 
community as much contracts by being born into it, as he contracts an obligation to 
certain parents by having been derived from their bodies.”566  Since one no longer 
consents to the founding of civil society, obligation has become antecedent to 
consent, and as a result, compels consent.  Burke does not inquire into men’s 
prepolitical rights in a state of nature, but begins with the purposes of civil society.  
Because of this, civil society is not framed according to men’s natural equality in a 
state of nature, but according to the benefits that civil society can confer upon men.  
Political power is just according to the ends it achieves, not the ends it intends. 
 
Principle is not simply a complement to the institutions that make up the 
government, but is at the same time the spirit and safeguard of the constitution.  
Therefore, until power and right are the same thing (and to Burke they never will be), 
no man has a right that is inconsistent with virtue, the first virtue, according to Burke, 
being prudence.  As he explained in the Appeal, “prudence is not only the first in rank 
of the virtues of political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard 
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of them all.”567  Prudence tempers men’s selfish instincts and as a result is most 
effective in instructing men to understand their place in society.  The principle, or 
“force of character” that regulates this division does not come from below, as a 
popular sentiment, but from above, “as all such spirits must ever be.”568   
Both Frohnen and Stanlis note that Burke’s understanding of prudence guides 
right action by checking our evil or selfish instincts.569  While they both note that 
prudence is meant to slow down political decisions, Frohnen explains that prudence 
can at times be used to preempt as well as to restrain.  Prudence slows down political 
decisions, but it is not the same as moderation, as prudence may at times dictate that 
moderation be cast aside.570  For instance, Burke believed that prudence should be 
taken in defending the British constitution against the Jacobin threat, but the point 
was past where such resistance should be done moderately.   
The rules of prudence are practical and guide action according to 
circumstance.  Since prudence is a virtue, it assumes a moral end and applies itself to 
determining the means to that end, though the end is not a moral absolute.  Principles 
guide action, but since they are previously determined, they cannot make an 
instantaneous determination.  This is why prudence guides right action.  Prudence 
makes the exceptions and the modifications for moral action according to 
circumstance.  Prudence fills the gap between principle and practice, connecting the 
two.  Canavan argues that Burke did have absolute moral principles that were 
provided by a moral natural law which, “stated an order of ends, derived from human 
nature…the basic principles of moral law imposed the realization of these ends and 
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forbade actions contrary to them.”571  If this were the case, however, the only 
mandatory duties would be negative duties, or the duty not to violate the ends of 
government.  Instead, prudence recognizes the utility of prejudice and knows that the 
vice inherent in prejudice can, politically speaking, pay homage to virtue.  It helps 
men tolerate their own inconsistencies and live up to greater expectations.   
Principle necessitates an elongated process in its application, one whereby the 
people are separated from power.  Subjects are understandably jealous of the power 
they give up insomuch as they separate themselves from the use of power.  Attached 
to this separation, therefore, are the concepts of fame and estimation, which must be 
maintained as the distance grows.  A perfect democracy, where there is little or no 
separation, is at once the most shameless and the most fearless.  Each man feels 
himself free from punishment because he is free from judgment.  Therefore, Burke 
warns, as the distance widens between those who give up and those who assume 
power, the estimation given to those who direct government must grow accordingly.  
Fame and estimation thus act as a check against a lack of principle.  Responsibility 
through public approbation is critical to the legitimacy of government, but the people 
cannot assume this responsibility or else there would be no approbation.572  
Burke believed that certain men, a “natural aristocracy,” are born to lead, 
guide and govern because they themselves are governed by principle.  In a rather 
lengthy explanation in the Appeal, Burke explains the merits of an aristocracy: 
To be bred in a place of estimation; To see nothing low and sordid 
from one’s infancy; To be taught to respect one’s self; To be 
habituated to the censorial inspection of the public eye; To look early 
to public opinion; To stand upon such elevated ground as to be enabled 
to take a large view of the wide-spread and infinitely diversified 
combinations of men and affairs in a large society; To have leisure to 
read, reflect, to converse; To be enabled to draw the court and attention 
                                                
571 Canavan, The Political Reason of Edmund Burke, 24-26.   
572 RRF, 189. 
204 
 
of the wise and learned wherever they are to be found; To be 
habituated in armies to command and to obey; To be taught to despise 
danger in the pursuit of honour and duty; To be formed to the greatest 
degree of vigilance, foresight, and circumspection, in a state of things 
in which no fault is committed with impunity, and the slightest 
mistakes draw on the most ruinous consequences – To be led to a 
guarded and regulated conduct, from a sense that you are considered as 
an instructor of your fellow-citizens in their highest concerns, and that 
you act as a reconciler between God and man – To be employed as an 
administrator of law and justice, and to be thereby amongst the first 
benefactors to mankind – To be a professor of high science, or of 
liberal and ingenuous art – To be amongst rich traders, who from their 
success are presumed to have sharp and vigorous understandings, and 
to possess the virtues of diligence, order, constancy, and regularity, 
and to have cultivated an habitual regard to commutative justice – 
These are the circumstances of men, that form what I should call a 
natural aristocracy, without which there is no nation.573  
 
Men who govern should be men of principle, and men of principle come from a 
“natural aristocracy” that promotes and facilitates the adoption of principle.  Yet, how 
is a natural aristocracy formed, and how does one arrive at the principles which they 
should follow?  Burke believed that men’s unequal faculties inevitably led to natural 
divisions in the state, in turn fostering prejudices.  If such prejudices were prudently 
managed, however, they could be just and politically effective.  Prejudice is thus a 
second virtue for Burke.  It was to all men in their local “connexions” what prudence 
was to the statesman, a necessary virtue for the succor of political liberty. 
 
Men, Burke states simply in the Letters, “are led to associate by resemblances, 
by conformities, by sympathies.”574  Our affections begin with the family, Burke 
explained in the Reflections, and from there, “pass on to our neighbourhoods, and our 
habitual provincial connections.”575  Associations form communities, and 
communities form a commonwealth, which Burke defined as, “one great state having 
the same basis of general law; with some diversity of provincial customs and local 
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establishments.”576  A state’s laws, customs, and establishments were particular and 
were in no way abstract things, nor should they be abstracted.   
Men, according to Burke, are not attached to abstract measurements of land or 
geometric divisions of right.  Reacting in the Reflections against the ludicrous extent 
to which the French government had been rationally abstracted, Burke wrote, “no 
man ever was attached by a sense of pride, partiality, or real affection, to a description 
of square measurement.”577  Instead, men are attached to what they know.  Burke calls 
the attachment that all men have to their customs, traditions, talents, and relationships 
“connexions,” which in political society bind men together into parties according to, 
“common opinions, common affections, and common interests.”578   
Prejudices result from the interaction of men in society.  They are necessary in 
order to form connexions and thus cannot be removed, even though they can be so 
factious that they often fail to recognize the common and sovereign interest of the 
whole nation.  Prejudices teach men to value their local short-term gain over that of 
the long-term gain of the nation.  Such negative tendencies inherent in prejudice, 
however, require further questioning.  Namely, for what ends are prejudices 
necessary?  And, how are these negative tendencies controlled?   
The negative tendencies of connexions could be ameliorated in a party system, 
Burke explains in the Reflections.  Though the presence of parties in government is 
bound to create friction, such resistance was constructive.  “Opposed and conflicting 
interests” deliberate, compromise, and moderate each other.  Indeed, they,  
interpose a salutary check to all precipitate resolutions; they render 
deliberation a matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all 
change the subject of compromise, which naturally begets moderation; 
they produce temperamants, preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude, 
unqualified reformations; and rendering all the headlong exertions of 
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arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable.  
Through that diversity of members and interests, general liberty had as 
many securities as there were separate views in the several orders.579  
 
Without conflict or dissonance in a state among separate interests, governments are 
liable to assume arbitrary powers.  Burke calls this difficulty to operate in government 
“a severe instructor,” but one that is overall helpful.  “He that wrestles with us 
strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill.  Our antagonist is our helper.”580  The 
first benefit of prejudice, therefore, is the constructive antagonism that comes from a 
division of civil society whereby each division seeks to maintain their individual 
rights. 
An antagonist can only help if he does not seek to destroy his opponent, 
however.  Antagonists need a common referee, and Burke’s referee is the sovereign, 
to whom prudence dictates that all interests in the state submit.  Burke illustrates, 
describing King William’s unpopular war a century earlier, when peace would have 
been popular but disastrous, how principle can carry an unpopular war through to 
principled ends.  Acting on principle, the King persevered to, “sink their factious 
temper in his public spirit.”581  With the national interest at stake: “split before an 
hundred adverse factions…the whole nation, Lords, Commons, and People, 
proceeded as one body, informed by one soul.”582  As a higher principle, prudence 
regulated the submission of the representative to the national interest.  Principled 
representatives thus became integral to the constitutional operation of ensuring the 
national interest, which Burke explained in his “Speech to the Electors of Bristol.”   
Burke considered himself to be a Member of Parliament before he was a 
“delegate” from Bristol.  He professed to be a “good Member of Parliament” who 
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would not fall into pitiful and futile party politics in which there, “is so strong a 
disposition to run into the perilous extremes of servile compliance, or wild 
popularity.”583  He did not expect his constituents to sacrifice their interests to the 
national interest, but he did expect them to allow him to forfeit their prejudices when 
those prejudices risked impairing the national interest.  “Parliament is not a Congress 
of Ambassadors from different and hostile interests,” Burke explained, “Parliament is 
a deliberative Assembly of one Nation, with one Interest, that of the whole; where, 
not local purposes, not local Prejudices ought to guide, but the general Good, 
resulting from the general Reason of the whole.”584  This was a fundamental belief 
Burke had in the British constitution.  When Parliament met, it represented the whole 
and not just the parts.  Likewise, the representative can have “no action and no 
existence” unless a part of the whole.585  
Prudence is an imperative principle for the representative in government.  He 
must be dedicated to the interests of his constituents, and in this way his interests are 
their interests, but his prudence must regulate the naked vigor of local prejudice that 
their self-interest might invoke.  Representatives safeguard the welfare of the nation 
as a whole by screening local prejudices through prudence.  A representative should: 
prefer their interest to his own.  But, his unbiassed opinion, his mature 
judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to 
you; to any man, or to any sett of men living…Your Representative 
owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, 
instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.586  
 
Government and legislation Burke calls, “matters of reason and judgement, and not of 
inclination.”587  Decisions can never precede discussion; the Representative should 
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therefore never promise to decide according to the inclinations of those who are not a 
part of the national discussion.   
In addition to prudence, the proper function and boundary of government 
limited the negative tendencies of prejudice.  The state should confine itself to: “every 
thing that is truly and properly public, to the public peace, to the public safety, to the 
public order, to the public prosperity.”588  National politicians can give a leaning but 
not a law to local affairs.589  The principal purpose of national government should be 
to clarify differences by disseminating information; information, metaphorically 
speaking, being the retardant for the flames of local prejudice stoked by factious 
rumor.  Local or regional prejudices in themselves are not bad – they are after all what 
bind a community – but their tendency towards ignorance and discrimination can 
create national tension.  Government should thus be used as a restraint, especially on 
speculations “under circumstances of irritation.”  The rumors and lies, “spread about 
by the industry of faction…tends infinitely to aggravate prejudices.”  Government’s 
first responsibility, therefore, “is information; the next is timely coercion: – the one to 
guide our judgment; the other to regulate our tempers.”590  Government should slow 
all political decisions down, not accelerate them.591  Prudence and prejudice thus act 
in balance, the one necessary for the other.  The latter gives energy to the government 
through the connexions it forms; the former instills moderation in the representative 
when those connexions become parties, encouraging them to act as principled faction 
and limiting their tendency to act as singular faction. 
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European qualities of character arose out of the practices of chivalry into what 
Burke calls a “noble equality.”  They produced an opinion, “which mitigated kings 
into companions, and raised private men to be fellows with kings.”592  They tamed 
feelings of pride and lusts for power and even had a control upon sovereigns, who 
could not help but be influenced by social esteem.  Additionally, power was made 
gentle and obedience liberal because legislators of European states were obliged to 
study human nature, incorporating over time the differences of class, religion, and 
trade into one society.  They not only studied human nature, but man in civil society 
and, “were sensible that the operation of this second nature on the first produced a 
new combination.”  New diversities arose among men, “according to their birth, their 
education, their professions, the periods of their lives, their residence in towns or in 
the country, their several ways of acquiring and of fixing property…all which 
rendered them as it were so many different species of animals.”593  Most importantly, 
these legislators understood that all interests should be allotted the appropriate, 
“privileges as might secure to them what their specific occasions required, and which 
might furnish to each description such force as might protect it in the conflict caused 
by the diversity of interests, that must exist, and must contend in all complex 
society.”594  Burke makes use of Montesquieu by noting where he “observed very 
justly” the success with which ancient legislators encouraged, maintained and 
provided for the natural difference of inequality in all men.595  Burke believed 
contemporary society to be no different.  Men were still unequal according to their 
naturally acquired differences. 
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Divisions, such as, “some decent regulated pre-eminence, some preference 
(not exclusive appropriation) given to birth,” were inevitable within a state.  Once 
these divisions were made, according to merit, talent, utility or any combination of the 
three, “all men have equal rights; but not to equal things.”  Men may have an equal 
right to their share but, Burke clarifies, “not a right to an equal dividend in the product 
of the joint stock.”  This parallels into civil society; an equal, “share of power, 
authority, and direction which each individual ought to have in the management of the 
state,” may be a hypothetical right, one that is just in theory, but Burke is adamant 
that it is not “amongst the direct original rights of man in civil society.”596 
Too many divisions exist in political society for there to be a common will; 
the direction of the state has to be placed amongst some division.  “It is said that 
twenty-four millions ought to prevail over two hundred thousand.  True; if the 
constitution of a kingdom be a problem of arithmetic,” Burke sardonically wrote in 
the Reflections.  “This sort of discourse does well enough with the lamp-post for its 
second: to men who may reason calmly, it is ridiculous.  The will of the many, and 
their interest, must very often differ.”597  Burke does not come to this conclusion 
theoretically, as it is not a conclusion that can be made without recourse to the 
historical development of a society, which will vary according to the historical 
accumulation of rights and property. 
Every individual struggles, “to preserve possession of what he has found to 
belong to him and to distinguish him, [it] is one of the securities against injustice and 
despotism implanted in our nature.”598  As such, unequal divisions ought to be 
regulated, not only by assigning certain rights according to birth, but also by lodging 
certain perquisites and responsibilities with positions in the state.  The arrangement of 
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such divisions is, “neither unnatural, nor unjust, nor impolitic.”599  “If wealth is the 
obedient and laborious slave of virtue and publick honour, then wealth is in it’s place, 
and has it’s use.”600  When inheritance of property was also contingent upon principle, 
Burke found that the state was better off.  The inheritance of property, titles and 
fortunes, what Burke calls prescription, “tends the most to the perpetuation of society 
itself [and] makes our weakness subservient to our virtue; it grafts benevolence even 
upon avarice.”601  Prescription was not only customary, meaning it was rooted in 
habits rather than choices, it was also immemorial, giving it permanence and 
authority.602 
Burke did not, however, encourage privilege without responsibility.  In A 
Letter to a Noble Lord, Burke describes himself as the ordinary man who will hold all 
other men, including those of noble blood, to account for their contribution to the 
welfare of the state, and more importantly their employment of the talents, offices or 
emoluments given to them by the state, privileges which secure their, “own utility or 
[their] own insignificance.”603  As it is not the rich or the noble who are charitable to 
the poor, but the poor who are charitable to the rich, it is the responsibility, the 
enlightened duty even, of the rich to give back to the poor the product of their 
labor.604  The Duke of Bedford, Burke’s target, was given wealth and property, but he 
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was also given certain duties and responsibilities that are inseparable from that wealth 
and property.  His principle should remind him of this fact. 
By connecting principle through prescription to positions in the state, principle 
becomes a prerequisite for assuming public office.  On this point, Mansfield divides 
Burke’s idea of virtue into two categories: actual and presumptive.  Actual virtue is 
the virtue of the honnête homme, like Burke the man who is not noble.  Virtue, 
according to this classification, is secondary to established goodness, which draws its 
authority from the monarch and noble families, the latter of which are the guardians 
of presumptive virtue.  Actual virtue, though higher than presumptive virtue, is 
without foundation and more apt to corruption, unlike presumptive virtue, which 
though lesser, is more certain.  Mansfield describes prescription as the basis of 
presumptive virtue, which is equated with duty.605   
Though Burke regarded inheritance and lineage as a sure way of guaranteeing 
the proper qualities of character necessary for government, he did not consider it the 
only way.  He himself was, after all, an ordinary Irishman by birth.  Power, authority, 
and distinction were not confined “to blood, and names, and titles,” Burke argued.  
“There is no qualification for government, but virtue and wisdom, actual or 
presumptive.”606  This was not an invitation for all men to enter government, 
however.  For Burke, government was still the milieu of only those who were 
qualified.  If someone were to rise to power or prominence, Burke was adamant that 
such a rise should be well tested and as such, well deserved.607  “The road to 
eminence and power, from obscure condition,” Burke wrote, “ought not to be made 
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too easy…If it be open through virtue, let it be remembered too, that virtue is never 
tried but by some difficulty, and some struggle.”608  In this way, the components of 
principle and class division come together.  Class division instructed and maintained 
principle, though it was not a permanent structure.  Burke believed that men wanted 
to improve their station in life, but he also realized that personal gain, rather than 
virtue, motivated more men.609  Thus, if self-interest motivated one to raise his station 
to one that contained titles, fortunes and perquisites, such positions should be lodged 
with political duties and responsibilities, the principle of prudence being one of those 
responsibilities.    
In this case, Burke is balancing order and motivation.  Good order was “the 
foundation of all good things.”  But the people, naturally proud, must have some form 
of discipline over their occasionally excessive motivation to acquire (titles, wealth, 
influence, etc.) else that “good order” be upset.  In the Discontents, Burke maintained 
that, because of the plastic nature of the nobility, a proper balance between order and 
motivation could be found in the British constitution:  
But a great official, a great professional, a great military and naval 
interest, all necessarily comprehending many people of the first 
weight, ability, wealth, and spirit, has been gradually formed in the 
kingdom.  These new interests must be let into a share of 
representation, else possibly they may be inclined to destroy those 
institutions of which they are not permitted to partake.610 
 
By appealing to the vanity of men, and permitting the influential into the ranks of the 
nobility, obedience to the governing principle is co-opted and secured.  Men are either 
tested in their actual virtue, or laden with the responsibility of presumptive virtue.  
Critically, self-interest is now curbed by the prudence required of the position.  
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Before looking at how Burke applied his understanding of principle, it is 
necessary to look at one more point, which will reoccur throughout the remainder this 
chapter.  That is, when it came to government reform, Burke believed that a change in 
principle was prior to a change in institutions.  As discussed above, Burke believed 
that the causes of evil are permanent, but the modes through which evil operates are 
not.  The existence of a tyrant does not mean that monarchy is bad, but simply that the 
cause of evil was able to use the monarchy as a conduit for evil designs.  Indeed, the 
same applies to any form of government.  The purpose is not to eradicate the effects 
of evil, or the means to those effects, but to eradicate the cause in whatever vehicle it 
may arise.  “Seldom have two ages the same fashion in their pretexts and the same 
modes of mischief,” Burke warned in the Reflections, “wickedness is a little more 
inventive.”611  Though faction can do harm, it is not the shell of faction but the evil 
spirit that can exist in it.  Reform, and not overt change, is therefore needed to rectify 
such an evil.  It is not the institutions that one must guard against, but the animating 
spirits which reside in them.  
In his speech on Commons reform, Burke highlighted a difference between a 
defect in a person in government or the administration of it, and a defect in the 
Constitution.  The former is a problem of principle and can be cured, “by the motives 
of religion, virtue, honour, fear, shame, or interest.”  The latter, “no man has ever 
willingly obeyed, much less was desirous of defending with his blood.”612  The 
problem with the argument for reform, Burke concluded, lay in the orientation of the 
debate, which should be centered on the character and conduct of men and the 
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soundness of measures, not the constitution itself.  Nearly a decade later this belief 
would be echoed in the Reflections.  The British constitution was not, he admitted, 
“without some causes of apprehension and complaint,” but for the British this did not 
owe, “to their constitution, but to their conduct.”613 
Such a strong belief in reform over change, improvement through practice 
over theoretical beginnings, begs the question of when resistance was legitimate, and 
for Burke, there did come such a time.  His thought on principle has been looked at 
via prudence, prejudice and prescription, but his understanding of constitutional 
resistance had more to do with the circumstances surrounding his career, and the 
application of the above ideas to those circumstances, than it did any abstract 
philosophy he might have composed.  The principles that arose as a result of two 
different political forms, Jacobin France and the English constitution, influenced 
Burke’s philosophy to the extent that he staked his own political career on his analysis 
of them.  Both will be examined below. 
 
Jacobin Principle: 
Principles permeated the constitution of the ancien régime and their effect on 
French society was at the same time foundational and impulsive, Burke explained in 
the first of his Letters on a Regicide Peace.  It was the rationale for the political 
structure and gave meaning to political life: 
The body politick of France existed in the majesty of it’s throne; in the 
dignity of it’s nobility; in the honour of it’s gentry; in the sanctity of 
it’s clergy; in the reverence of it’s magistracy; in the weight and 
consideration due to it’s landed property in the several bailliages; in 
the respect due to it’s moveable substance represented by the 
corporations of the kingdom.614 
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Majesty, dignity, honor, sanctity, reverence: each describe the effects of principle on 
French society.  Though Burke did admit that the French nobility, “were not without 
considerable faults and errors,” he believed them to have been, “composed of men of 
an high spirit, and of a delicate sense of honour, both with regard to themselves 
individually, and with regard to their whole corps, over whom they kept, beyond what 
is common in other countries, a censorial eye.”615  
As in England, class division in France maintained stability under the old 
regime.  Property, and in particular the inheritance of property, entailed a duty 
attached to the tenure of the land, concerning both production and ownership.  The 
privileged individual who kept the estate was obliged to uphold the dignity of it by 
maintaining the high standards of manners, hospitality, and charity.  Burke considered 
the inheritance and maintenance of property as more than simple possession; it was a 
system which formed noble and enlightened men of character, both secular and 
religious.616  In this way, the nobility secured, “unity, coherence, consistency, and 
stability to the state.”617   
There nevertheless remained one blemish upon the French constitution, one 
fatal error in government composition that Burke believed helped to bring about the 
Revolution.  As a rule, and unlike in Britain, “those of the commons, who approached 
to or exceeded many of the nobility in point of wealth, were not fully admitted to that 
rank and estimation which wealth, in reason and good policy, ought to bestow in 
every country.”618  Burke considered such a strict division between nobility and other 
classes to be one of the principal causes of the destruction of the old nobility.  Since 
the allegiance of the newly influential was never secured, the principle upon which 
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the Revolution was directed had to be contrary to the principles of the ancien régime.  
Consequently, Burke writes, the French Revolution was not only a revolution in 
government form, but a revolution “in sentiments, manners, and moral opinions.”619   
The Revolution in France was, “a change in national spirit [which] is the most 
terrible of all revolutions.”620  The principles which moulded not only the character, 
but the institutions and traditions of their nation were rejected.  By breaking this 
mould, the men were free to form themselves.  This unrestrained liberty produced 
contradictory principles by which men began to regulate their actions.  Heinous 
crimes by sinister means were allowed for righteous ends; the murder of one was 
justified if it was to the benefit of all.  Burke described the vicious cycle he foresaw 
for Jacobin France: “Justifying perfidy and murder for public benefit, public benefit 
would soon become the pretext, and perfidy and murder the end; until rapacity, 
malice, revenge, and fear more dreadful than revenge, could satiate their insatiable 
appetites.”621   
The Jacobin leaders of France had perverted their system of manners by 
“grafting virtues on vices.”622  The motivations of love, veneration, admiration, or 
attachment, all produced by principles such as honor or virtue, vanished because these 
principles were disregarded.  The people may seem to benefit from the murder of a 
king or a queen, Burke remarked, but in doing these things, “nothing is left which 
engages the affections on the part of the commonwealth.”623  Burke elaborated upon 
this in the Appeal by noting that though he may agree with the principle behind an act, 
he reserved his judgment of it by examining the manner in which it was carried out.  
Burke also maintained that principle in a state was top-down.  A despot killed by a 
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revolting mob would not have the same effect of permanency as when a despot was 
removed by a revered Senate and replaced with a moderate monarch.  In the former 
case, Burke explained, “the feelings are true, and the theory is false”; in the latter both 
are proper.624  Principles and manners should be something that one can see embodied 
in the state.  Manners, formed by principle, “are what vex or sooth, corrupt or purify, 
exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible 
operation, like that of the air we breathe in.”625  And so, “to make us love our 
country,” Burke notes, “our country ought to be lovely”; any country that executes its 
monarch (in the wrong manner) is no longer lovely.626 
What the French newly termed civic education was, for Burke, a replacement 
of an education guided by both religion and principle, inclusive of self-interest, by an 
education formed by philosophical fanatics.627  Burke disdained the attempt to create 
citizens who might put the interests of the state above their own self-interest.  In their 
attempt at radical equality, the Jacobins attempted to eradicate all notion of self-
interest as an open motivation for government.  Yet, “those who attempt to level,” 
Burke maintained, “never equalize…The levellers therefore only change and pervert 
the natural order of things.”628   
In the new French republic, “nothing independent can co-exist,” because, “the 
will, the wish, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood of individuals is as nothing… 
The state is all in all.”629  The Jacobins erected a system whereby only their form of 
virtue, which aimed at reorienting men’s interest to the state, was legitimate.  France 
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had “prostituted” her virtue by attempting to make it universal, something which 
Burke believed virtue could never be.630  As his criticism of Jacobin France 
demonstrated, Burke had a strong aversion to any attempt at radical equality.  All men 
were not equal in the faculties they possess, he believed.  The state should recognize 
this in its permission of those who have a hand in government.  If principle does not 
regulate those who manage the affairs of the state, if self-interest does not teach men 
to jealously question power (Jacobin virtue had taught men to be unquestioning of 
power), then government will be abused by a few to the detriment of the many.631  
This is why the road to prominence in a state can never be too easy for Burke; leaders 
must be principled.  In their attempt at universal virtue and radical equality, the 
Jacobins rejected any notion of a legitimate division of society.  This rejection was 
thus a clear dismissal of Burke’s “natural aristocracy” as well as the principles of 
prudence and prejudice they embodied.  Moreover, by rejecting these things, the new 
Jacobin government had no way to ensure their statesmen were men of principle. 
Burke left room for the possibility that this could all have been a defect in the 
principle, and not in the constitution.  Indeed, Burke had little criticism for the 
constitutional form which immediately replaced the former French monarchy.632  The 
French people aimed at “virtue” and “wisdom” but they no longer possessed the 
ability to confer these objects upon those they ordained in government.  Principle, as 
remarked earlier, is not bottom-up but top-down.  If those in government are not 
actuated by a supreme degree of virtue, which Burke notes, “rarely appears in the 
world, and for that reason cannot enter into calculation,” then they will become the 
instruments of those with sinister ambitions.  Though this problem of principle can be 
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fixed, “by the motives of religion, virtue, honour, fear, shame, or interest,” events in 
France had gone too far; the natural divisions of society that supported those 
principles had been broken. 
Cromwell failed to make England an enduring republic because, Burke 
explains, though he had managed to break the state, he had not broken the spirit of the 
people that had for so long conformed to the previous constitution.633  As a result, 
when the constitution was restored, so too was the governing principle.  In France, 
however, the previous governing principle had been broken along with the state in an 
attempt at total equality and had been replaced with a principle that lacked 
institutional foundations.  Unlike the previous one, the new governing principle 
attempted to motivate the constitution from the bottom-up, and, in effect, this 
reorientation could not adequately motivate the new constitution because the principle 
was false and destructive. 
 
English Principle:  
Contrary to the lawyers and philosophers of Jacobin France, Burke noted, 
most ordinary Englishmen are not overly rational when it comes to examining 
political principle.  They see the practical side of its presence in society as well as the 
ridiculousness of its abstraction.  “An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth, to 
argue another Englishman into slavery.”634  Theoretical principle would not find an 
audience here because the principle that evolved as a matter of course in England is 
only followed for the sake of practicality.  “It is besides a very great mistake to 
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imagine, that mankind follow up practically any speculative principle, either of 
government or of freedom, as far as it will go in argument and logical illation,” Burke 
remarked.  “We Englishmen stop very short of the principles upon which we support 
any given part of our constitution; or even the whole of it together.”635  
Englishmen value liberty over abstract truth and thus willingly observe 
principle, even though they may realize, as explained in the Reflections, that it can be 
erroneous, excessively enthusiastic, and at times superstitious.  Principle may be an 
artificial construction but at its worst it remains the lesser of two evils: 
[If] a prudent man were obliged to make a choice of what errors and 
excesses of enthusiasm he would condemn or bear, perhaps he would 
think the superstition which builds, to be more tolerable than that 
which demolishes; that which adorns a country, than that which 
deforms it; that which endows, than that which plunders; that which 
disposes to mistaken beneficence, than that which stimulates to real 
injustice; that which leads a man to refuse himself lawful pleasures, 
than that which snatches from others the scanty subsistence of their 
self-denial.636   
 
Prudence is really another form of self-interest, thought not specifically self-denial.  
Prudence conforms to human nature since it is a tool through which our self-interest 
can be better understood; it tempers decision-making, reinforcing long-term interests 
over short-term ones.  Frohnen sums up Burke’s applied prudence: “Burke 
emphasized the wisdom of man over the wisdom of men.”637  Mansfield called 
prudence a “duty,” “a restraint given to the self, and for the sake of the self.  Its effect 
is to transform short-run self-interest into long-run self-interest, as in the modern 
conception of natural law.”638 
Principle, as both prudence and prejudice, moderates Englishmen.  “We fear 
God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to 
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magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility.”639  There is a 
clear division of roles, and assigned to those roles is the appropriate veneration 
according to the position.  Principle also divides Englishmen into these roles; it is, 
after all, based upon prejudice.  As prudence instructs men in the necessity of class 
divisions, making it more acceptable, prejudice reinforces such divisions making 
them more permanent and stable.  English principle does not attempt to eradicate self-
interest but instead harnesses and refines it.  “Instead of casting away all our old 
prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to 
ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have 
lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them.”640  
Prejudice here becomes not a pejorative term for self-interest, but a self-interest that is 
closer to the self-respect that comes from knowing and defending one’s position.  
Montesquieu called this honor – the prejudice of one’s condition – and here in the 
Reflections Burke echoes the use of honor in political society: 
Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously 
engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does 
not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, 
puzzled, and unresolved.  Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his habit; 
and not a series of unconnected acts.  Through just prejudice, his duty 
becomes a part of his nature.641   
 
Burke acknowledges that prejudice is biased, hypocritical, and to some extent unfair, 
but it is not unjust.  Prejudice is reasonable when it holds no claims on truth, only a 
claim that it is viable.  Prejudice is the most effective form of reason put to action 
since duties, “are imposed to govern our conduct, not to exercise our ingenuity.”642 
If principle is disregarded as it was in France, it follows that the mould which 
formed European social and political life would also be thrown away.  New interests 
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that correspond to the principles regulating society would subsequently emerge, 
generating new and different factions.  The next section will examine how Burke 
understood these new factions, as well as how he understood faction to operate in the 
British constitution where the principles of prudence and prejudice still governed.  Let 
us begin, however, by looking at how Burke understood faction in general. 
 
Faction 
Burke described party in the Discontents as, “a body of men united for 
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular 
principle in which they are all agreed.”643  Throughout his career, Burke’s 
understanding of party changed little from this brief definition in which he is an 
observer, not a participant.  He distinguishes both the national interest and political 
principle, which for participants would be synonymous.644  Such an understanding 
assumes that all parties will employ principles that are complementary to the national 
interest by combining the ideas of efficacy, political practicality and a duty to do more 
than have good intentions.   
Burke’s thought on party and faction remained remarkably consistent 
throughout his writings.  Though the object of discussion changed, the subject matter, 
by and large, remained the same.  This allows the reader to examine Burke’s thought 
from both a domestic and a foreign perspective.  The result is two separate analyses of 
party and faction, the former on reform and the latter on revolution.  The former, 
found in Burke’s first tract on party, “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present 
Discontents,” is a tract for moderation and understanding.  It is a tract arguing for and 
against faction.  It simultaneously informs the reader that a pernicious form of faction, 
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court cabal, is the cause of the present discontents, while managing to champion party 
politics as not only practical in a mixed government, but necessary for its survival.  
The latter analysis, found principally in his later works, abandons the caution found in 
Burke’s earlier work and warns of a new type of faction that employed a contrary 
principle, as discussed above.  Incapable of reform, this faction had for its end the 
total destruction of the existing state.  This section will examine both analyses on 
party and faction, and examine what Burke believed to be the cause of the 
discontents, the cause of the Revolution, and lastly the deleterious effect each of the 
causes had on party by the reorientation of sovereignty.  
 
English Faction: Burke’s “Discontents” 
Burke is at his best in the Discontents.  His argument is sound, though a subtle 
tint of esoteric rationale colors the work overall.  Whether or not this was intentional 
for reasons of personal security (he could not, after all, blatantly insult the King) or 
for more subtle reasons (such as the translucent nature of political truth) will never be 
known.  What is known, however, is that the work was carried out in a discursive 
manner with the express intention of putting a finger on the problem that was 
upsetting British politics at the time.  The Discontents is a nonpartisan party piece that 
bemoans party, yet celebrates it.  Burke is at the same time profound and duplicitous.  
Though ever the statesman, he remains aware of his position as a politician in the 
House of Commons and at all times orients himself from the Rockingham 
perspective.  It is a practical piece, born of a philosopher-statesman in office, and its 
highlights as well as its shortcomings reflect as much.   
Burke begins his “Thoughts on the Present Discontents” with an understated 
qualification, one that might be given were the writer to be earnestly appealing 
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caution and moderation to the reader of his tract.  Otherwise, it appears as an excuse, 
a rhetorical method of situating the argument on neither side of the debate, but above 
it in a manner of enlightened perspective.  “My aim is to bring this matter into more 
public discussion.  Let the sagacity of others work upon it.  It is not uncommon for 
medical writers to describe histories of diseases very accurately, on whose cure they 
can say very little.”645  Burke’s initial qualification is both simultaneously a 
reorientation of the argument and an excuse for not engaging himself in the familiar 
language that surrounds the “present discontents.”  Burke cannot win, he tells the 
reader.  If he fails in putting his finger on the true cause of the discontents he will be 
thought “weak and visionary.”  Worse still is if he were to succeed, for here he would 
surely invoke the wrath of those who benefit from the present system.646  
Demagogues and sycophants are both dangerous targets, Burke reminds the reader.  
He wants to attempt, “some other scheme beside that easy one which is fashionable,” 
or, for that matter, profitable.647  For all these reasons, Burke attempts to stand alone, 
without personal bias or interest, other than that which is in the interest of the nation 
as a whole.  Here in his first major political work, Burke underscores his concept of 
the national interest, sustained through the party system.  
In the Discontents, Burke employed the word faction in both positive and 
negative contexts.  Without a qualifier, and to signify faction that is either harmful or 
beneficial to the state, Burke more often uses the words cabal and party.  Cabal is 
used to describe something larger than party, such as a conspiratorial movement, like 
the one employed by the Court that Burke lays out throughout the pamphlet.  Cabal is 
antithetical to party and argues that party is unnecessary and ultimately evil.  Party, on 
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the other hand, is necessary not only for protection against cabal but for the protection 
of the national interest as well. 
In sketching the events that led up to the “present discontents,” Burke notes 
that the crown, after losing some of its power, began to substitute influence for 
prerogative, yet in order to gain influence, the court needed to appear to give certain 
powers back to the people.  Giving up certain powers to the people, however, would 
have been something wholly contradictory to the court cabal; thus, the policy of the 
court was to regain its influence without actually having to devolve any further 
powers back to the people.  In order to make two ministries, a distinction was drawn 
between the court and the administration, entities which had previously been 
synonymous.  The latter assumed all the responsibility of the ministerial policies but 
were only dejure in charge of their own affairs.  The former, the court cabal, were the 
defacto operators of ministerial policies.  The ministry would continue to execute, but 
have little say in the decision of what to execute.  A court party, in favor of the court 
over that of the ministry, was additionally established.  Under the influence of this 
party, Parliament gradually came to accept this course of affairs and increasingly 
abandoned their independence from the crown.  In this way, the court party killed 
faction by promoting the doctrine, “that all political connexions are in their nature 
factious, and as such ought to be dissipated, and destroyed.”648 
Burke compared the court cabal to a ruling junta who were above party.649  
Whereas party made the decisions on the agenda, the cabal set the agenda; this was its 
true power.  The cabal tried to, “form in the outward Administration two parties at the 
least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the 
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favour and protection of the Cabal; and, by their emulation, contribute to throw 
everything more and more into the hands of the interior managers.”650  The court 
cabal established itself as an innocent party, and when confronted with accusations of 
corruption, such as its abuse of royal funds, it asserted that the honor of the crown 
was at stake.  In this fashion, they became untouchable.  It was not the damage to the 
public credit that worried Burke, but the harm done to, “public morals and to the 
safety of the constitution, from the exhaustless mine of corruption opened by the 
precedent.”651  Forgetting who was really to blame the, “quarrel is begun between the 
representatives and the People.  The court faction have at length committed them.”652   
By reorienting the affections of the members of Parliament through 
emoluments, the court cabal made sure that Parliament’s ability to act as a control 
upon the crown was lost.  Members of Parliament forgot that they, “depend on the 
affection or opinion of the people for their political being,” and, in forgetting this, 
“[gave] themselves over, without even an appearance of reserve, to the influence of 
the court.”653  Ministers who feigned principle were more interested in the payments 
that emanated from the crown than the popularity they held with their constituents.  
“Whenever parliament is persuaded to assume the offices of executive Government, it 
will lose all the confidence, love, and veneration, which it has ever enjoyed whilst it 
was supposed the corrective and controul of the acting powers of the state.”654  As the 
crown placed men in ministerial posts, further undermining what was left of 
Parliament’s independence, the people lost the efficacy of their two greatest 
securities, the power they possessed from their popularity and connection.655  
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Whereas previously the crown relied on the opinion of the people through the power 
of the Assembly for the conferring of honors, this principle was now turned on its 
head: “The favour of the Court is the only sure way of obtaining and holding those 
honours which ought to be in the disposal of the people.”656  The constitutional 
arrangement guided by principle and prudence, whereby those who seek to serve in 
the Administration are recommended to the King by their virtue and through the 
opinion of the country, was reversed.  Burke called those who controlled the favor of 
the court “the new Court corporation.”  They called themselves “King’s men, or the 
King’s friends,” and they, acting in cabal, were the source of the discontents.657   
The perversion of principle outlined in the Discontents resulted from a defect 
in the administration, not the constitution.  As such, it could be fixed, but how?  
Burke stated that it could be fixed by the motives of principle, but again, what exactly 
did he mean by that?  If principle acts as both prejudice and prudence in government, 
then their effects must have been somehow perverted.  What were the effects, and 
how does Burke recommend fixing them?   
 
The people’s opinion is important to Burke, but the translation of its meaning, 
instead of its substance, is paramount to its validity.  The representative should know 
this.  Separating law from tradition, the statesman understands the instrumentality of 
the former – “the laws reach but a very little way” – and the nature of the latter which 
is understood, “by a knowledge of [the people’s] temper, and by a judicious 
management of it.”658  The people are to be understood rather than believed.  In the 
case of a distemper arising in the state, the representative is to give favor to the people 
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more so than the government because “the people have no interest in disorder,” and as 
such it should be seen as a symptom of something wrong with the constitution.659  
This does not mean the people are blameless; as Burke writes, “it is their error, and 
not their crime.”660  More importantly, however, is the fact that the people do not 
enact, but react, which is a defensive mechanism.  
The power of remonstrance was one power that Burke considered to be 
extremely influential.  Burke points out that the origin of this power was in the 
Commons.  It could remonstrate or, at best, resolve.  The House of Commons was to 
be, “no part of the standing Government of this country.”  It was instead, “a controul, 
issuing immediately from the people, and speedily to be resolved into the mass from 
whence it arose.  In this respect, it was the higher part of Government what juries are 
in the lower.”661  The King was still granted with forming an administration, but 
Parliament had a negative in its refusal to support, and as Burke pointed out in the 
Reflections, “those who can negative indefinitely in reality appoint.”662  The nature of 
the House of Commons, “consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the 
nation.”  It was designed not, “to be a controul upon the people…[but] as a controul 
for the people.”663  It does not seek to weaken through active means any other body of 
the state, but is designed only to defend the rightful liberties of the people.   
 Since the effects of principle are defensive, Parliament could no longer defend 
against the monarchy when the effects of principle were removed.  Burke’s solution 
to this problem is two-fold.  First, as explained above, the effects of principle must be 
reinstated.  To be reinstated, however, requires a vehicle.  Thus, Burke subsequently 
identified party as the vehicle to promote and defend the necessary principles that 
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maintain the balance of the constitution.  As explained above, connexions incorporate 
men through shared principles, talents, and dispositions in business.  Burke 
encouraged men to join factions and resist the pride of independence, where their 
individual power of resistance was null.  Individuals do not have the unique, “power 
to defeat the subtle designs and united Cabals of ambitious citizens,” and so Burke 
explains in an oft-quoted passage, “when bad men combine, the good must associate; 
else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.”  By 
being connected, men can, “easily and speedily communicate the alarm of an evil 
design.”664  Burke no longer wanted to rely on the virtue of individuals.  If party could 
embody the same principles, it could ensure that party members acted according to 
principle. 
Party is not perfect, Burke would later admit in his “Speech on American 
Taxation.”  It is composed of some men who are neither helpful nor pertinent.665  But 
if a man does not agree with his party overall, he should have joined one more 
conformable to his opinions.666  For the sake of efficacy, men have a duty to associate 
with one another.  Good intentions, which one could easily have alone, are not 
enough; men must find a way to carry out the means to their intended end.  It is, 
impossible to conceive, that any one believes in his own politicks, or 
thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of 
having them reduced into practice.  It is the business of the speculative 
philosopher to mark the proper ends of Government.  It is the business 
of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper 
means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect.667 
 
Burke is not advocating which ends to follow, only that men unite over shared 
principles.  This is what “connexions” are for in politics; they are, “essentially 
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necessary for the full performance of our public duty,” even though they are, Burke 
admits, “accidentally liable to degenerate into faction.”668   
Since men will often prefer their own interest to that of the national interest, 
factions can oftentimes be considered more harmful than beneficial.  “But,” Burke 
reminded his readers, “where duty renders a critical situation a necessary one, it is our 
business to keep free from the evils attendant upon it; and not fly from the situation 
itself.”669  As connexions encourage degenerative tendencies in factions, principle 
regulates these connexions by making such critical situations “our business.”  Thus, in 
his earliest work on party, Burke demonstrated how the principles of prudence and 
prejudice strengthened and regulated party, rectifying the defect in the administration, 
and how in turn a strengthened party could encapsulate the defensive mechanism of 
principle against those who seek to usurp power, namely the court cabal.   
 
Jacobin Faction: 
By 1790, Burke had been in opposition almost continually for twenty-eight 
years and, though his writings demonstrated the same intricacy of thought as they did 
years earlier, one finds by this later stage a writer who was more patient and careful in 
expressing himself.670  He rarely joined a fashionable cause or showed much interest 
towards one.  He was better at criticizing than creating; a traditionalist for sure, but 
thorough and consistent in his defense of being so.  
The French Revolution was undoubtedly the greatest threat to all that Burke 
held dear in the British constitution.  The menace came late in his life, at a time when 
most of his fortunes had reversed.  He was perpetually in debt; his energies and 
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talents were slowly drained by the unsuccessful impeachment of Warren Hastings; his 
attempts at reform in Ireland were constantly rebutted or altered to a state that was to 
him futile; he was increasingly ostracized from the Foxite Whigs; and finally, the 
death of his only son Richard dealt a blow from which he would never fully recover.  
Through these hardships, however, Burke continued.  A tired and defeated man, he 
continued to write and lobby for what he saw as the only alternative to the French 
Revolution: resistance to Jacobinism.  
In the first of the Letters on a Regicide Peace, Burke defined Jacobinism as, 
“the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against it’s property.”  He goes on: 
When private men form themselves into associations for the purpose of 
destroying the pre-existing laws and institutions of their country; when 
they secure to themselves an army by dividing amongst the people of 
no property, the estates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when a 
state recognizes those acts; when it does not make confiscations for 
crimes, but makes crimes for confiscations; when it has it’s principal 
strength, and all it’s resources in such a violation of property; when it 
stands chiefly upon such a violation; massacring by judgments, or 
otherwise, those who make any struggle for their old legal government, 
and their legal, hereditary, or acquired possessions – I call this 
Jacobinism by Establishment.671 
 
The Jacobins themselves were composed of different groups of men, but together they 
had a more vigorous spirit of action: “It is a dreadful truth, Burke wrote, “in ability, in 
dexterity, in the distinctness of their views, the Jacobins are our superiors.”672 
Burke calls the Jacobins an “armed doctrine” in the Reflections.  In the Letters, 
they are a “sect” who, “have deliberately, at one stroke, demolished the whole body of 
that jurisprudence which France had pretty nearly in common with other civilized 
countries.”673  Burke imagined a Revolutionary France, “wholly governed by the 
agitators in corporations, by societies in the towns formed of directors and assignats, 
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and trustees for the sale of church lands, attornies, agents, money-jobbers, 
speculators, and adventurers, composing an ignoble oligarchy founded on the 
destruction of the crown, the church, the nobility and the people.”674  In the 
Reflections, Burke singled out three groups of men responsible: a monied interest, 
lawyers, and philosophers.  Together these three groups of men sought to subvert a 
system that was antithetical to the interests they sought to pursue.675 
The power of the monied interest lay in the control they had over the national 
finances.  As Burke put it, “those whose operations can take from, or add ten per cent. 
to, the possessions of every man in France, must be the masters of every man in 
France.”676  The pride of these men increased with their cause, even though they felt 
inferior to a nobility they could never join.  Lawyers, according to Burke, were men 
who were, “not taught to habitually respect themselves” and who, because they, “had 
no previous fortune in character at stake,” could not be expected to appropriately or 
discreetly handle power.677   
Perhaps the most dangerous group of all, however, had little presence in, but a 
great influence over, the Assembly: philosophers.  Burke had both a deep dislike and 
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distrust of French philosophers, the sort of people he considered to have been, “so 
taken up with their theories about the rights of man, that they have totally forgot his 
nature.”678  Their writing he considered antithetical to his ideas on change and 
reformation, antithetical enough to warrant this outburst in the Reflections:   
We are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of 
Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress amongst us.  Atheists are not 
our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers.  We know that we have 
made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be made, 
in morality; nor many in the great principles of government, nor in the 
ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, 
altogether as well as they will be after the grave has heaped its mould 
upon our presumption, and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law 
on our pert loquacity.679   
 
According to Burke, these philosophers had taught, and been taught, to believe that 
religion was the only cause of enthusiastic zeal and sectarian propagation.  In their 
own zeal and sectarian propagation, however, they lost sight of the truth that, “there is 
no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of the very same 
effect.”680  They encouraged the very same sectarianism they originally sought to 
destroy.  Together, these three groups attacked the foundations of the ancien régime, 
an action which necessitated rejecting the old principles and propagating new ones 
which were wholly inimical to those that had barred their access to the government. 
 
Legitimate faction, Burke believed, was rooted in the recognition of property, 
law and sovereignty.  The “revolutionaries” of France recognized none of these 
things.  It was therefore not a revolution in government, nor was it “the victory of 
party over party.”  It was instead, “the destruction and decomposition of the whole 
society; which never can be made right by any faction, however powerful, nor without 
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terrible consequences to all about it, both in the act and in the example.”681  At stake 
against the Jacobin faction, Burke explains, is: “all the dignity, property, honour, 
virtue, and religion of England, of Germany, and of all nations.”682  The Jacobins had 
not only destroyed the constitution, but the principle behind the constitution.  As a 
result, all of the effects that men had come to enjoy as the advantages of society, not 
just in France but everywhere, were at stake. 
With no outlet to apply their extreme principles, the Jacobins turned against 
the principles that regulated public affairs.  “They see no merit in the good, and no 
fault in the vicious management of public affairs; they rather rejoice in the latter, as 
more propitious to revolution.”683  No longer was change to preserve, but to create 
anew.  In the Letters, Burke summarized the new fight: “It is a war between the 
partizans of the ancient, civil, moral, and political order of Europe against a sect of 
fanatical and ambitious atheists which means to change them all.”684  The Jacobins 
operated according to a categorical singularity: “take it or leave it; there is no 
medium.”685  They considered all other forms of government hypocritical, unjust, and 
“an atrocious violation of the indefeasible rights of man.”  By the rationale of their 
existence there was no compromise: “all other governments are usurpations, which 
justify and even demand resistance.”686  They therefore, “stigmatized [moderation] as 
the virtue of cowards, and compromise as the prudence of traitors.”687  Jacobins will 
                                                
681 LRP1, 139. 
682 Ibid., 143. 
683 RRF, 156. 
684 LRP2, 157. 
685 AONW, 93. 
686 Ibid., 193.  Cf. LRP1: “I call a commonwealth Regicide, which lays it down as a fixed law of nature, 
and a fundamental right of man, that all government, not being a democracy, is an usurpation; that all 
Kings, as such, are usurpers, and for being Kings, may and ought to be put to death, with their wives, 
families, and adherents.” (124-25) 
687 RRF, 362. 
236 
 
not rest, as Burke puts it, “in plain French or English, until they have accomplished 
our utter and irretrievable ruin.”688     
 Jacobinism had taken political ideals to an irrational extreme, though it 
remained to be seen whether their extremes resulted from a defect in their 
administration or a defect in their constitution.  This difference was highlighted in 
Burke’s thought on both the English and the Jacobin use of principle, and divides his 
writings along two concepts that have been traced throughout this chapter, reform and 
change.  Below, the two concepts will again be examined.  The first section will look 
at Burke’s general understanding of reform and change before examining Burke’s 
preferred government form.  Employing the conclusions from the first section, the 
second section will seek to answer the question posed at the opening of this chapter, 
that is, when is resistance legitimate?   
 
Legitimate Resistance: Party’s End 
Metaphysics and politics did not meet at any crossroads in Burke’s thought.  
Theory and practice were two separate instructors.  Burke could not, as he wrote in 
the Reflections, 
give praise or blame to any thing which relates to human actions, and 
human concerns, on a simple view of the object as it stands stripped of 
every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical 
abstraction.  Circumstances…give in reality to every political principle 
its distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect.  The circumstances 
are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious 
to mankind.689 
 
Though Burke’s idea of change was not static, he left as little to the imagination as 
possible.  He was not beholden to, “the rich treasury of fertile framers of imaginary 
commonwealths; not to the Republick of Plato, not to the Utopia of More, not to the 
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Oceana of Harrington.”690  As a politician, he remained the philosopher in action, 
never the conceptual philosopher at rest. 
Burke ended the Reflections by listing the principles that guided his actions: 
conservation and moderation, obedience to legitimate authority, and self-respect.  
Burke was someone who, as he described himself, “wishes to preserve consistency; 
but who would preserve consistency by varying his means to secure the unity of his 
end.”691  Burke clarified that he was not against change, as long as that change 
occurred in the means, and not the end, which should always remain the national 
interest.  He would change his means to maintain the balance necessary to secure the 
end, but he would not change his means to something untested.  As he explained in 
the Discontents, institutional reform arose from practice and from practice theory, not 
the other way around.692  The latter, theory informing practice, was equated with 
change; the former was considered to be the natural way of things.  As he put it in A 
Letter to a Noble Lord, change is equated with novelty, while reform is, “but a direct 
application of a remedy to the grievance complained of.”693   
Burke considered the motives of those who sought abstract change to be, more 
often than not, deceitful and illegitimate.  New modes of acquiring power in a state, 
absent of convention, should be, “critcise[d] on the use that is made of it, with less 
awe and reverence than that which is usually conceded to a settled and recognized 
authority.”694  Since government begins by a contract, but becomes a partnership, the 
ends of government become something that cannot be reached in one generation, or 
even multiple; prescription and principle aid in the continuity of these ends.  The 
partnership becomes one that is, “between those who are living, those who are dead, 
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and those who are to be born.”695  Government is therefore a process of development 
where no one party or age can claim a monopoly on the end or ends of government.  
Burke’s skepticism towards change was partly informed by his view of human nature 
and partly by his understanding of political society, both of which were too diverse 
for the application of abstract rights.  Rights had to be acquired and built upon slowly, 
otherwise, they would be artificial and unreliable.696  Rights are critical because they 
are fixed to duties; without one the other would be meaningless.  For Burke, if men 
could not enjoy their rights, then their obligations would cease. 
It remains an understatement to say Burke was against absolute change, 
though he was in no way opposed to reform, the possibility for which must exist.  
Those who claimed that abstract change was needed (Jacobins and philosophers) were 
negligent of the only process by which Burke believed government could be 
improved: change in the means, only to reform.  A state that cannot reform, he wrote 
in the Reflections, “is without the means of its conservation.  Without such means it 
might even risque the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the most 
religiously to preserve.”697  Burke’s ideal statesman should have a disposition to 
preserve as well as an ability to improve upon that which already exists in a state.698 
When the question of Commons reform arose, Burke made clear his strong 
preference for practice over theory.  “A prescriptive Government, such as ours, never 
was the work of any Legislator, never was made upon any foregone theory.”699  
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Prescription, Burke wrote, is the “most solid of all titles” to Government.  If it has 
lasted the test of time, then there is something to be said for its stability.  If men 
continue to enjoy this stability then there is also something to be said for its continual 
lack of degeneration; Burke called it, “a growing liberty and a growing prosperity for 
five hundred years.”700  Burke preferred the intellectual certainty provided by 
experience to hypothetical promises.  “What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract 
right to food or to medicine?  The question is upon the method of procuring and 
administering them.  In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of the 
farmer and the physician, rather than the professor of metaphysics.”701  It is not what 
is built, but the way it is built that informs its character, “for how do you know the 
principles but from the construction?”702 
Burke believed that the British constitution, as it was, stood upon deep and 
solid foundations that were rooted in time and experience.  What’s more, the 
constitution had become a part of the fabric of society and gave it the stability from 
which political liberty developed.  To alter the system at this point would open the 
floodgates to all sorts of untested and unproven theories that could only base the new 
system upon foundations of abstract and conditional arguments.  Burke, “will have 
none of that freedom,” by which he meant unrestrained liberty.  Instead, he will seek 
moderation in, “the Constitution I actually enjoy,” which, “says to an encroaching 
prerogative, Your sceptre has its length…Here it says to an overweening peerage, 
Your pride finds banks, that it cannot overflow: here to a tumultuous and giddy 
people, There is a bound to the raging of the Sea.”703 
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Burke was a supporter of most, if not all, forms of government.  “I reprobate 
no form of government merely upon abstract principles,” he wrote whilst discussing 
democracies in the Reflections, “there may be situations in which the purely 
democratic form will become necessary.  There may be some (very few, and very 
particularly circumstanced) where it would be clearly desirable.”704  Indeed, Burke’s 
toleration of government form stretched from purely democratic to despotic.  He did 
not consider, “a government, that has, been, on the whole, so oppressive, or so 
corrupt, or so negligent, as to be utterly unfit for all reformation.”  It was instead, 
“well deserved to have its excellencies heightened; its faults corrected; and its 
capacities improved into a British constitution.”705  The new French state was 
likewise not without praise, albeit well qualified praise.  If Burke were to, “know 
nothing of this Assembly but by its title and function, no colours could paint to the 
imagination any thing more venerable.”706   
Though he would not criticize a government “merely upon abstract 
principles,” Burke did prefer monarchy to other forms of government.  Speaking of a 
principle put forth by Bolingbroke, whom he was so notably against, Burke admits 
one of their few shared principles: “he prefers a monarchy to other governments; 
because you can better ingraft any description of republic on a monarchy than any 
thing of monarchy upon republican forms.  I think him perfectly in the right.”707  
Burke preferred monarchies because they alone had the greatest ability to adopt those 
parts of other government forms which could improve a monarchical constitution 
without weakening it.  Monarchy, Burke remarked, is, “a thing perfectly susceptible 
of reform; perfectly susceptible of a balance of power; and that, when reformed and 
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balanced, for a great country, it is the best of all governments.”708  Burke’s preference 
was thus not a monarchy in the absence of other powers, but a reformed, limited, and 
mixed monarchy, such as the British one.  “The whole scheme of our mixed 
constitution is to prevent any one of its principles from being carried as far, as taken 
by itself, and theoretically, it would go.”709   
Burke preferred a constitutional monarchy that could, through its ministry 
recommended and regulated by principle, vigorously serve the national interest, 
coupled with a parliament that acted as a control for and not on the people.  As noted 
earlier, Burke did not believe that the people possessed a common will, nor did he 
believe that the “people” themselves could govern.  Only “wise and reflecting minds” 
can decipher the intricate workings of the British constitution because, “it is of too 
high an order of excellence to be adapted to those which are common.  It takes in too 
many views, it makes too many combinations, to be so much as comprehended by 
shallow and superficial understandings.”  Only, “profound thinkers,” Burke notes, 
“will know it in its reason and spirit.”710  The contract upon which the British 
constitution rested separated government from the governed, though this was in no 
way an excuse for abuse, but quite the opposite.  Fame and estimation, stemming 
from both self-interest and required prudence, harnessed and moderated the passions 
of men in order to serve the national interest.   
Just as the Commons should be separate from the crown, so too should the 
crown maintain its independence from the Commons.  Since their power has no other 
end but the general advantage, kings are like servants, though with explicit 
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differences; kings are not obliged to obey the commands of others, nor can they be 
removed at pleasure.  Though Burke does admit that all European kingdoms were at 
one time elective, he is quick to point out that times have changed, as there is now “a 
fixed rule of succession.”711  The king is not the servant of the people, but his power 
should be used for the general advantage of the nation.  Misconduct may occur, but if 
the king’s actions tend towards a change in the constitution, the position, and the 
proper balance of power, becomes more important than the man.  If this occurs, as 
Burke explained in the Discontents, “the natural strength of the kingdom, the great 
peers, the leading landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants and manufacturers, the 
substantial yeomanry, must interpose, to rescue their Prince, themselves, and their 
posterity.”712  Burke illustrated this in the Reflections by clarifying English history; 
the grounds upon which King James was removed from the throne were not for 
misconduct, but for having broken the “original contract between king and 
people.”713   
 
Burke’s answer to the question of legitimate resistance is linguistically vague, 
and perhaps intentionally so.  His most direct answer in the Reflections remains 
imprecise:  
The speculative line of demarcation, where obedience ought to end, 
and resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and not easily definable.  It 
is not a single act, or a single event, which determines it.  Governments 
must be abused and deranged indeed, before it can be thought of; and 
the prospect of the future must be as bad as the experience of the 
past.714   
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This answer, however, does help to clarify a few points.  Burke implies that as 
conditions get worse, there is a point at which reform of the system as it is, is no 
longer an option because the defect in the constitution cannot be corrected by the 
means Burke suggests.  Burke continued,  
When things are in that lamentable condition, the nature of the disease 
is to indicate the remedy to those whom nature has qualified to 
administer in extremities this critical, ambiguous, bitter potion to a 
distempered state.  Times and occasions, and provocations, will teach 
their own lessons.  The wise will determine from the gravity of the 
case; the irritable from sensibility to oppression; the high-minded from 
disdain and indignation at abusive power in unworthy hands; the brave 
and bold from the love of honourable danger in a generous cause: but, 
with or without right, a revolution will be the very last resource of the 
thinking and the good.715 
 
Burke raises more questions in this passage than he gives answers.  Who are these 
“wise” and “high-minded” individuals?  Burke hints that whoever they are, they can 
sense the tide of events as things get increasingly worse.  Assuming these men are 
also the “thinking and the good,” how and when do they employ their “very last 
resource”? 
 Before returning to the Appeal, from which most of these questions can be 
answered, two points drawn upon throughout this chapter must be examined again: 
the “Discontents” of Burke’s early political career and the Jacobin threat to which he 
responded so vociferously nearly two decades later.  A defect of the administration of 
the constitution was the cause of the “discontents,” not a defect in the constitution 
itself.  Party government that rested upon the principles of prejudice and prudence 
was the solution.  Prejudice makes one jealous of his liberty, while prudence makes 
one observant of the constitution which provides for that liberty.  If one is to be a 
member of a party, as Burke conceives of it, one must embody both. 
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 Jacobin France was initially capable of reform.  Burke admitted that, in the 
abstract (which counted for nothing), the new constitution could be commended.  
Nonetheless, it became apparent that in the operation of the new constitution, like the 
“discontents,” the defect lay in its administration.  The difference in this case, 
however, was that the only solution to this defect had become defective itself.  That 
is, those who were the prime movers of the Revolution had broken the principles upon 
which reform was possible.  As a result, the only solution was outright resistance. 
 
In examining the “Discontents” and the Jacobin threat, this chapter outlined 
one case for reform and one case for outright resistance.  Two points on a spectrum 
are identified, but it remains to be seen where upon that spectrum Burke’s 
understanding of resistance lies.  It remains to be seen at which point between the 
two, reform and resistance, the “wise” and “high-minded” men must employ their 
“very last resource.”  In the passage from the Reflections cited above, Burke appealed 
to his contemporaries, but was referring to his predecessors a century earlier.  His 
predecessors thus become the starting point to discover the answers.  
Burke did not group 1688 and the French Revolution together.  1688 rested on 
principles that secured a stable line of succession, avoiding an election that would 
have been “utterly destructive.”  This provided for the “unity, peace, and tranquility” 
of the nation.716  For Burke, 1688 was decidedly not a revolution in principle, nor was 
it a revolution in government.  The word “revolution” is understood today as a 
complete change in government, or as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it, “the 
overthrow of a government or social order by force, in favour of a new system.”  
Burke, however, employed the term differently.  The revolution of 1688 was a 
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reaffirmation of the British constitution, a bringing-back-to instead of a rejection-of.  
As noted earlier, Burke was not against change, as long as it occurred in the means 
and not the end.  In this way, Francis Canavan pointed out, there is no limit to the 
number of changes a constitution may undergo, “provided that the direction of change 
continues to be set by the controlling end, the good of the people.”717 
In a passage from “A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly,” Burke’s 
understanding of revolution becomes clearer: “one would think, that after an honest 
and necessary Revolution (if they had in mind that theirs should pass as such) your 
masters would have imitated the virtuous policy of those who have been at the head of 
revolutions of that glorious character.”718  1688 was, for Burke, a reaffirmation of 
longstanding principle that had been disrupted, but never broken, during the previous 
half century.  In 1688 the legislature, “altered the direction, but kept the principle” of 
hereditary succession in the British constitution, showing that they “held it 
inviolable.”719  Their change was in the means of the British constitution, but not in its 
end.  The men of the Revolution carried the “weight of their reasons” to one side in 
order to right the vessel.720  The French Revolution, on the other hand, was an 
outright rejection of both the means and, with the perversion of the former principle, 
the end. 
Burke described the Glorious Revolution and the British constitution with the 
same words: “the firm but cautious and deliberate spirit which produced the one, and 
which presides in the other.”721  Firm, cautious, and deliberate are not words 
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ordinarily associated with “revolution.”  They are words that describe a careful 
process.  Indeed, they are words that describe a process taken by “wise” and “high-
minded” individuals in the “Glorious Revolution” whose resistance was legitimate 
only because it was under the “utmost necessity.” 
Burke speaks through others in the defense of this Revolution.  Quoting Sir 
Joseph Jekyl, who gave a defense of the Revolution of 1688 during the trial of Dr. 
Sacheverell, Burke maintains that the Revolution was the only form of justifiable 
resistance, and that it was, “so far from promoting popular licence of confusion, that it 
will have a contrary effect, and be a means of settling men’s minds in the love of, and 
veneration for the laws; to rescue and secure which, was the ONLY aim and intention 
of those concerned in resistance.”722  Quoting Sir John Hawles, Burke remarks that 
resistance is only permissible “as an exception from necessity.”723  Quoting Walpole, 
Burke admits that resistance is unlawful and as such can never be, “described or 
affirmed in any positive law, to be excusable.”  It is therefore the highest form of 
treason, and can only spring from the “utmost necessity…for the preservation of the 
whole.”724  Again, quoting from the trial of Dr. Sacheverell, Burke parallels the words 
of Sir John Holland to his in the Reflections: “Those general rules of obedience may 
upon a real necessity, admit a lawful exception; and such a necessary exception we 
assert the revolution to be.”725 
Since King James sought to subvert the constitution and not just the 
administration of it, the crown became, for the revolutionaries, more important than 
the king.  Burke valued the position more than the man, yet that position held its value 
for Burke only in its constitutional operation.  If it deviated from its intended 
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function, it could no longer serve to further the national interest, the end of 
government.  If political authority is abused to the detriment of the national interest, 
resistance is morally legitimate because, as discussed earlier, whatever is not done for 
the benefit of the people cannot have their consent.  Though obligation is prior to 
consent (as we are all born after the founding of society), without consent there can be 
no obligation.  This reasoning provided the Old Whigs with the justification for the 
“exception” of resistance, which was of the “utmost necessity.”  Their revolution was 
thus a rectification of the constitution, a bringing-back-to and not a rejection-of.  It 
was more than a reformation because it entailed resistance to a constituted power, 
even if that resistance was in order to restore the proper powers of the constitution.   
Burke praised the actions of those who could not praise party, the Old Whigs, 
even though their example was inapplicable for him.  New times call for new 
remedies, and so in his praise of them, Burke departed from their actions.  As 
Mansfield remarks, “there is a very great difference between using party and praising 
it.”726  It was difficult for Burke to justify what the Old Whigs did, as explained in the 
Sacheverell trial, because it was made public.  Necessity cannot be made a rule, for 
once it is, the rule will be abstracted from the circumstances which brought about the 
necessity.   
According to Mansfield, Burke “seems to say” that it was not just the actions 
of the Old Whigs alone that saved the constitution, but a coalition of the parties led by 
the Old Whigs that saved it.727  Burke appeals to the system overall, not just one 
party, because having just one party serve the national interest (or what they consider 
to be the national interest) would weaken the system.  A variety of interests that can 
unite for the common good in a crisis guarantees that the national interest will always 
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be maintained.  The Old Whigs led the charge, so to speak, but they did not create a 
system from which their actions could be repeated since it was the exception and not 
the rule.  If prerogative is he who can decide the exception, then the Old Whigs 
assumed prerogative but relinquished it as soon as a stable succession was decided.  
Party therefore saved the constitution, but it did not provide for a future failsafe.  
Party, for Burke, was to be this failsafe; it was to prevent the constitution from having 
to be saved. 
 
“Well, he would, wouldn’t he?” was Mandy Rice-Davies’ famous reply to 
Lord Astor’s denial of their affair.  Burke, like Astor, operated along the same 
principles:  deny publicly what can never become standard practice, as much as we 
might privately want it to.  Duties must always trump our selfish will, and prudence 
must remind us of our duties.  Unlike Lord Astor, the Old Whigs acted out of 
necessary duty in creating the offense.  Unlike the Old Whigs, Lord Astor acted 
prudently in defending himself.  In the trial of Dr. Sacheverell the Old Whigs failed at 
being prudent in their own defense. 
Contrary to the radical and innovative tendencies that change can have on 
most individuals, Burke promoted change only when it was to preserve.  Resistance 
was an exception; and, because of the radical and innovative tendencies of resistance, 
any action to secure the necessity must be conceived among the “wise” only in order 
to put the constituted powers back into their respective and appropriate orbits. 
In his “Address to the King,” in 1777, Burke spoke of “the people” who in 
1688, “re-entered into their original rights; and it was not because a positive Law 
authorized what was then done, but because the freedom and safety of the Subject, the 
origin and cause of all Laws, required a proceeding paramount and superior to 
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them.”728  Though less clear at this point than he would be later, by “people” Burke 
had a very limited understanding.  Whether a point of candor or a rhetorical flourish, 
this understanding became increasingly limited to the extent that he no longer trusted 
power in any hands except those who held it prescriptively, and then only within their 
respective bounds.  To say “the people,” but describe the actions of only a few men, 
demonstrates Burke’s increasing unwillingness to condone any resistance to 
constituted authority.  Burke becomes almost conspiratorial on the topic, displaying 
his lack of confidence in the constant presence of “wise” men. 
The events in France had steeled Burke to the conclusion that even if 
“remarkable men” were to be found, they faced a new and formidable enemy that did 
not exist a century earlier.  1688 was not only an exception, therefore, it was a 
remarkable exception.  The Old Whigs were remarkable men who gave up power just 
as fast as they assumed it.  As much as he admired their actions, Burke did not believe 
that such a remarkable exception could be executed any longer.  His faith in the 
presence of “wise” and “high-minded” men increasingly waned by the time he wrote 
the Appeal.  His task, therefore, was to obviate the need for remarkable men, if there 
were any, who could restore the constitution by assuming and then relinquishing 
prerogative.  Burke’s solution to this was the party system, which not only refined and 
institutionalized principle, but limited ambition and so provided more consistent 
statesmen.  Burke sought to institutionalize in party the same principles, and not the 
actions, of the “wise and the good,” who were, after all, few in number.  Party became 
the vehicle by which the governing principles of prejudice and prudence were now 
delivered.  If party could guarantee that the appropriate principles regulated its 
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members, then reform would always be possible and the exception, which had led to 
tyranny in France, would never be necessary.  
Rather than see the discord and absence of perfection or harmony which had 
plagued the British constitution for the length of its duration, Burke chose to see the 
synthesis created by the dissonance of human nature.  He realized that out of 
continual political dissonance, encased by an effective constitution, came the most 
perfect harmony constitutional government could produce.  What others had done by 
their nature, Burke patented by design.  In this way, Burke was the accidental founder 
of party government.  He gave it a name, something the Old Whigs – who were 
opposed to party government in its outright form – had refused to do.  In doing this, 
Burke only lifted the veil and described the practices that had been established by the 
Old Whigs, and the traditions of party and principle that had been examined by both 
Hume and Montesquieu.  
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5  §  Principle, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
Constitutionalism suffers from the defects inherent in its own merits.  
Because it cannot do some evil it is precluded from doing some good.  
Shall we, then, forego the good to prevent the evil, or shall we submit 
to the evil to secure the good?  This is the fundamental practical 
question of all constitutionalism.729 
 
 
 
The political dissonance inherent in party government is most often seen as a 
nuisance, a bother to be done away with.  For the three thinkers of this thesis, 
however, such dissonance, if orchestrated correctly, could produce the best possible 
government.  Indeed, all three had a unique understanding of the purpose of political 
dissonance in party government, and recognized the necessity, as well as the utility, of 
political principle to that purpose, which was to produce political liberty.  This thesis 
began by demonstrating the form and function of Montesquieu’s principled faction, it 
considered how Hume sought to employ both principle and institutional design in 
order to regulate faction, and concluded by examining the reasons for which Burke 
promoted parties of principle.  What are the results for us today of incorporating a 
governing principle into faction, and making parties principled?    
Linguistically speaking, one could argue that until Montesquieu, Hume, and 
especially Burke wrote upon the subject, party and faction were both derogatory 
terms, which in many ways still retain a depreciatory definition.  Somewhere along 
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the way, however, faction became party and party became respectable.  The most 
important reason for this change was that party reversed the trend whereby statesmen 
created faction, for faction now created statesman.  As an accepted part of modern 
constitutions, party is now not only respectable, but in many ways it is inconceivable 
that government could operate without it.  Despite the negative tendencies of party 
politics, it could be said that the presence of political parties within a state is a 
reassuring sign of political liberty.  As Hume remarked, where one finds different 
factions coexisting in a state one will find both the arts and commerce, and their 
presence is an encouraging measure of liberty in that state.730  Today, one-party states 
are feared, and rightfully so.  From Julius Caesar to Cromwell, from Robespierre to 
Hitler, history demonstrates the danger that singular faction can pose to a state’s 
constitution, as well as the danger they can pose to neighboring states.   
Political principle, as we know it today, has changed as well.  Montesquieu 
concluded that though virtue might be the better social principle, honor was the better 
political principle.  Virtue, in the Montesquieuan sense, may make better men or 
women out of all of us, but it does not necessarily make us better citizens.  As this 
thesis has argued, each thinker came to the similar conclusion that it could not.  The 
belief on this is graduated according to each thinker, but all three view man as 
inherently selfish, and in man’s normal activities, in community and in commerce, 
they could be said to be typical of a new type of laissez-faire political economist.  
When it came to men acting in government, it was recognized that something was 
needed in order to moderate man’s selfish ambition.  After all, they advocated that 
statesman, representatives, and those who are to hold them politically responsible 
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follow a system built upon political principle, which harnesses and employs self-
interest for political ends, not social ones. 
 By exposing some of the conclusions on the topic of this thesis, like the one 
above, a general trend emerges that still influences us today.  That is, political 
principle is inherently hypocritical, though hypocrisy itself is a vice that should not be 
tolerated in all its forms.  As will be argued below, there are both functional and 
detrimental forms of political hypocrisy.  To begin, then, let us make an initial 
parallel.  “Virtue,” in the Montesquieuan sense, is not only outdated, it is 
antihypocritical (a term that will be examined in greater detail below).  On the other 
hand, the principles that motivate principled faction are inherently hypocritical.   
The first part of this conclusion takes a brief look at a similar conclusion made 
by Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke, namely, a shared understanding of political 
consent predicated upon self-interest, highlighting their shared understanding of the 
ends of political society.  The second section examines the concept of political 
hypocrisy before taking a look at political principle through the lens of what will be 
called first- and second-order hypocrisy.  The third section examines how each 
thinker secured politically principled statesmen, and how these statesmen were then 
incorporated into party.  The fourth section looks at how principle became 
institutionalized in party, highlighting the unique emphasis each thinker put on party 
over that of the statesman.  The final section considers what implications these shared 
understandings have for party and principle in constitutional government, and 
concludes by taking a new look at how, according to these thinkers, the advantages of 
society are secured. 
 
The Advantages of Society 
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Government is only legitimate when it serves the interests of those in political 
society, and if men voluntarily join (or remain to enjoy) a political association, it 
follows that government is to their interests.  Yet, all three thinkers understood that 
men’s own interests, outside of immediate physical necessities, were not easily 
understood, nor easily agreed upon.  Interests could be short- or long-term; they could 
benefit one individual to the detriment of one family, one family to the detriment of 
one community, or one community to the detriment of the nation.  Determining whose 
interests were being served (and how) was, in fact, the political problem to be solved.  
Though all three thinkers understood consent as an inherently self-interested concept, 
they sought to limit self-interest for greater interests of which men were not 
immediately aware.  Yet, who could recognize these greater interests?  Montesquieu, 
Hume, and Burke arrived at similar conclusions in answering this question, with the 
result that our modern understanding of party reflects such conclusions.  The answer 
to this question preempts the discussion, however.  It must first be demonstrated how 
each thinker understood the idea of consent, how greater interests were achieved, and 
what such an understanding meant for constitutional government. 
 Men enter society, Montesquieu believed, so that they might further their own 
interests.  Upon entering society, however, where they feel equal to those around 
them, men compete for its advantages and a state of war begins.  Positive laws are 
therefore needed in order to restrain men from acting upon their own inclinations of 
personal gain to the detriment of others.  As a result, Montesquieu makes an 
immediate distinction.  In society, men have limited rights, yet their most important 
right is the political right, established by law between the governed and those who 
govern, for government to secure the advantages of society.731  Montesquieu does not 
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explain precisely what these advantages are, but the political right to have them 
secured guarantees that government will be (or should be) to men’s benefit. 
For Hume, a government’s legitimacy derives from its utility, not from 
original consent, though consent can follow from the recognition of a government’s 
utility, as a passive rather than an active form of consent.  Since all government 
commenced with a usurpation of power, it can never be made theoretically legitimate, 
but as a man is born into a family, Hume held, he is compelled for reasons of 
necessity, natural inclination, and habit to consent to society.732  Born a part of 
society, men recognize its utility when they see that it secures “justice.”  Government 
acts as the mechanism which prevents against our natural inclinations to abandon the 
long-term view of justice for an ephemeral satisfaction.  Though one can gain more 
by fraud than what one would lose if caught in a breach of justice, Hume maintains 
that, overall, men are concerned with interests that are more distant and lasting, 
interests which benefit the individual as well as the community.  Since society exists 
so that justice might be administered, it is only legitimate if men can achieve justice, 
or what is in their ultimate, and not their temporary, interest.  
Burke maintained that men imply their consent to a government when they 
enjoy its advantages.  Like Hume, he maintained that just as one is born into a family 
unknowingly and unwillingly, so too is one born a part of a community and therefore 
a nation.  Men could be made to see the advantages of society, but because they are 
not always easy to decipher, and because men are prone to cheat that society for their 
own ends, men do not always pursue them.  Burke thus concluded that men’s passions 
needed to be controlled, though not eliminated, until such advantages could be 
achieved: “the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among 
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their rights.”733  Like Hume, Burke is concerned with how useful rights are to the men 
who have them.  Burke was adamant that government was not “made in virtue of 
natural rights,” rights which cannot be applied to society in their abstract 
perfection.734  Instead, the end of government and the right that all men in political 
society possess, is the fulfillment of “genuine needs.”  Government therefore begins 
by restraining men’s selfish will for their own good so that their “genuine needs” 
might be secured.   
Accordingly, government is only legitimate if it can secure the advantages of 
society, whatever such advantages might be.  If such advantages are secured, 
however, consent to government is therefore implied.  Though man’s more immediate 
physical necessities are a part of such advantages, Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke are 
vague about what exactly these advantages comprise overall.  What exactly such 
advantages are, however, is a matter of opinion and not political truth.  Determining 
the advantages of society is a political question, and is one that, if not properly 
guarded, could destroy the constitution.  It is therefore not who could recognize men’s 
greater interests, as asked above, but who should.735  Coupled with the political ability 
of securing the interests of the state is the political responsibility to secure the 
appropriate interests appropriately.  It is not just what is secured, but how it is secured 
that is important.   
As will be shown below, it is the statesman’s role to determine the advantages 
of society; such important political questions cannot be decided by everyone but only 
those taught to govern.  Indeed, nowhere is it pinpointed how the people themselves 
                                                
733 RRF, 152.  
734 RRF, 151. 
735 The democratic thought of the thinkers of this thesis does not go much past their shared 
understanding of implied consent, an understanding echoed by Bernard Crick: the sovereignty of the 
people, “can mean little more than an affirmation that government should be in the interests of 
everyone and that it should be representative.” In Defense of Politics, 60. 
257 
 
are to secure these advantages, except through the industry of their everyday affairs.  
Apart from demanding their “political right,” “their justice,” and the fulfillment of 
their “genuine needs,” the people should refrain from the creation or execution of 
political affairs.  Two conclusions can be drawn from this.  First, there exists in 
society (or should exist) a class who is governed and a class who governs.  Second, if 
government is to be legitimate, the governed must possess the right to have the 
advantages of society secured for them.  The inverse is also true.  Since the people do 
not have the right to secure these advantages themselves, they retain the right of 
approbation.  The political question of what the advantages of society are and how 
they are to be secured, however, remains to be answered by the statesmen of the 
governing class.   
 
Hypocrisy 
Principle is political self-restraint, and in this way it is tolerant, but it is not 
tolerance as normally understood.  It is not selfless; it is not virtuous; it does not entail 
religious underpinnings.  Principle balances between self-interest and duty, and 
fluctuates between vice and virtue.  Indeed, it harnesses self-interest by reminding 
statesmen of their duty.  It is a subtle form of discipline upon desire that exacts 
penalties, though more importantly it also promises social rewards.  It is adopted for 
selfish reasons – to be seen as principled – and thus the adoption of principle is often 
called hypocritical, though all three thinkers called it something else: honor, manners, 
prejudices, tradition, etc.  In this way, hypocrisy is an attribute of principle and in 
looking at hypocrisy, its effect on principle in political society, as well as the 
perceived results that effect can have on political life, will be examined.  Much of the 
discussion will remain the same though it will allow us to frame principle in a slightly 
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different way, helping to bring the conclusions discussed in earlier chapters into a 
more contemporary debate.  That said, to better understand the principles described in 
this thesis, and how they might be relevant today, we must take a closer look at the 
idea of political hypocrisy, a topic which has gained much ground in recent political 
literature, in order to better frame the conclusions that will be made in the remainder 
of this thesis.736  
 
Hypocrisy, “remains the only unforgivable sin,” Judith Shklar remarks in 
Ordinary Vices, “perhaps especially among those who can overlook and explain away 
almost every other vice.”737  Hypocrisy is a product of liberalism and the values it 
fosters, however, and is not a vice that should be removed, especially in politics.  
Instead, in the ranking of vices, cruelty should be put first, well before the vice of 
hypocrisy, which is itself only acutely dangerous when it fosters cruelty.738  It may be 
a gateway vice, but this does not mean that hypocrisy is not politically useful.  
Besides, David Runciman notes, “everyone is at it, which means that it is difficult to 
criticise hypocrisy without falling into the trap of exemplifying the very thing one is 
criticising.”739  Accordingly, the temptation to slide towards either extreme must be 
resisted.  If we deny that hypocrisy exists, we open ourselves up to claims that we are 
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being naïve, and if we maintain that hypocrisy is ubiquitous, we open ourselves up to 
claims that we are apologists for its abuses. 
“Hypocrisy” is a pretense, and originally meant acting a part out on a stage.740  
On the political stage, it can be the public denial of a private truth or the discrepancy 
between rhetoric and action.  Hypocrisy involves the construction of a persona, of an 
image that one sells to the world, and this is why it can be particularly damning for 
politicians who are likely to make promises and commitments which, by the very 
nature of politics, they cannot always keep.  What’s more, in liberal societies, 
politicians are apt, and somewhat encouraged, to exaggerate their moral commitments 
in order to gain political legitimacy.  When they fail to live up to those commitments, 
they are called hypocrites.741 
Though political hypocrisy is unavoidable, hypocrisy in all its forms should 
not be tolerated.  If the nature of political hypocrisy is examined a bit deeper, it 
becomes apparent that both good and bad forms of political hypocrisy are directly 
relevant to this thesis.  In its best form, hypocrisy is a fundamental aspect of political 
principle.  It helps smooth the rough nature of political interactions and helps to 
establish compromise.  It should not be the public denial of a public truth, however.  
Hypocrisy has its limits, and that limit, as understood by the thinkers of this thesis, 
continues to be relevant to us today.   
Hypocrisy turns on questions of character, not questions of truth.  A man may 
be inconsistent, but this does not necessarily mean he is a hypocrite.742  What tends to 
make us both inconsistent and hypocritical is the overlapping of our various 
obligations as members of different families, communities, churches, or trades, etc.  
Situations that change without notice (especially political situations) force us to 
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compromise; our prejudices often run deeper than our established reason; and, our 
connexions can call for corporate action that obligate us to set aside our previous 
commitments.  Anytime our obligations overlap and we are forced to compromise 
between the two, we expose ourselves to being called hypocrites.  Indeed, in a free 
society, this is almost impossible to avoid.  No one is completely consistent; or, as 
Aristotle put it, we are neither gods nor beasts.743 
There are two ways of thinking about hypocrisy: as a vice itself, or as a coping 
mechanism for vice.  In the latter, hypocrisy is not a vice at all, while in the former, 
the vice lies in the act of manipulating or denying the initial act.  If discretion is the 
polite word for hypocrisy, as Christine Keeler so famously quipped, it must be known 
for what use that discretion is being employed.  As a coping mechanism for vice, 
hypocrisy at least forces the hypocrite to acknowledge the proper course of action.  
“Let us follow nature,” Montesquieu wrote, “which has given men shame for their 
scourge, and let the greatest part of the penalty be the infamy of suffering it.”744  Or, 
as La Rochefoucauld famously wrote in his Maximes, hypocrisy is “the homage vice 
pays to virtue.”745   
Traditions, manners, and mores exist so that the two realms of public and 
private life can be bridged, without having to examine the conscience of the latter.  
They smooth over the uncomfortable nature of our personal inconsistencies, as well as 
our societal inequalities.  Politeness, for instance, is hypocritical.  In being polite, we 
are dressing up our true feelings and acting concerned or interested in someone or 
something that we might not otherwise be.  As one recent commentator aptly put it, 
“politeness keeps small-stakes events small stakes, nondescript encounters 
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nondescript.”746  I may be hypocritical in being gracious to houseguests I cannot 
stand, for instance, but no one would suggest I tell them my true feelings; that is, of 
course, if I still want the visit to be a nondescript encounter.  Hypocrisy is therefore a 
tool used to alleviate the inconsistencies of our interactions in life, as well as in 
politics.  It should not seek to improve them by denying that our inconsistencies are 
actually inconsistencies, even when it may be politically advantageous to do so.   
Hypocrisy may violate natural or religious laws that concern themselves with 
the intention of an actor, but civil law does not concern itself with private intention, 
only the outward conformity of the actor with the law.  Because one need not be 
moral in politics, manners take on greater importance, especially as politicians’ lives 
become more public, so that they might be seen to be moral even if they are not.747  
As Hume noted, “admiration and acquaintance are altogether incompatible towards 
any moral creature.”748  One need not trouble oneself with the pangs of conscience 
when acting as a citizen or a politician, one need only follow the law, though this does 
not lessen one’s responsibility to maintain manners and customs.   
Because of the difference between our public and private selves, we cannot 
help but be hypocrites in political matters, nor can we help being antihypocritical in 
observing it.  This is the gap between our hopes and reality, political rhetoric and 
political possibility.  The principles that regulate our political actions are the measure 
of the distance between the two.  Just as manners bridge the gap between our private 
and public selves, so too do principles bridge that gap politically.  Without such a 
bridge, party politics would be hopeless.  In appropriately tolerating hypocrisy, the 
necessary space for the political actor to compromise is provided.   
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A helpful way of looking at hypocrisy is by ordering it, as David Runciman 
does in his work Political Hypocrisy, according to first- and second-order hypocrisy.  
First-order hypocrisy, he writes, “is the ubiquitous practice of concealing vice as 
virtue, which makes up the parade of our social existence.”  The hypocrisy of political 
principle here equates with the hypocrisy one finds in manners and traditions.  In first-
order hypocrisy, vice is tolerated and controlled, mostly because we desire the social 
rewards of being seen as virtuous.  Denying or deceiving others or oneself can turn 
first-order hypocrisy into second-order hypocrisy by, “pretending that the parade itself 
is a form of genuinely virtuous, and therefore self-denying behaviour.”  The 
difference between the two is better spelled out by saying that, “we may need to hide 
the truth about ourselves in order to get by in this world, but we oughtn’t to hide the 
truth from ourselves that this is what we are doing.”749   
Second-order hypocrisy is being hypocritical about hypocrisy.  It is the public 
denial of a public truth.  We deceive ourselves, or others, intentionally or 
unintentionally, that what we are doing is genuine and virtuous.  It can encourage the 
attempt for what Montesquieu called “true honor,” something all three thinkers, as 
well as Mandeville before them, recognized was impossible in politics.  In its most 
innocent form, second-order hypocrisy is simply ignorance of the reality of political 
men.  Men are not naturally selfless, virtuous, or altruistic, and to encourage them to 
be so runs counter to human nature.  Those who deceive themselves are relatively 
harmless in their ignorance, though when ignorance turns into delusion, the result can 
be a catastrophic antihypocrisy.   
In its most extreme form, the unacceptability of hypocrisy in politics can lead 
to tyranny and terrorism.  The antihypocrite, who is often sincere but delusional, 
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cannot accept the fact that he himself might be a hypocrite.  By taking the position he 
does, he cannot tolerate contradictions – for to do so would be hypocritical – and 
therefore cannot accept that men are by their nature contradictory.  Not accepting this 
last belief means that the antihypocrite is certain men can be corrected from any such 
aberration, and he will seek to do so by whatever means are necessary, including 
ignoring reality.  In the mind of an antihypocrite, all those who oppose him are 
traitors to the “cause” or the “truth,” or agents of those who threaten it.  “Truth” is 
something which has no place in politics.  “The purity of their aims, and the 
wickedness of actuality, combine to absolve their followers not only from their 
normal duties, but from looking at any facts that disturb their beliefs.”750  The tyrant 
or the terrorist believes, in the end, that he is justified in “protecting” (in whatever 
form that may take) the people from that danger via his virtue.751  Those who are not 
delusional, however, or those who manipulate the ignorance of others – those who 
understand the system and employ it to their own benefit – are even more dangerous, 
for they understand how to use antihypocrisy as a political weapon.752    
Historically, this is most evident when religion is mixed with politics.  
Religion has no place in politics for the simple reason that it cannot abide hypocrisy 
and as a result seeks to rid us of it.  Unlike religion, politics does not focus on 
personal intention, or, more so in terms of religious discourse, private conscience; it is 
enough that an action is carried out for the public good.  As Shklar comments, such a 
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man, “may have been a Greek, not a Christian.”753  “Only singular institutions,” 
Montesquieu notes, “thus confuse law, mores, and manners, things which are 
naturally separate.”754  Indeed, to rid ourselves of hypocrisy is an impossible task, 
“and all attempts to find such an escape route are a delusion.”755   
There is political capital to be made in that delusion, however.  Extremists can 
use hypocrisy to their own advantage by feigning strict public morality (as well as 
private) in order to politically manipulate others.  This often comes in the guise of 
religion – as the discussion of Hume’s “interested principle” demonstrates – though it 
can take other forms as well: ideologues who profess extreme forms of racism, 
jingoism, Stalinism, etc.756  Tolerating hypocrisy remains frustrating for the simple 
reason that being an antihypocrite can promise so much.  We are disappointed that 
politics remains an area of conflict; we are upset that it has not liberated or equally 
enfranchised us to the extent it promises; we are astounded at its lethargy to educate 
and provide for the masses.  Antihypocrisy masquerades as the “truth” and promises 
to rid us of these, our perpetual problems.  The strength of its argument rests on its 
diagnosis which, because liberalism will always be inconsistent, seems prescient.  
Antihypocrisy is, “a splendid weapon of psychic warfare but,” Judith Shklar warns, it 
is, “not a principle of government.”757 
Hypocrisy provides another way to look at singular faction, as both delusional 
antihypocrites and second-order hypocrites who employ antihypocrisy give rise to 
forms of it.  Montesquieu’s virtuous monk is a perfect example of the delusional 
antihypocrite, though he was only harmful to himself.  The former and the latter are 
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not mutually exclusive, of course.  Indeed, both Burke and Hume had doubts whether 
a delusional antihypocrite could exist, such as the monk, who was not also a second-
order hypocrite with an agenda of his own.758  There is no purity in political motives, 
they argued, no matter how well intentioned.  Their resistance to this type of 
hypocrisy united them, and to see how that resistance ties into party, we will return to 
their conclusions on political principle in the light of Runciman’s categorization of 
first- and second-order hypocrisy.   
  
Men join political society because it is in their self-interest to do so.  Such an 
understanding of self-interest rests on the idea that men are restrained for their own 
good so that greater ends (which are in their ultimate self-interest) might be achieved.  
As shown through all three chapters, each thinker described political principles that 
could regulate the way in which men – principally meaning statesmen – act 
politically.  As men are inherently self-interested, each thinker sought to employ 
principle in order to restrain the negative effects of self-interest while also promoting 
its benefits, most notably for the energy it provided government.  This meant being 
able to differentiate and balance between the principled ambitions of honor and the 
lower ambitions of self-interest. 
These principles had different names, according to each thinker, although their 
effect was the same, that is, to moderate power, promote political liberty, and further 
the national interest.  Montesquieu’s honor harnessed self-interest and directed it 
towards principled ends; Hume’s genuine principles taught men the usefulness of 
socially constructed guides of conduct; Burke’s prudence recognized the political 
                                                
758 Hume writes in the Enquiries that “Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, 
silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues,” are rejected by “men of sense” not because 
they are selfless acts done without an agenda, but because in fact they almost always are.  They, 
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utility and necessary vigor of prejudice, but also recognized the point at which it was 
politically appropriate to curb prejudice so that the general interest could be protected.  
Most importantly, the political principles they advocated all tolerated first-order 
hypocrisy but prevented against second-order hypocrisy.   
For Montesquieu, the political principles of virtue and honor are both forms of 
self-renunciation, more so in the former principle and incredibly less so in the latter, 
which limit individual will for greater ends.  Though they do so in different ways – 
virtue blatantly discourages against the natural inclinations of self-interest while 
honor encourages them – both achieve long-term interests.  Political virtue is a direct 
and more complete form of self-renunciation, as it instructs the individual to put the 
interests of the state above his own interests.  Virtue seeks to operate at a level beyond 
individual self-interest and vanity to one where collective interest supports the 
republic.  By renouncing individual and momentary interests, long-term interests are 
secured because the virtuous man is taught, and subsequently believes, that self-
interest should always be subordinate to the welfare of the state.  Nevertheless, this 
type of virtue could not abide hypocrisy.   
Though both virtue and honor were forms of self-interest, Montesquieu 
concluded that virtue could only serve to destroy political liberty if it were the spring 
of contemporary constitutions.  Public interest could never take precedence over all 
private interests without interference from private concerns.  Consequently, a 
dissonance resonated from the conflict between the theory of virtue and the reality of 
its practice.  Social conditions in Europe were changing faster than the pace to which 
virtue could become accustomed.  It was simply outdated, since the constitutional 
arrangements which provided for collective virtue, namely an indoctrinating 
education, had become obsolete.  Montesquieu therefore concluded that the system of 
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honor was the only abstract principle that could preserve political liberty in 
contemporary states. 
The honorable man obeys the code of honor because he believes it is in his 
own interest to do so.  Whereas virtue taught men that their self-interest was identical 
with being equal to their countrymen, honor taught men that it was in their own 
interest to maintain the prejudices of their “condition.”  Honor is therefore predicated 
on self-interest and achieves the same ends as virtue, though much less harshly.  Here, 
vice does indeed pay homage to virtue.  Honor, “demands preferences and 
distinctions,” but it also forms men to act in ways which achieve long-term interests, 
if not always for themselves, than at least for the state as a whole.  Like Mandeville, 
Montesquieu maintained that honor allows each individual to work towards his own 
interests (singular ends), but in doing so there is an unintended benefit to the common 
good (principled ends).759  The honorable man is thus taught, and believes, that 
pursuing one’s self-interest is synonymous with defending one’s position and 
upholding the code of honor, which itself maintains the end of political liberty.  
Though virtue is intolerant of any form of hypocrisy, first- and second-order, honor 
tolerates the former form while preventing against the latter. 
Honor regulates self-interest by its code, which requires that the honorable 
man be independent, self-serving, and self-respecting.  The honorable man is more 
self-confident and self-governing than the virtuous man.  He is at the same time 
independent of and obedient to the law, but is never subservient since he has a 
stronger attachment to the code of honor than to the laws.  This singularity allows for 
the resistance to anything contrary to what the code of honor permits, even, if the 
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need arises, resistance to the sovereign.760  Honor thus restrains self-interest precisely 
when it matters politically.  It unites responsibility with self-interest, since that 
responsibility is to one’s position according to the code of honor.  Thus, men could 
perform selfless actions, though they might be acting according to selfish motivations.  
The notable examples of honor maintaining the liberty of the state (Crillon and the 
Viscount d’Orte) were hypocritical self-interested actions, though they were 
principled and, as a result, beneficial to the state.   
Montesquieu called contemporary honor “false,” which is to say hypocritical, 
even though it was just as “useful to the public” as “true” honor could have been.761  
Montesquieu, like Hume after him, had no intrinsic faith in the truth of political 
principles.  Like Hume, the value of a political principle rested in its usefulness, and 
its usefulness was measured by how well it regulated men in political function.  All 
principle, for Hume, was socially constructed and lacked the truth it claimed it to 
possess.  It took a “reasonable” man to recognize this, even though most reasonable 
men adopted principle for reasons of utility, habit, or self-interest, and employed it in 
order to achieve political ends.   
Hume’s “genuine principles” are socially constructed guides of conduct that 
regulate men’s actions.  They are held by those who recognize the utility of principle 
but who do not necessarily accept its credibility.  Men who are motivated by genuine 
principle recognize the existence of contrary impulses within the mind and endeavor 
to achieve some kind of internal balance between blind faith and skepticism, both of 
which could lead to the extremes engendered by second-order hypocrisy.762  
Enthusiasm, for instance, which is engendered by genuine principle, leads men to 
question, challenge, and confront authority.  In this way, it maintains independence 
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and, though not free of self-interest or prejudice, helps to preserve the spirit of 
liberty.763 
Gallantry functioned in different ways, according to Hume.  It formed men to 
seek out unique passions that could serve them best in their lives, and gave them the 
prudence to value genuine principle over interested principle.  But more importantly, 
it moderated power by operating as the public reversal of a superior/inferior 
relationship (chivalry, hospitality, charity etc.).  Gallantry also has an influence upon 
the sovereign who, because of the imbalance of power in his state, fears the jealousy 
of his subjects.  Accordingly, he grants liberties that he might not otherwise have 
granted in order to better secure his own position.  Power becomes gentler, even 
though the relationship of authority is strengthened by a tacit acknowledgment of it.  
Albeit hypocritically, self-interest is politically restrained at the point where self-
interest and the potential exercise of power come together.764  In both cases, principle 
is tolerant of first-order hypocrisy but prevents against the extremes of second-order 
hypocrisy. 
In explaining his understanding of prejudice, which he maintained was not a 
pejorative term for self-interest, Burke drew the clearest connection between principle 
and self-interest.  Though it possesses negative tendencies, it is a necessary and 
legitimate principle.  It is very close to Montesquieu’s principle of honor, which is, as 
Montesquieu understood it, a “prejudice.”  It is a self-interest that is closer to self-
respect, and the self-respect that is closer to upholding the dignity of one’s position.  
Prejudice guides men in a course of “wisdom and virtue,” instructing them as to the 
decisions one should make in political life.  Most importantly, prejudice forms men so 
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that their virtue becomes their habit, and their duty “a part of [their] nature.”765  
Ultimately, prejudice is reason put to action.766  Though prejudice is biased and, in 
some ways, unfair, Burke maintains that it is not unjust.  For Burke, prejudice is 
reasonable when it does not attempt to make truth claims, only a claim, like Hume’s 
understanding of principle, that its application in political society is practical.   
Despite the fact that prejudices are factious by their nature, they cannot be 
removed.  They result naturally from men’s interactions in society and are necessary 
to form connexions.  Burke therefore supplies a second principle, prudence, which 
guides right action by checking selfish instincts and, as a higher principle, regulates 
the submission of the magistrate or representative to the national interest.  Prudence 
corrects the degenerative tendency of prejudice by overriding it in political function.  
It prevents first-order hypocrisy from sinking into second-order hypocrisy.  It also 
makes the exceptions and the modifications for moral action according to 
circumstance.  Prudence fills the gap between principle and practice, connecting the 
two.  While prejudice remains to give vigor to the government, prudence neutralizes 
the negative tendencies of self-interested men.   
 
The principles advocated by all three thinkers aimed at appropriately limiting 
hypocrisy.  Each thinker tolerated first-order hypocrisy because they believed that 
men, especially political men, were self-interested.  Indeed, the foundation of 
government rested upon such a consideration of men as inherently self-centered.  
Political principle tolerates first-order hypocrisy as it seeks to smooth the rough 
nature of politics, though it also prevents against hypocritical extremes.  Because 
hypocrisy tolerates the inconsistencies of men, it allows them to live up to the 
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expectations of political principle without sinking into despair or, worse, becoming 
second-order hypocrites.  Furthermore, because principle is hypocritical, it turns vice 
into virtue precisely where it matters politically.  It restrains men where political 
opportunity meets the abuse of power, where second-order hypocrisy begins to 
manipulate power.  Most importantly, it recognizes that, “the greatest good that can 
befall men is the one they derive from the evil that besets them.”767 
What Judith Shklar called “the liberalism of fear” highlights just such a 
principled defense, similarly advocated by all three thinkers, against second-order 
hypocritical politics.  Namely, this principled defense is set against fear: the fear of 
impartial power whereby one’s life, property, and prosperity are never safe.  This is 
set in contrast to ideas of a benevolent despotism where our physical comforts are put 
before freedom.  Such hope in a benevolent despot is pure fantasy, according to the 
liberalism of fear.  Instead, the liberalism of fear, “begins with the assumption that the 
power to govern is the power to inflict fear and cruelty.”  No matter how benevolent 
those who hold power are, benevolence is still not sufficient enough to protect an 
unarmed population.  The liberalism of fear therefore “institutionalizes suspicion” and 
creates a “distrustful population” that protects against fear and secures its rights.768 
Shklar’s “fear” is not a vice itself, though it can incite vice by making our 
resistance to it weaker.769  Politically, fear is a large force to be resisted, and is 
equivalent to the unobstructed power that each political actor holds.  As a result, it is 
not natural for men to resist fear.  This is why pardons and reconciliation are so 
necessary in societies that have experienced forms of extremism.  Reigns of terror 
demonstrate, “that resistance to terror is not a duty and that fear under protracted 
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threats must inevitably wear down all but the heroic few.”770  Principle instructs men 
to resist this fear, however, even when threatened with death.  This is why Hume 
valued religious enthusiasm, for instance, even though he saw how dangerous it could 
be.771  This continues to be true today; whatever can resist extremism and terror needs 
to be valued responsibly.772    
The principles described and promoted by Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke are 
the political opposites of fear.  The fear of fear, turned into a resistance to fear, 
provides the motive for action.  They instruct men not to be afraid of fear, and at 
times to be brazenly resistant to it, even when they may not be fully conscious of why 
they are so, as Montesquieu’s illustration of the Viscount d’Orte demonstrates.  In 
being principled, the Viscount’s vice was turned into virtue, albeit hypocritically.  
Nevertheless, instructing men in political principle, such as enthusiasm, is a difficult 
and potentially dangerous undertaking.  The self-interested nature of man must be 
overcome, or as in the case of honor it must be equated with that principle.  Even 
then, principle must be guided.  Enthusiasm continues to have a thin line separating 
principled resistance to tyranny from more drastic acts such as terrorism, for 
enthusiasm can easily lead to delusion.  This is a fact that political theory continues to 
struggle with today, and it centers largely on the concept of hypocrisy. 
If an acceptance of hypocrisy is necessary for political principle to operate, 
there remains one aspect that connects principle to the resistance of fear: party.  It is 
futile to expect that one man can singly resist fear.  Even Montesquieu recognized that 
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the age in which the Viscount’s actions were possible had already passed.  An 
individual resisting fear may be a martyr, but if resisting fear is a responsibility that 
all men must take seriously, as Burke argued it was, then a man acting alone is 
shirking his duty.  Fear must be resisted by an incorporation of men – a party – for 
party is the only force that can effectively repel the force of fear.  The next section 
will therefore take a look at who was to compose this party as well as how, and for 
what reasons, party was promoted. 
 
Securing the Statesman; Securing the Party 
This chapter has described how the principles that each thinker promoted 
appropriately tolerated first-order hypocrisy while preventing against second-order 
hypocrisy, but it remains to be seen how they envisioned incorporating principle that 
was based on self-interest into the constitution.  All three thinkers connected political 
principle to factions within the government, whether as constitutionally permitted 
factions, such as a nobility possessed of prerogatives, or “parties” in the modern 
sense.  Principle operating politically became not only an individual affair, but a 
corporate one.  Who and how parties were composed remained important issues.  
Therefore, two questions must be asked.  What role did political principle play in 
creating and regulating statesmen?  And, what role did party play in regulating 
statesmen?   
 To discover the answer to the above questions, we must examine what might 
be called the “conservative” thought shared by all three thinkers, for their systems 
were all predicated upon a unique understanding of inequality and class division 
where the “governors” secure the advantages of society.  Assuming for a moment that 
their systems all necessitated inequality, it should be remembered that each thinker 
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was a proponent of a “plastic” nobility.  Such a focus upon the nobility serves to shed 
more light upon how, and by whom, they envisioned government to operate. 
That man acted according to his own interests was plain enough to each 
thinker, yet a dilemma lay in the fact that men were often motivated to pursue their 
own interests to the detriment of the state.  When men could no longer hope to attain 
the rewards of their work because of the limits of the constitution, they would seek to 
work outside its bounds or worse, destroy it.  Indeed, in the Reflections, Burke gives 
such a reason for the destruction of the Old Regime.773  Thus, all three recognized a 
practice that suitably exploited the motivation of successful men in order that it might 
be employed towards political ends: venality. 
Montesquieu stated simply, “a profession will be better pursued when those 
who have excelled in it can expect to attain another.”774  Though he believed in the 
weight of tradition, he did not believe that tradition was excuse enough to refuse 
ennoblement to those whose energy and intelligence had helped the state prosper.  His 
reasoning for this was not on principle; that the nobility might be diluted or weakened 
by venality was of secondary importance.  He feared instead what could result from 
ignoring newly rich or powerful men who held no direct responsibility to the state.  
By granting or allowing these men to purchase titles, the state guaranteed that those 
talents would then be employed in political function and, more importantly, within 
constitutional limits.  Venality provided, “for performing as a family vocation what 
one would not want to undertake for virtue…it destines each to his duty and renders 
the orders of the state more permanent.”775  Inequality thus became a prerequisite for 
stable government.  Men had to be set apart in political function for their own sake as 
                                                
773 RRF, 240. 
774 SPL, XX.22, 351. 
775 SPL, V.19, 70. 
275 
 
the more dignified they felt, the more responsibility they would have towards their 
constitutional position and the stronger they would defend it.   
Hume’s understanding of venality stemmed chiefly from his observations of 
the British constitution.  He believed that as the power of the Commons or the 
monarchy increased, venality could help balance power within the state by instilling 
in or connecting to the Lords, rather than the Commons, those men who had a 
concerted interest intimately linked to the welfare of the nation.  Such men would 
appear to be concerned with things greater than their material interests, for to 
safeguard their interests, political liberty and sovereignty had to be maintained.  Thus 
the Lords, “would consist entirely of the men of chief credit, abilities, and interest in 
the nation…such an aristocracy would be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy 
and against it.”776  Equally, venality could corrupt the state when it was not connected 
to principle or when principle did not moderate self-interest.  Hume criticized Poland, 
for instance, for having an elective monarchy, the power of which he believed to be 
sold by the nobility for no other purpose than to enrich themselves.777  A critical 
component to Hume’s understanding of venality, therefore, was the adoption of 
principle; without it, there was no responsibility attached to each constitutional 
position. 
Burke believed that most men were motivated by personal gain, and very few 
by virtue.  He also believed that men had a natural desire to improve their station in 
life, and therefore sought to channel such a desire towards ends that might benefit the 
government.  He maintained that titled positions were lodged with political duties and 
responsibilities, the principle of prudence being one of those responsibilities.  By 
appealing to the self-interest of men, Burke recognized, like Hume and Montesquieu, 
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that venality harnessed the influential men of the state into the ranks of the nobility 
where their obedience to the governing principle was co-opted and secured.778  Their 
power and influence, which previously had little political allegiance, was 
subsequently curbed by the prudence required of their constitutional position.  Now 
constitutionally a part of the government, they could not work against it. 
 The most important effect of selling and granting offices was that it 
strengthened the nobility as a political class.  Along with the selling of old or the 
creation of new titles came the necessary adoption of principle by those who had 
already proved their talents through the wealth or influence they achieved.  Yet, it 
must be asked, why not strengthen any other part of the constitution; indeed, why the 
nobility?  What was so special, according each thinker, about the nobility?  As each 
chapter demonstrated it was from the nobility that each sought to secure the 
“governors”: Montesquieu’s initial division of political society, the “middling rank of 
men” that Hume saw as the most stable depository of political liberty, and the “natural 
aristocracy” that Burke believed were the best and most natural choice of men to 
operate in government.  It is to their thought on the necessity of political inequality 
that we now must turn. 
Montesquieu believed that inequality led to forms of moderate government, 
either aristocracy or monarchy.779  Extreme equality, on the other hand, led not to 
moderate government, but to despotism.  To maintain moderate government, 
therefore, the constitution had to be discriminatory; indeed, Montesquieu appealed for 
all legislators to adopt the spirit of moderation, the motivating principle of 
aristocracies.780  Moderation was best achieved through a corporate nobility which 
could provide for the liberty of the state by operating as an intermediate body between 
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the people and the monarch.781  Such a division of the state supported the constitution 
in two ways.  First, the nobility could moderate the power of the sovereign.  Second, 
by maintaining honor, different factions of nobility within the state moderated the 
accumulation of power by defending their own constitutional prerogatives since their 
positions, and their shares of power, were constitutionally guaranteed.  Honor 
stipulated that each faction should be concerned with what it was owed according to 
its respective condition.  This guaranteed that power and wealth in a state were both 
divided, and also provided a constitutional framework to which factions could appeal 
if their prerogatives were usurped.   
Hume traced division and inequality to the historical development of each 
state.  Along with the improved methods of husbandry and the division of labor, came 
a division of society into different classes which formed when artisans, merchants, 
and those engaged in all forms of industry evolved to become the middle-men 
between the highest (landed) and lowest (peasant) ranks of society.  For Hume, this 
division, which increased inequality, mirrored the economic value of diverse talents 
and was a necessary step towards progress.  Though political society made men more 
similar by the adoption of a national character, men were also distinguished by their 
unique talents, abilities, and passions, as well as by the prejudices of birth, titles, or 
possessions.  These divisions did not weaken the state but instead gave strength to 
it.782  Though luxury increased inequality and lessened virtue, it encouraged 
politeness which, though hypocritical, was a product of the refinement in the arts.783  
The end result was the creation of a “middling rank of men” who, by virtue of their 
talents and position, elicit “authority” and “consideration.”  They are independent and 
powerful, yet they are not so powerful as to think it possible to unlawfully usurp 
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power.  They protect their rights as well as the rights of others and so are, Hume 
concludes, “the best and firmest basis of public liberty.”784 
In complex societies, Burke believed that a diversity of interests “must exist” 
due to natural inequalities among men.785  “Some decent regulated pre-eminence, 
some preference (not exclusive appropriation) given to birth,” should be mirrored 
within a state.  The equal share of power, though hypothetically correct, was not, 
“amongst the direct original rights of man in civil society.”786  Like Montesquieu’s 
corporate nobility and Hume’s “middling rank of men,” Burke maintained that 
government should be composed of a “natural aristocracy,” who were formed from 
infancy to lead, guide, and govern.787  Though such men were not free from prejudice, 
the principle that taught them to uphold the dignity of their position, they were well 
schooled in prudence which, “taught to despise danger in the pursuit of honour and 
duty.”788  Most importantly, Burke wanted wealth and privilege to serve the end of 
principle so that it made one’s “weakness subservient to [one’s] virtue.”789  To be of 
the natural aristocracy meant to possess these qualities.   
 
The principle that motivated government had an immediate effect on that 
government’s form.  On this front, there are more overlapping traits than there are 
disparities among the three thinkers.  The first and most evident area of overlap is 
their insistence in the independence of magistrates or delegates, from both the crown 
and the body of the people.  Such independence created a “middle class” who, though 
responsible to both the lower and higher orders of the state, were never subservient to 
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them.  It is from this corporate nobility, “middling rank of men,” and “natural 
aristocracy” that all three thinkers found their statesmen.   
Montesquieu maintained that statesmen should be able to act independently 
from those who elect them.  In a mixed constitution like that of England, 
independence from the sovereign is a necessary quality of the nobility, as is their 
independence from the people.  The people, who are “not at all appropriate” to 
discuss public business, “should not enter the government except to choose their 
representatives.”790  Once elected, these representatives, who have been generally 
instructed by their constituents, need not be instructed, “about each matter of business 
in particular,” for if they were, “it would produce infinite delays and make each 
deputy the master of all others, and on the most pressing occasions the whole force of 
the nation could be checked by a caprice.”791 
Like Montesquieu, Hume believed that the people should have a limited role 
in the affairs of government.  Representatives should reserve their independence from 
the people they represent, or else the country would be exposed to all the ills of 
popular tides.  Hume thus encouraged legislators to govern “invisibly” so that they 
might promote the reason that lies in independence without the desire for greater 
power, which constitutionally lies in “that middling rank of men.”792 
Burke pronounced this idea with insistence and clarity.  In his “Speech to the 
Electors of Bristol,” he made clear his intention to remain independent, though 
“informed.”  Burke would “prefer their interest to his own,” but he would not 
sacrifice the national interest to local prejudice.793  It was his duty as a Member of 
Parliament to safeguard the welfare of the nation as a whole by prudently regulating 
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the naked vigor of local prejudice that his constituent’s self-interest might invoke.  
Burke’s principle also helped to maintain an elongated political process whereby the 
people are separated from power.  Critical to the legitimacy of government, therefore, 
is responsibility through public approbation garnered through fame and estimation, 
both of which check against the lack of principle in the statesman. 
 
A Party in Principle 
The application of principle in government found its form in the independent 
statesman, though the statesman had to have the ability to act in government in order 
for principle to be effective.  However, Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke no longer 
trusted individual men to act unselfishly in government.  Principle could only take 
men so far; the lure of power, in its many forms, they all believed to be stronger than 
what most men could withstand.  Men were no longer “virtuous” as the state could no 
longer be an end in itself.  Indeed, Montesquieu believed that the age of virtuous men 
had long passed.  Society had become far too complex and made too many demands 
upon individuals for their allegiance to reside solely with the state.  Hume, always 
questioning the logic others found in human nature, believed that men, even 
principled men, could be duplicitous; where the greatest liberty was allowed men 
could be expected to neglect the “justice” of government.  Burke believed that the last 
great act of selfless resistance to tyranny, the Glorious Revolution, could no longer be 
repeated. 
According to all three thinkers, division was a necessary part of society and, as 
such, should be mirrored politically.  This division gave rise to faction and party, 
which each considered an increasingly necessary part of eighteenth-century politics.  
Though each recognized the danger of singular faction, this did not dissuade them 
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from abandoning party politics.  Instead, each promoted what has been called in this 
thesis, principled faction and envisioned a unique role for “party” in constitutional 
government – party being the vehicle through which each thinker, in his own way, 
sought to encapsulate principle.  Though their understanding of such a role differed, 
the end they envisioned was the same: political liberty.   
In order to institutionalize principle, all three described the best possible 
principles that could be produced and maintained in practice.  As Pierre Manent 
describes of Montesquieu, the thinkers of this thesis did not “seek” these principles, 
they “found” them.  In  “seeking,” one looks to theory and absolutes.  By “finding,” 
however, one discovers what is already constructed.  “Not much trouble need be taken 
to discover political liberty in the constitution,” Montesquieu writes, “if it can be seen 
where it is, if it has been found, why seek it?”794  Or, as Hume put it, “the question is 
not concerning any fine imaginary republic.”795  Each thinker described and 
heightened what already existed in practice instead of artificially manipulating ideas 
to fit some form of an absolute.796  In this way, they sought the good, not the true.797   
As discussed above, this was pertinent to the role that principle played in 
permitting political hypocrisy in a state, while limiting the attempt at political 
perfection.  For Montesquieu, the code of honor protected constitutionally established 
prerogatives, which in turn maintained the liberty of the state.  By appealing to 
“reasonable men,” Hume sought to institutionally channel the natural passions of 
man, both good and bad, for political purposes.  Fearing that “remarkable” men could 
no longer be found Burke sought to institutionalize the principles that motivated 
remarkable men in party.  This was an undeniable shift in political thinking.  Whereas 
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prominent statesmen had before been the creators of faction (usually singular faction) 
by virtue of their power or influence, all three thinkers now anticipated the creation of 
statesman by principled faction. 
Montesquieu sought to incorporate faction that employed the governing 
principle into the constitution, believing that the potential benefits of principled 
faction (faction as positive competition within the state), if controlled, could outweigh 
the potential risks posed by singular faction.  To be held politically responsible, 
however, one had to be a part of a constitutional faction, and to be a part of a 
constitutional faction, one had to be educated by the world in the code of honor.798  
Honor as a principle thus necessitated faction, and vice versa.  As employed by 
principled faction, honor stipulated both a balance of power among the established 
bodies of the state, and a balance between those bodies and the sovereign.   
Far from being free of faction, a free state is, Hume believed, the cause of 
faction, though it can also provide the means for its improvement.799  A free state 
must be able to provide both the necessary liberty for faction to exist and the requisite 
authority needed to limit the degenerative tendency such liberty may encourage.800  
As a result, Hume’s principled faction recognizes political authority by working 
within constitutional limits, but maintains its independence by appropriately 
channeling political ambition.  Hume secures the operation of principle, and thus 
justice, by institutionally checking against its opposite.  By appropriately channeling 
human interests and passions, which check for the lack of principle in elected 
representatives, Hume employs the structure of the constitution in order to regulate 
principle.  Each faction possesses the power of oversight by accusation, though none 
hold positive powers with which to manipulate the constitution towards its own 
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interests.  Thus, the interaction among factions is akin to the individual’s 
understanding of justice.  The oversight of one faction upon another restrains self-
interest, though it does not necessarily limit the vigor of government as the overseeing 
faction protests only if that faction operates beyond the limit of its constituted rights. 
Burke acknowledged that the presence of parties in government inevitably 
creates friction, but as “opposed and conflicting interests” deliberate, compromise, 
and moderate each other, such resistance could be constructive.801  When employed 
by principled faction, the constructive antagonism engendered by prejudice thus 
served its own ends.  Additionally, Burke chose to see in the British constitution a 
synthesis created by this continual political dissonance, indeed the most perfect 
harmony that was possible under constitutional government, instead of the discord 
and absence of perfection that the “king’s friends” and Dr. Price railed against. 
By putting the emphasis of principle upon party, rather than the individual, 
Burke institutionalized the principles of prejudice and prudence in party form.  Party 
now became the guarantor of their presence in political function.  Prejudice makes 
one jealous of his liberty, while prudence makes one observant of the constitution 
which provides for that liberty.  To be a member of a party, one must embody both.802  
By creating this shift, Burke hoped to transfer the responsibility of maintaining the 
national interest from the “wise and the good” to the party, so that the presence of the 
appropriate principles could be guaranteed in government.  Not believing that the 
actions of the Old Whigs could be repeated, he attempted to rid political society of the 
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need for remarkable men via the party system, which could refine principle and limit 
ambition, while institutionalizing the principles, and not the actions, of the “wise and 
the good.”   
 
Party had come to mean something new by the end of the eighteenth century.  
It no longer represented a singular form of government but instead came to symbolize 
a “body of men united,” as Burke put it, which pursued the national interest.  By 
coupling the political ability of a governing class with the political responsibility 
inherent in its principle, party could now secure the advantages of society.  The 
answer came in three steps, the first two of which secured able and responsible 
statesmen, engendered by inequality and principle respectively.  In order to avoid the 
inconsistency of individual men, the third step incorporated the actions of able and 
responsible statesmen into party. 
The constitutionally mandated structuring of an unequal society was the first 
step in creating able statesmen that possessed the necessary political ability to govern.  
Inequality was thus a necessary part of creating the conditions whereby a class of 
statesmen (a corporate nobility, a “middling rank of men,” and a “natural 
aristocracy”) could be educated in political matters.  Because of its exclusionary 
nature, such a structured society produced a class of men that, due in large part to 
their prejudice of position and condition, valued independence over subservience, and 
were less susceptible to second-order hypocrisy.  Independence is only as good as 
what one does with it, however.  Since ability alone was not enough to govern, it had 
to be coupled with political responsibility through the adoption of principle.  One 
necessitated the other since the adoption of principle was coupled with one’s position 
and could not be separated from it.  This gave constancy to the capability of 
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government and certainty to the inclusion of principle in it.  Principle instructed men 
how to be politically responsible by restraining the natural inclinations of self-interest, 
but it did not do away with self-interest altogether.  It appropriately instructed 
statesmen in the balance between, as Burke described, prejudice and prudence, the 
one to give vigor to the government, the other to curb the overenthusiastic tendency of 
defending one’s own interests (or one’s constituency) to the detriment of other 
interests in the state.  More importantly, it helped men recognize that in order to act 
prudently in politics, their vice must pay homage to virtue.  Though hypocritical, 
“false honor” is socially useful.  “And, happily, men are in a situation such that, 
though their passions inspire in them the thought of being wicked, they nevertheless 
have an interest in not being so.”803    
Political principle, which once aimed to form men, now sought to restrain 
them for their own good.  As a result, the end of political principle had changed from 
an end in itself (such as Aristotle’s “best life”) to the end of political liberty.  Principle 
could no longer form men to achieve the good life, but it could instruct them in 
political function so that the best possible political life could be achieved.  Principle 
changed from a quality of character that personally instructs the subject for what he 
thinks is in the interest of the nation but is ultimately self-defeating (think 
Montesquieu’s virtue), to one, such as honor, that instructs the subject for what he 
thinks is in his own interest, but is ultimately to the benefit of all.  The motive for this 
principle is undeniably hypocritical, but hypocrisy gives to this principle additional 
strength in resisting corrupt power and fear.   
Principle also informed the statesman of the political responsibility to 
moderate power in the state.  Each thinker’s principle did this precisely where it 
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mattered politically, or where inequalities of power met with the potential exercise of 
power, and the fear one has of its abuse.  Though it reaffirms in many ways a 
previously established and sometimes unequal system, principle helps to protect 
legitimate minorities and weaker members of the state because principled men are 
incited to action when something occurs which is contrary to their principle, the 
illegitimate usurpation of power being one such act.  What’s more, the existence of a 
constitutionally mandated nobility, by being exclusionary though plastic, encouraged 
all men in the state to put their energy towards enriching themselves with the ultimate 
aim of being rewarded with recognition by the state.  By being plastic, the nobility 
subsequently secured the allegiance of such successful men and instilled 
responsibility in their actions, co-opting and moderating the potential use of their 
newly acquired power. 
Ability coupled with responsibility, a formula that produced principled 
statesmen, was again not enough.  Steps one and two created politically proficient and 
responsible statesman, though neither guaranteed that the advantages of society would 
be secured.  The second step hinted at the necessity of faction, whereby one’s position 
was contingent upon the adoption of principle, but a third step was still needed; it was 
not enough to assume that men would consistently maintain the dignity of their 
position.  This third step incorporated principled faction into the operation of 
constitutional government, and by doing so shifted the responsibility for the operation 
of principle in government from the individual holding the position to the party, 
making principle prior to the individual in government, and not the other way around.  
Whereas step one formed the statesman, and step two instilled political responsibility, 
the third step anchored that responsibility in the party.  In this way, party became 
synonymous with principle, and constitutional government became synonymous with 
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party government.  This was no small change in political thinking and it deeply 
impacted our modern understanding of party.  What are the results for us today? 
 
Party and Hypocrisy Today: what are the advantages of society? 
One difference in thought upon party today continues to persist, as much as it 
did in the eighteenth century, a difference recognized by Rosenblum in On the Side of 
the Angels.  Rosenblum sets her argument against normal appreciations of party, 
which argue that partisanship is needed in order to realize the value of parties, and 
argues instead that party is the “carrier” of partisanship.804  It is a reversal in 
precedence, and an important point regarding this thesis.  Montesquieu, Hume, and 
Burke all pronounced an understanding of party as principled faction, and by Burke 
we find an argument that matches Rosenblum’s: party is the vehicle by which the 
virtues of partisanship are upheld and secured so that they can be maintained in (not 
necessarily by) the members of party.  A strong argument still exists for returning to 
the emphasis of party as the carrier of partisanship, instead of one that considers 
partisanship a necessity to discover the value of parties.  The former argues that party 
is and has been the carrier of political principle, while the latter argues that it is only 
principled men or women who give value to the party system.  By promoting the 
latter, our faith in constitutional government is lost when we lose faith in individuals 
who lead party, since only they can give value to the party.  If, however, party is 
recognized to be the carrier of partisanship, greater faith can be put in the constitution 
because it is recognized that partisanship – which alone can secure the opinion of 
political liberty – is secured and maintained by party, something much greater than 
inconsistent individuals.   
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Party today remains the fundamental aspect of representative government, 
even though it is largely a “private” part of every constitution, or what Bolingbroke 
called the “government.”  Though it is conceivable without party, and is indeed much 
theorized in the absence of party, politics does not exist in practice without it.  Despite 
its omnipresence, party remains an uncomfortable thought.  It is divisive and its very 
presence highlights two unpleasant facts: the political body can never be made whole, 
and politics will always fall short of our expectations if we continue to believe that it 
can.  The thinkers of this thesis never had such expectations, of course.  Instead of 
seeking ways out of the party system, or ways out of “party politics,” they proposed 
ways in which self-interested parties and hypocritical politicians would continue to 
play within the bounds of politics, all for the greater good.   
Starting with the wrong premise – such as how to rid ourselves of party 
politics – means the wrong questions are being asked.  Today, the question should be: 
why is it that self-interested parties and hypocritical politicians continue to operate 
within the bounds of politics?  A more honest question might be: why would parties 
give up power at election time?  Indeed, what is it that influences them to do so?  As 
this thesis has argued, Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke proposed some answers that 
might help us better understand these questions. 
  
The introduction of party to constitutional government has had profound 
effects.  The first and most obvious result of this change is the emphasis now placed 
upon party, and the lack of prominence now given to the individual.  By orienting the 
passions of ambition into party, individuals cannot achieve direct political influence 
or power without first going through its rigmarole.  This has the effect of directing 
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and moderating men’s political ambition.  More importantly, it makes sure that those 
men who operate in government are men of party, and hence men of principle.   
At least we hope they are men of principle.  This was a much simpler affair 
when class was synonymous with principle.  Earlier thinkers, Mandeville in 
particular, believed that only well-bred gentlemen could maintain first-order 
hypocrisy.  Yet, the thinkers of this thesis came to recognize what Mandeville did not: 
the social and economic system that supported the class of well-bred gentlemen was 
and would be continually under threat.  As Montesquieu noted, England’s, “political 
interests give way to the interests of its commerce.”805  Accordingly, parties would 
come to represent politically what class had previously.  Though they all came to 
describe what has been called in this thesis as “principled faction,” the differences in 
their thought are demonstrative of the fact that the idea of a well-bred gentleman was 
constantly changing.  Though he was aware of political and economic change, 
especially as it occurred in England, Montesquieu focused on faction as class, and 
thus principle as the prejudice of one’s condition.  Hume considered two examples: 
faction as an institutional mechanism where principle was operationally negative, and 
faction as a middling rank of men who maintained “reasonable” principles.  Burke 
focused on faction as party (largely aristocratic, in values at least) where principle 
was a balance between prejudice and prudence. 
Though it is clear that states today are still composed of governing classes, 
these classes can no longer be defined as an “aristocracy,” which is the one simple 
way to connect all three different understandings of principled faction in this thesis.806  
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Honor as a principle has linguistically changed from one allied with class to one allied 
with party.  An aristocracy no longer exists, though something else has taken its 
place: a plutocracy, a meritocracy, a “partyocracy”?  Regardless of the appellation, 
one which varies according to the state in question, party still plays a large part in 
deciding who composes this governing class, and relies in many ways upon forms of 
inequality, though it is not strictly based upon an inequality of wealth and pedigree as 
it was once was.  Today, though it varies greatly by state, parties select their members 
through such strictures as wealth, talent, education, pedigree, race, gender, or creed.   
The field may have widened, but the party system has actually helped to make 
representative government less democratic and hence more hypocritical.  Since men 
are now chosen for election via party, a more fundamental political shift has taken 
place.  Election, and not lot for instance, separates men and creates a political class 
that, now regulated by party, must (or should) act in a principled manner.  The 
process of election is designed to select those who have already set themselves apart 
from others in some function, but it cannot always be known in what ways men have 
established themselves.  Fearing a Wilkes, as Burke did, the establishment of party 
government now adds another protective layer to the process of election.  It selects 
those who are to be selected, and makes a system based upon inequality (in its most 
basic form an inequality of talents) even more unequal.  This second step is 
constructive, however, as the principle of party is now secured in the representative 
even before he is elected, since the adoption of party principle is necessary and prior 
to the election itself.  Whereas venality previously secured ambition and linked it with 
political principle, party now selects those who it deems worthy of political service.  
This further separated the citizen from the representative, and therefore altered the 
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understanding of citizenship.  Under the discriminating constraints inherent in the 
party system, fewer candidates run for office and, as a result, citizens become an 
increasing source of legitimacy (often as antihypocrites) rather than potential 
candidates and rivals.807  Because they are previously selected by a party, candidates 
become increasingly separated from the electorate and election takes on what might 
be called a “refined nature.”808  In this way, as James Conniff wrote describing Burke, 
party serves to, “control and domesticate the people even as it works for reform.”809   
This leads us back to the discussion of party and hypocrisy.  The unique 
political problem – the gap between the eighteenth century and now – is that liberal 
societies have become democracies of a sort that have adopted this “refined nature” of 
election.  Because of the inherent limitations faced by large democracies, sincerity has 
lessened the more “democratic” states become.  Representatives must at once be seen 
to be of the people, while at the same time above them in order to speak for them.  In 
order to sustain this double act, political leaders need to wear different masks; they, 
“need to be familiar enough so that we let them rule us, but not so familiar that we 
cease to regard what they do as rule.”810  They need to be Janus-faced hypocrites who 
understand both the political necessity of hypocrisy for compromise, and the political 
nature of election by those who are (and will be at election time) antihypocrites.  This 
occurs most often among competing politicians, as the easiest criticism to make is that 
your opponent has failed to live up to his own professed ideals.  It is certainly easier 
than arguing against an opponent’s political convictions.  
The paradox of liberal democracy is that it encourages hypocrisy 
because the politics of persuasion require…a certain amount of 
dissimulation on the part of all speakers.  On the other hand, the 
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structure of open political competition exaggerates the importance and 
the prevalence of hypocrisy because it is the vice of which all parties 
can and do accuse each other.811   
 
As Pierre Manent writes, describing Montesquieu’s understanding of a representative, 
“the faithfulness of the representatives to the electorate is valuable only if they also 
know how to be unfaithful.”812  Then, as now, the difficulty of this double act, as well 
as the susceptibility of it to manipulation, highlights the need for party, in which 
principle (which flags and limits the individual’s tendency to use hypocrisy for the 
abuse of power) is now institutionalized, as it alone can regulate principle by 
tolerating first-order hypocrisy while preventing against second-order hypocrisy. 
We may need to hide the truth about ourselves by adopting manners to 
alleviate our inconsistencies, but in practice, and especially in politics, there is no 
need to deny that manners are hypocritical.  Thus, some people are hypocritical 
because the system requires it.  Others are hypocritical, however, because they seek to 
manipulate politics; these are second-order hypocrites.  The former are more honest 
(or should be), though there is an irresistible temptation into using hypocrisy for one’s 
own ends, often to the detriment of others.  Another problem with the former is that 
they can be naïve about hypocrisy and its uses.  Politicians and statesmen must 
understand the charade that is hypocrisy in politics, which means not only 
understanding its limits, but also how that charade can be manipulated.  If hypocrisy 
is abused, taken too far, or denied altogether, the charade is likely to fall apart, and the 
system is likely to fail.  Just as someone can be too hypocritical, so too can one be too 
honest and therefore ignorant of the way in which others abuse it.  Being too honest 
can lead to underestimating those who are second-order hypocrites, those who seek to 
create singular faction.  By encapsulating principle in party, the responsibility of 
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appropriately tolerating and preventing against different forms of hypocrisy is secured 
in party, not individuals; “remarkable men” were no longer needed.  Let us return, 
then, to the assumptions formed earlier in this conclusion to see if the constitutional 
thought on party and principle of Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke might still be 
relevant today. 
 
The “institutionalized suspicion” of the liberalism of fear results from the 
antagonism of the party system.  Party rivalry is constitutive, and helps to establish 
the conflict of opposing reasons.  It has historically been assumed to exist, or rather 
tolerated when anticipation beget practice, as argued in the introduction.  As 
demonstrated in each chapter, parties, both in and out of power, became “defensible 
parts of the whole,” and not parts seeking to create their own whole.  The parties were 
antagonistic, though necessary; more importantly, they became inclusive.  As political 
divisions, whether as class, branch, or party, principled factions recognize established 
sovereignty, admit that political conflict is inevitable and ineliminable, and share with 
other parties a similar concept of justice.  As parties continue to be regulated by 
principle today, the political thought of Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke concerning 
party politics still merit our attention. 
Bernard Crick gives perhaps the most cogent definition of “politics.”  It is, he 
writes, “the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are 
conciliated by giving them a share of power in proportion to their importance to the 
welfare and the survival of the whole community.”813  It arises from “a recognition of 
restraints” and is best conducted amid rival interests.  Politics is, in fact, what holds a 
state together.  It is established so as to defend each and every minority.  It is not a 
                                                
813 Crick, 21. 
294 
 
common interest or a “general will,” nor the rule of the majority or a minority.  The 
general business of government is to maintain order, and the hard truth is that it is the 
political operation of principled faction itself – the party antagonism – that maintains 
order, not the operation of the government, for order in politics is really nothing more 
than the possibility for, and the realization of, diversity and change.814  The purpose of 
the political state is not just to keep the ship afloat.  Such people “have a rather 
curious view of the purpose of ships.”815  There may not be a particular destination in 
sight though some directions are clearly preferable over others since continually 
moving and adapting – changing, that is – is not only inevitable, but necessary in 
order to preserve.   
To continue this metaphor, as Crick does, it must also be remembered that 
states are no longer a ship.  They are, at best, a convoy of different interests; it is 
politics that corrals and directs them.816  If parties are ships in a political regime then 
the, “only basic agreement in a political regime is to use political means.”817  
Principled faction, and party today, may differ in their religious, civic, economic, or 
social beliefs, but they are settled on the political means that they can and will use to 
assert those beliefs in the public realm.  Since there is no single view of the general 
welfare, politics, and hence party politics, are more necessary than ever.  Politics is 
not a singular endeavor, nor does it exist as something so frightening as a “general 
will.”  In plural societies, the best that can be done is to find out what people think the 
general welfare should be, and to provide the means for discussing the divergent 
results of those opinions.  It is not what people want that should be sought as political 
ends, but what people think is possible.  Political ends should be found, not sought.  
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Often, this takes the limited form of agreeing on how to discuss disagreements, not 
necessarily agreeing on the ends of political decisions.818  This entails the willingness 
to seek acceptable compromise from each side’s stated positions and accepting the 
role of hypocrisy in politics.  It requires tolerating opposition, finding harmony in 
dissonance, and, most importantly, vigilance against forcing any harmony into unison.   
 
Party antagonism and the principle that regulates that antagonism, as described 
by the thinkers of this thesis, should be brought about in an operationally negative 
manner, as demonstrated by Montesquieu’s nobleman shouting “mon droit,” Hume’s 
court of competitors, and Burke’s historical interpretation of the Commons that acted 
as a control for, and not against, the people.  Party antagonism was motivated by 
groups seeking to secure their rights, not the rights of others, and especially not the 
rights of “all men.”  Burke claimed that “liberty” could only mean “liberties”; mon 
droit is not liberté.  The law in politics was always more fundamental than an idea; it 
was tangible, real, and directly applicable.  Theory can only promise something for 
the future; more often it can only deliver in the hereafter.  Corporate resistance to 
corrupt power was therefore practical (not theoretical), defensive, self-serving, and 
based upon previously established rights. 
Modern party shares much with this definition of party.  Rosenblum describes 
the antagonism, or as she puts it “regulated rivalry,” of modern parties:   
As long as partisans accept regulated rivalry, do not aim at eliminating 
the opposition, and concede that political authority is partisan and 
contestable, there is no moral imperative for them to assume the view 
from the outside, the perspective of the impartial observer.  It suffices 
that parties reject identifiable elements of the others’ projects and 
promises, create politically relevant divisions, and accept regulated 
rivalry as the form in which they are played out.819  
                                                
818 Cf. Ibid., 72-73, 170, 247-254. 
819 Rosenblum, 143. 
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The party system brings together partisans in a deliberative process that though 
hypocritical, is necessary.  Every political act that appears hypocritical must at least 
acknowledge certain moral standards of right action in politics, or put in terms more 
often used in this thesis: duty.  What matters in politics is what men actually do: 
“‘sincerity’ is no excuse for acting unpolitically, and insincerity may be channeled by 
politics into good results,” Crick remarks, “even hypocrisy, to a very, very small 
degree, keeps alive something of the idea of virtue.”820  Pretense of virtue can provide 
for political restraint; it provides for civility, if nothing else.  Principle helps us to 
tolerate our own hypocrisy and as such allows our vice to pay homage to virtue.  Just 
as importantly, it instructs us in appropriately tolerating the hypocrisy of others so 
that their vice may pay homage to virtue.   
Political deliberation among parties today, “requires the rough process of a 
struggle among combatants fighting under hostile banners.”821  Party antagonism has 
its purpose, and in the realm of the political it defends and refines; it motivates and 
moderates; it gives meaning to a cause and sets the debate; ultimately, it establishes 
compromise while maintaining difference.  Parties determine the range of matters for 
discussion, decision, and ultimately compromise.  Partisanship thus contributes to 
political stability, and appropriately employs and confines hypocrisy.  In politics, 
principled political actors must play a hypocritical role that is, by and large, already 
written for them by their party.  Party permits statesmen and representatives to be 
independent of those whom they would normally be dependent upon (voters, the 
monarch, etc.).  This allows them to be better politicians than they would be without 
party: “if they all simply represent their immediate constituents and did not mediate, 
                                                
820 Crick, 155. 
821 Rosenblum, 307. 
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compromise, and occasionally think of the interests of government, they might 
survive, but it is unlikely that the Republic would.”822  Hypocrites play a role to which 
party confines them, and perhaps this is the best possible result because party, rather 
than law, defines their role and the extent to which they can be hypocrites.     
Parties are long-term institutions restrained by the political memory they carry 
with them.  This political memory in turn shapes political principle, or what 
Rosenblum calls partisan identity, and could be a direct extension of the way in which 
Montesquieu, Hume, and Burke understood the theory of consent: “Partisan identity, 
with its incorporation of party history and character, however small, is a touchstone 
and a check on short-term, arrant, political considerations.”823  If party continues to 
secure the advantages of political society, or what Hume called “justice,” it remains to 
be answered just what those advantages are, if indeed such a question can be 
answered at all.   
 
In the quote that heads this chapter, Charles Howard McIlwain summed up the 
dilemma faced by all constitutional theorists, a dilemma that rests upon a pressing but 
ultimately unnecessary assumption.  That is, constitutions, and thus political society, 
should be constantly perfected; the “good” that McIlwain mentions should always be 
sought.  But at what costs, he asks?  This is an important consideration, though it 
leads one to consider something McIlwain does not ask: whose “good” and whose 
“evil” are we talking about?  If we cannot definitively decide that, and in most (if not 
every) society we cannot, then we are not talking about issues of “good” and “evil,” 
but opinions of better or worse, expediency versus obstruction, tyranny of the 
                                                
822 Crick, 69.  The difference between the thinkers of this thesis and Crick is that, though doubtful, 
Crick still promoted the idea of an active citizenry that could secure the long-term interests of society 
by “helping others.” (272)  Putting their faith in the citizenry would be asking too much of 
Montesquieu, Hume, or Burke; it was enough that they put faith in party. 
823 Rosenblum, 355. 
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majority versus tolerance of the minority, and organized moralities versus established 
law. 
Because of this inability to definitively decide the good in a society, 
constitutions cannot aim at securing the best, or even the good.  The end sought by a 
constitution cannot be an improved state of being; it must be an improved state of 
mind.  Constitutions can only aim at securing a shared opinion of the good, which 
brings us back to the definition of political liberty as given in the introduction: “that 
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in 
order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot 
fear another citizen.”824  Political liberty in a state is a shared opinion, and since it is 
shared by all (or all who are enfranchised), the constitution seeks to obstruct what is 
most expedient, tolerate minorities, and establish law that in its execution is 
independent of ever-shifting moral considerations.  This is indeed Shklar’s “liberalism 
of fear” that principled faction seeks to uphold.  In this way, the party politics of 
principled faction is prior to this improved state of mind; “the governors,” Hume 
reminds his reader, “have nothing to support them but opinion.”825  As Crick remarks, 
“If consensus is simply taken to mean that a high degree of agreement in fact exists 
about social values – all right; but this is more likely to be a product of politics than a 
condition.”826  Or, more to the point, “the moral consensus of a free state is not 
something mysteriously prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing 
activity) of politics itself.”827  The end may be “political liberty” but as that is an 
opinion, how that opinion is secured – party politics – becomes just as important as 
                                                
824 SPL, XI.6, 157. 
825 MPL, “On the First Principles of Government,” 32. 
826 Crick, 177.  
827 Ibid., 24. 
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the opinion itself.  The existence of party politics is antecedent to any opinion one can 
have of political liberty.   
Intolerant of party politics, singular faction seeks and encourages the 
expedient; it is intolerant of minorities; it seeks to merge the law with its own moral 
considerations.  Singular faction is doctrinaire.  It refuses to recognize the right of 
other factions to exist and argues, “that some of these groups must be eliminated 
urgently, illegally, and unpolitically if other great benefits are to follow.”828  Even 
though it is extremely hypocritical itself, it cannot abide the hypocrisy of others. 
Principled faction, on the other hand, obstructs by its very nature; it instructs 
men to tolerate and respect difference; it separates prejudice from law, local 
considerations from the national interest and teaches men to prefer the latter.  By 
doing these very things, it secures the opinion of political liberty in a state which, 
because each thinker recognized that political liberty is intangible, remains the best 
that can be secured in constitutional government.  Indeed, the constitutional operation 
of principled faction does not aim directly at an improved state of being, but a state of 
mind which provides the foundation for securing “justice” as well as “the advantages 
of society.”  This state of mind – this opinion of one’s liberty – encourages men to 
improve their state of being, from which they can tangibly secure the advantages of 
society.  Thus, the state of mind, engendered by party politics, is an opinion that, like 
Montesquieu’s false honor, “is as useful to the public as the true one would be to the 
individuals who could have it.”829  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
828 Ibid., 32. 
829 SPL, III.7, 27. 
300 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
 
 
Primary: 
Aristotle. The Politics. Edited and translated by T.A. Sinclair and Trevor J. Saunders.  
London: Penguin Books, 1981. 
 
Bolingbroke. “A Dissertation upon Parties” (1733-34) in Bolingbroke: Political  
Writings. Edited by David Armitage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. 
 
Cicero, On the Commonwealth. Edited by James E. G. Zetzel. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 1999. 
 
Burke, Edmund: 
- “Address to the King.” In The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund  
Burke, Vol. IX. (16 vols.) London: the Rivington Edition, 1803- 
1827.  
- An Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs. In Further Reflections on the  
Revolution in France. Edited by Daniel E. Ritchie. Indianapolis:  
Liberty Fund, 1992. 
- “A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly.” In Further Reflections  
on the Revolution in France. Edited by Daniel R. Ritchie.  
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992. 
- Letter to a Noble Lord. In Further Reflections on the Revolution in  
France. Edited by Daniel R. Ritchie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1992. 
- Letters on a Regicide Peace, “Letter 1. On the Overture of Peace.” In  
Select Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. 3. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,  
1999. 
- Letters on a Regicide Peace, “Letter 2. Genius and Character of the French  
Revolution.” In Select Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. 3. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999. 
- Letters on a Regicide Peace, “Letter 3. Proposals for Peace.” In Select  
Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. 3. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc.,  
1999. 
- Reflections on the Revolution in France. In Select Works of Edmund  
Burke, Vol. 2. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999. 
- Selected Letters of Edmund Burke. Edited by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.  
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
- “Speech on American Taxation” In Select Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. 1.  
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999. 
- “Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies.” In Select Works of Edmund  
Burke, Vol. 1. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999. 
- “Speech on the Reform of the Representation of the Commons in  
301 
 
Parliament.” In Select Works of Edmund Burke, Miscellaneous 
Writings. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999. 
- “Speech to the Electors of Bristol.” In Select Works of Edmund Burke,  
Miscellaneous Writings. Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, 1999. 
- “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents.” In Select Works of  
Edmund Burke, Vol. 1. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999. 
- “Thoughts and Details on Scarcity.” In The Writings and Speeches of  
Edmund Burke. Edited by R.B. McDowell, Vol. IX. New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
Ferguson, Adam. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Edited by Fania Oz- 
Salzberger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist: A Commentary  
on the Constitution of the United States. Edited by Robert Scigliano. New 
York: Modern Library, 2000. 
 
Hume, David: 
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited by Norman Kemp Smith.  
New York: Macmillan, 1947. 
- Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the  
Principles of Morals. Edited by P.H. Nidditch. 3rd ed. Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1982. 
- Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller.  
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987. 
- The History of England. Vols. 1-6 (based on 1778 ed.). Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1983. 
- The Letters of David Hume. Edited by J.Y.T. Greig. Vol. 1. Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1932. 
- A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the  
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Edited by  
P.H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
 
La Rochefoucauld. Maximes. Edited by Jacques Truchet. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1967. 
 
Mandeville, Bernard. The Fable of the Bees. 2 Vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,  
1988. 
 
Montesquieu: 
- “Avertissement de l’Auteur.” In Oeuvres complètes de Montesquieu II.  
Edited by Roger Caillois. Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1951. 
- Correspondance de Montesquieu. Edited by François Gebelin. Paris:  
Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1914. 
- “Éclaircissements sur L’Esprit des Lois.” In Oeuvres complètes de  
Montesquieu II. Edited by Roger Caillois. Paris: Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade, 1951. 
- The Spirit of the Laws. Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia  
Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
- Considerations on the Causes of The Greatness of the Romans and Their  
302 
 
Decline.   Translated and edited by David Lowenthal. Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Inc, 1999. 
- Considerations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romans et de Leur  
Décadence. Edited by Camille Jullian. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 
1921. 
- De l’Esprit des Lois. Edited by J. Ehrard. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1969. 
 
- Persian Letters. Translated and edited by C.J. Betts. London: Penguin  
Books, 2004. 
- Pensées; Le Spicèlege. Edited by Louis Desgraves. Paris: Robert Laffont,  
1991. 
 
Plato. Republic. Translated and edited by Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1998. 
 
Robespierre, Maximillien. Textes Choisis. Edited by Jean Poperen. 3 volumes. Paris:  
Editions Sociales, 1974.   
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings.  
Translated and edited by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
 
Secondary: 
Adair, Douglass. “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science.” In Fame and the  
Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglas Adair. Edited by Trevor Colbourn.  
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998. 
 
Aron, Raymond. Main Currents in Sociological Thought – 1. London: Weidenfeld  
and Nicolson, 1965. 
 
Berlin, Isaiah. Two Conceptions of Liberty. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. 
 
Black, Jeremy. The politics of Britain, 1688-1800. Manchester: Manchester  
University Press, 1993. 
 
Bok, Sissela. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage  
Books, 1999. 
 
Canavan, Francis: 
- The Political Reason of Edmund Burke. Durham: Duke University Press,  
1960. 
- “Burke on Prescription of Government.” In The Review of Politics Vol. 35  
No. 4 (Oct., 1973): 454-474. 
 
Carrithers, David W.: 
- “Not So Virtuous Republics: Montesquieu, Venice, and the Theory of  
Aristocratic Republicanism.” Journal of the History of Ideas 52 
(no. 2, Apr. – Jun., 1991): 245-268. 
- “Montesquieu’s Philosophy of History.” Journal of the History of Ideas 47  
303 
 
(Jan.-Mar., 1986): 61-80. 
 
Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History.  Edited by J. van der Dussen. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Conniff, James. The Useful Cobbler: Edmund Burke and the Politics of Progress.  
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
 
Cottle, Charles. “Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume’s Treatise.” Journal of the  
History of Ideas 40 no. 3 (Jul. 1979): 457-66. 
 
Courtney, C.P. Montesquieu and Burke. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1975. 
 
Crick, Bernard. In Defense of Politics. 4th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
1993. 
 
Danford, John. David Hume and the Problem of Reason: Recovering the Human  
Sciences. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. 
 
Davidson, Jenny. Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness: Manners and Morals from  
Locke to Austen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Day, John. “Hume on Justice and Allegiance.” Philosophy 40 (no. 151, Jan. 1965):  
35-56. 
 
Dees, Richard H.: 
- “Hume and the Contexts of Politics.” Journal of the History of Philosophy  
Vol. 30, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 219-42. 
- “Hume on the Characters of Virtue,” Journal of the History of Philosophy  
Vol. 35, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 45-64. 
 
Dovi, Suzanne. “‘Making the World Safe for Hypocrisy?” Polity Vol. 34, no. 1  
(Autumn, 2001): 3-30. 
 
Edmonds, David and John Edinow, Rousseau’s Dog. New York: Harper Collins,  
2006. 
 
Femia, Joseph V. “An historicist critique of ‘revisionist’ methods for studying the  
history of ideas.” In Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics.  
Edited by James Tully. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
 
Forbes, Duncan. Hume’s Philosophical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 1975. 
 
Ford, Franklin L. Robe and Sword: the Regrouping of the French Aristocracy After  
Louis XIV. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 
 
Fortescue, Sir John. The Correspondence of King George the Third: from 1760 to  
December 1783. London: Macmillan and Co., 1928. 
 
304 
 
Frohnen, Bruce. Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism: the Legacy of Burke and  
Tocqueville. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 
 
Gay, Peter. The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, The Rise of Modern Paganism.  
Vol. 1. London: Wildwood House, 1973. 
 
Goldie, Mark. “The English system of liberty.” In The Cambridge History of  
Eighteenth-Century Political Thought. Edited by Mark Goldie and Robert  
Wokler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Grant, Ruth W. Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of  
Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Gunn, J.A.W. Factions No More: Attitudes to Party Government and Opposition in  
Eighteenth Century England. London: Frank Cass, 1971. 
 
Gunnell, John G. “The Myth of the Tradition.” The American Political Science  
Review, Vol. 22, no. 1 (Mar., 1978): 122-134. 
 
Harrison, Jonathan. Hume’s Theory of Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. 
 
Haakonssen, Knud. “Introduction.” In David Hume: Political Essays. Edited by Knud  
Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Hampsher-Monk, Iain. The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke. New York:  
Longman Group, 1987. 
 
Herdt, Jennifer A. Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Herzog, Don. Cunning. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
Hill, B.W.: 
- The Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689-1742. Hamden, CT: Archon  
Books, 1976. 
- British Parliamentary Parties 1742-1832: From the Fall of Walpole to the  
First Reform Act. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. 
 
Hont, Istvan: 
- Jealousy of Trade. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
- “The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury.” In The  
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought. 
Edited by Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Hulliung, Mark. Montesquieu and the Old Regime. Los Angeles: University of  
California Press, 1976. 
 
Jennings, Jeremy “The Debate about Luxury in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century  
French Political Thought.” Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 68, no. 1 (Jan.,  
305 
 
2007): 79-105. 
 
Keohane, Nannerl O. Philosophy and the State in France. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1980. 
 
King, James. “Hume’s Classical Theory of Justice.” Hume Studies VII, no. 1 (Apr.  
1981): 32-54. 
 
Kirk, Russell. A Genius Reconsidered. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies  
Institute, 1997. 
 
Kramnick, Isaac. The Rage of Edmund Burke, Portrait of an Ambivalent  
Conservative. New York: Basic Books, 1977. 
 
Krause, Sharon: 
- Liberalism With Honor. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
- “The Uncertain Inevitability of Decline in Montesquieu.” Political Theory  
Vol. 30, no. 5 (Oct. 2002): 702-727. 
- “History and the Human Soul in Montesquieu.” History of Political  
Thought. Vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 235-261. 
- “Two Concepts of Liberty in Montesquieu.” Perspectives on Political  
Science. Vol. 34 no. 2 (spring 2005): 88-96.  
- “Frenzy, Gloom, and Spirit of Liberty in Hume.” In The Arts of Rule:  
Essays in Honor of Harvey C. Mansfield. Edited by Krause and  
McGrail. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. 
- Civil Passions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Lieberman, David. “The mixed constitution and the common law.” In The Cambridge  
History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought. Edited by Mark Goldie and  
Robert Wokler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Loy, J. Robert. Montesquieu. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1968. 
 
Lynch, Andrew J. “Montesquieu and the Ecclesiastical Critics of L’Esprit Des Lois.”  
Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 1977): 487-500. 
 
Macfarlane, Alan. The Riddle of the Modern World. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd,  
2000. 
 
MacNabb, D.G.C. David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality. 2nd ed.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966. 
 
Macpherson, C.B. Burke. New York: Hill & Wang, 1980. 
 
Manent, Pierre: 
- The City of Man.  Translated by Marc A. LePain. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1998. 
- An Intellectual History of Liberalism. Translated by Rebecca Balinski.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
306 
 
Manin, Bernard. The principles of representative government. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 1997. 
 
Mansfield Jr., Harvey C.: 
- America’s Constitutional Soul. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University  
Press, 1993. 
- Statesmanship and Party Government. Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 1965. 
- Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power. New  
York: The Free Press, 1989. 
 
Manzer, Robert A. “Hume’s Constitutionalism and the Identity of Constitutional  
Democracy.” American Political Science Review 90 no. 3 (Sept. 1996): 488- 
496. 
 
McIlwain, Charles Howard. Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern. Indianapolis:  
Liberty Fund, 1975. 
 
Mosher, Michael. “Monarchy’s Paradox: Honor in the Face of Sovereign Power.” In  
Montesquieu’s Science of Politics. Edited by David W. Carrithers, Michael A.  
Mosher & Paul A. Rahe. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2001.  
 
Miller, David. Philosophy and Ideology in Hume’s Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1981. 
 
Miller, William Ian. Faking It. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Mossner, E.C. The Life of David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. 
 
Norton, Anne. Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire. New Haven: Yale  
University Press, 2004. 
 
O’Brien, Conor Cruise. The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography of Edmund Burke.  
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
 
The Oxford Companion to British History. Revised edition. S.v. “Dunning’s Motion.”  
Edited by John Cannon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Oz-Salzberger, Fania. “Introduction.” In An Essay on the History of Civil Society.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Pangle, Thomas. Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism. Chicago: The University  
of Chicago Press, 1989. 
 
Parker, Christopher. The English Idea of History from Coleridge to Collingwood.  
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000. 
 
Phillipson, Nicholas T. Hume. St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1989. 
 
307 
 
Pocock, J.G.A.: 
- The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. 
- Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History.  
New York: Atheneum, 1971. 
- Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1985. 
- “The Political Economy of Burke’s Analysis of the French Revolution.”  
The Historical Journal Vol. 25 no. 2, (June, 1982): 331-349. 
 
Rahe, Paul A. Republics: Ancient & Modern. Chapel Hill: The University of North  
Carolina Press, 1992.  
 
Richter, Melvin. The Political Theory of Montesquieu. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 1977. 
 
Rhodes, James M. “Philosophy, Revelation, and Political Theory: Leo Strauss and  
Eric Vogelin.” The Journal of Politics 49 (Nov. 1987): 1036-1060. 
 
Robbins, Caroline. “‘Discordant Parties’: A Study of the Acceptance of Party by  
Englishmen.” Political Science Quarterly 73 no. 4 (Dec., 1958): 505-529. 
 
Robertson, John. “Scottish Enlightenment at the limits of the civic tradition.” In  
Wealth and Virtue: the shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish  
Enlightenment. Edited by Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1983. 137-178. 
 
Rosenblum, Nancy L. On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and  
Partisanship. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Runciman, David. Political Hypocrisy: the mask of power from Hobbes to Orwell and  
beyond. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Sabine, George. History of Political Theory. London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 
1951. 
 
Shackleton, Robert. Montesquieu: A Critical Biography. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1961. 
 
Shklar, Judith: 
- Montesquieu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
- Ordinary Vices. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 
 
Skinner, Quentin: 
- Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
- “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and Theory  
Vol. 8 no. 1 (1969): 3-53. 
 
Sorel, Albert. Montesquieu. Paris: Coulommiers, 1887. 
 
Spurlin, Paul Merrill. Montesquieu in America. Louisiana: Louisiana State University  
308 
 
Press, 1940. 
 
Stanlis, Peter J. Edmund Burke: The Enlightenment and Revolution. New Brunswick:  
Transaction Publishers, 1991. 
 
Stewart, John B. Opinion and Reform in Hume’s Political Philosophy. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Strauss, Leo: 
- “Political Philosophy and History.” Journal of the History of Ideas 10 
(Jan. 1949): 30-50. 
- “What is Political Philosophy?” The Journal of Politics 19 (Aug. 1957):  
343-368. 
- Art and the Persecution of Writing. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952. 
 
Waddicor, Mark H. Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law. The Hague:  
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. 
 
Wills, Garry. Explaining America: The Federalist. New York: Doubleday and Co.,  
1981. 
 
Whelan, Frederick G. “Time, Revolution, and Prescriptive Right in Hume’s Theory of  
Government.” Utilitas 7 no. 1 (May 2005): 97-119. 
 
 
